Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI2502
2007-11-19 10:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN ON COMPETING UN

Tags:  PGOV TW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9817
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #2502/01 3231053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191053Z NOV 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7408
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7447
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9042
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9249
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2200
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0657
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8735
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1473
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6174
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002502 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2022
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN ON COMPETING UN
REFERENDA AND UPCOMING ELECTIONS

Classified By: Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002502 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2022 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN KUAN ON COMPETING UN REFERENDA AND UPCOMING ELECTIONS Classified By: Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: KMT Vice Chairman John Kuan told the Deputy Director November 14 that China now understands better why the KMT had to launch its own referendum to remain competitive in next year's presidential race. Kuan, echoing others in the KMT, predicted low voter turnout and high thresholds for passage would doom both UN referenda to failure. Kuan insisted the large number of signatures in support of the DPP UN referendum is not a reliable indicator of public support and argued that U.S. opposition has reduced public support for the DPP UN referendum. He stated that KMT-governed cities and counties will disregard the CEC decision requiring a "one-stage" voting process for upcoming legislative election and related referenda, regardless of the consequences. Finally, Kuan predicted the KMT might win at or near a 69-44 seat majority in the next legislature, but noted the DPP would likely try to use the legislative defeat to energize Green voters for the presidential election. End Summary. COMMENT -------------- ¶2. (C) John Kuan, the KMT's top election strategist, was primarily responsible for the party's controversial decision to promote its own UN referendum as a way to counter the expected effects of the DPP referendum on the presidential election. While Kuan and some other KMT contacts maintain that the DPP's UN referendum is unlikely to pass, a DPP pollster has told AIT that introduction of the KMT referendum increases the likelihood that the DPP referendum will pass because a significant number of Blue voters is likely to cross party lines and vote for both referenda. While Kuan argues that U.S. opposition has reduced support for the DPP UN referendum, some pro-Green contacts argue that U.S. and, especially, PRC opposition stirs up the Green base, increases support for the UN referendum and other DPP causes, and allows President Chen to portray himself as bravely standing up to outside pressure. CHINA GETS KMT REFERENDUM -------------- ¶3. (C) John Kuan (Kuan Chung) told the Deputy Director that he had recently returned from Jinan University in Guangzhou, China, where he had delivered a speech on the KMT UN referendum. Kuan said he told his PRC audience that the KMT had styled its UN
referendum to recognize the Taiwan people's desire for international respect and living space, but defused the "name rectification" issue to avoid damaging Taiwan's relations with the U.S. and China. Kuan told the Deputy Director that he met with several academics and local party members, and is hopeful that his message was relayed to Beijing. ¶4. (C) Kuan stated his belief that Beijing now understood better why the KMT had to launch its own UN referendum to dilute the appeal of the DPP version and to remain competitive in the presidential race. Immediately after the KMT announced its referendum, he continued, Beijing harshly criticized the decision. Since then, PRC leaders have largely kept quiet, suggesting to Kuan they understand and accept the KMT's rationale for the referendum. On the home front, Kuan added, the KMT is doing its best to attract referendum supporters, but many Blue voters care little about the referendum, especially in the south where the focus is on the economy and its poor performance. REFERENDA WON'T PASS -------------- ¶5. (C) Kuan said he could not predict how Beijing might react if one or both of the UN referenda were to pass, but argued that chances of that happening were extremely low. He explained that voter turnout for Taiwan presidential elections has never exceeded 80 percent of eligible voters, and cited a recent study by DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui that suggested voter frustration would keep turnout for next year's presidential election at or below 75 percent. A TAIPEI 00002502 002 OF 003 referendum is only valid if at least 50 percent of all eligible voters participate, and will pass if a simple majority of them vote in favor. ¶6. (C) Taiwan has approximately 18 million eligible voters, Kuan continued. If turnout is limited to 75 percent, only 13.5 million voters will participate in the presidential election and referendum ballot. With the electorate so polarized, Kuan argued, Blue supporters will likely only cast ballots in favor of the KMT referendum, and Green voters will only support the DPP version. According to Kuan, the electorate is also roughly split along Blue-Green lines (approx. 6.75 million voters each). By Kuan's reasoning, even if all 6.75 million DPP voters endorsed the DPP referendum, some 2.25 million Blue voters would have to cross party lines for it to surpass the 9 million voter threshold, which Kuan argued is a virtual impossibility. REFERENDA SUPPORT WEAKENING? -------------- ¶7. (C) Kuan told the Deputy Director that U.S. opposition to the DPP UN referendum had noticeably dampened public support for the measure. According to Kuan, 75 percent of the public supported the DPP UN referendum before U.S. officials began to criticize it. Following the public statements from Deputy Secretary Negroponte, NSC Senior Director Wilder, and DAS SIPDIS Christensen, public support is down to 57 percent. Additionally, 39 percent of those polled said U.S. opposition to the measure would affect their referendum voting decisions (39 percent would also ignore U.S. opposition). Kuan acknowledged the DPP has obtained more than twice the signatures required to get its UN measure on the ballot, but insisted such numbers were not indicative of actual support for it, since members of the public "will often sign whatever is put in front of them." KMT ON VOTING: MIGHT MAKES RIGHT -------------- ¶8. (C) Kuan told the Deputy Director the KMT expects the DPP-controlled Central Election Commission (CEC) to order a "one-stage" balloting process, versus the "two-stage" process urged by the KMT. If that happens, the KMT would have "no choice" but to disregard the CEC's decision, Kuan said. (Note: On Nov. 16 the CEC decided to use the one-stage voting process for the Jan. 12 legislative elections and non-UN referenda. End note.) Kuan argued that the local election commissions, and not the CEC, are vested with the authority to make balloting and procedural decisions. Regardless of what the law says, he added, KMT-controlled cities and counties could probably disregard the CEC decision with impunity. KMT mayors and magistrates govern 18 of Taiwan's 25 city and county electoral districts, accounting for 70 percent of Taiwan's population, Kuan explained. If the local election commissions in those 18 jurisdictions use a "two-stage" process in violation of the CEC decision, he asked, what can the central government do? It cannot order the arrest and removal from office of so many local leaders without provoking a public outcry, Kuan insisted, and any lesser punishment (i.e. censure) would simply be shrugged off. ¶9. (C) Kuan added that existing voter registration requirements made it illegal to combine the presidential and referendum votes on one ballot. Voters must be registered at least four months in advance of a presidential election to participate, but at least six months in advance of any referendum vote. If the two ballots are combined, Kuan argued, it would be possible for those registered only four months in advance to vote on the referendum. KMT LEGISLATIVE CHANCES GOOD -------------- ¶10. (C) The KMT is confident of winning as many as 22 of the 39 at-large legislative seats and 44 of the 74 district seats (including 5 of 6 aboriginal seats) up for grabs in next January's election, Kuan said. (Note: Others have told AIT the KMT can count on winning up to 18 at-large seats and up TAIPEI 00002502 003 OF 003 to 50 district seats. End note.) If all goes well, Kuan continued, the KMT will have a solid 69-44 majority in the next LY. The downside, Kuan lamented, is that the DPP may try to use its legislative defeat to persuade voters to "balance" the government by voting for a DPP president. But the conventional wisdom in Taiwan is that legislators who share party affiliation with the president do better at delivering government projects to their districts. If local self-interest trumps the desire for split government, Kuan concluded, a KMT LY victory will help Ma get elected. FISSURES IN THE KMT -------------- ¶11. (C) Kuan admitted that the KMT list of at-large legislative candidates had exposed divisions within the party, which he characterized as "tempests in a teapot." The new, smaller LY districts have forced legislative candidates to become more "local," Kuan explained. To craft a competitive at-large list, Kuan continued, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung had to favor candidates with strong local ties, at the expense of more reform-minded, but less locally-connected candidates, who publicly criticized the party. Kuan insisted that the KMT is more unified than it has ever been at this stage of the legislative and presidential elections, but conceded that it must do more to avoid public contradictions between its central leadership, legislative candidates, and Ma. HSIEH'S PROBLEM: PRESIDENT CHEN -------------- ¶12. (C) DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh is at a significant disadvantage, Kuan asserted, because he cannot distinguish his own policies from President Chen's without being contradicted by him. According to Kuan, Deep-Greens view Hsieh with suspicion because his "moderate" statements on cross-Strait relations have caused them to question his commitment to Taiwan independence. ¶13. (C) Kuan told the Deputy Director that there is little chance that a viable "third force" could emerge in Taiwan politics during this electoral cycle, but it might be possible during the next presidential election (in 2012). Former president and TSU spiritual leader Lee Teng-hui is trying to bring this change about, Kuan continued, and Ma and the KMT have taken special pains to show proper respect to Lee and to avoid offending him. Ma does not expect Lee to endorse him for president, Kuan noted, but Lee's continued criticism of Chen and the DPP would almost certainly help Ma at the polls. YOUNG

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -