FM HUANG ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CAMPAIGN RHETORIC,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002459 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2032 TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW SUBJECT: FM HUANG ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CAMPAIGN RHETORIC, AND NORTH KOREA REF: TAIPEI 2445 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Foreign Minister James Huang expressed general confidence over the state of Taiwan's relations with its 24 remaining diplomatic allies, which bear watching but evidence no major changes in the near term. At the same time, he expressed concern that Beijing might try to spring a surprise in the run up to legislative and presidential elections, to which the Director responded that we too are concerned about surprises, both from Beijing and from President Chen. Huang expressed particular interest in the status of six-party talks over North Korea, explaining that events in Korea had already twice determined the course of Taiwan's future -- 1895 and 1950. FM Huang, who plans to visit the U.S. in early December, said President Chen has not yet decided whether he will attend the January 14 inauguration of Guatemalan president-elect Alvaro Colom, but indicated this could involve a transit request. End summary. ¶2. (C) FM James Huang held a broad-ranging discussion on Nov. 7 with the Director and Deputy Director on Taiwan's foreign policy. Huang had originally requested a meeting with the Director on Oct. 24 to discuss Beijing's ten-day delay in transmitting to Taiwan a WHO health warning about tainted Thailand corn exports. In the Director's absence on official travel to Kaohsiung, MOFA separately passed the information to AIT (reported reftel). Huang told DIR that he plans to attend the TECRO chief of missions conference in Atlanta in early December, after which he will continue on to visit Taiwan allies in Central America, including the Dominican Republic, Panama and perhaps Guatemala. Taiwan Diplomacy Review -------------- ¶3. (C) FM Huang was generally confident about the state of Taiwan's relations with its eleven Caribbean and Central American "allies," as Taiwan terms them. He told DIR that Guatemala president-elect Alvaro Colom intends to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Noting that he had been in the room with President Chen an hour earlier when Chen telephoned Colom to offer congratulations, Huang said that Colom had expressed warm, friendly feelings toward Taiwan. He recalled to Chen that only Taiwan had offered support to Guatemala's National Foundation for Peace when Colom was Secretary-General during the early 1990's civil war years. SIPDIS Huang said President Chen has not yet decided whether he will attend Colom's January 14 presidential inauguration. DIR noted that he could not predict what the U.S. response might be to a transit request, to which Huang responded that such a transit would be wholly focused on Guatemala and the region and, he assured, would not cause the U.S. concern. ¶4. (C) The state of relations with Nicaragua also appear stable, Huang told DIR. President Ortega and President Chen got along very well on Chen's recent visit to Nicaragua, spending a total of thirteen hours together touring the countryside. Panama, on the other hand, is always of concern to Taipei. The fact that a PRC shipping company is the number one user of the Panama Canal and Panama as a UNSC member interacts closely with the PRC has raised Taiwan's antennae, he noted. Nevertheless, President Torrijos has twice promised President Chen that he would not shift Panama's recognition from Taipei to Beijing during the TAIPEI 00002459 002 OF 004 remainder of Chen's term of office. ¶5. (C) Huang said that Costa Rica's shift and recognition of Beijing had not led to an exodus of Taiwan's Central American allies. While Taipei is closely watching reports of Vatican interaction with Beijing, moreover, Huang said a shift by the Vatican would not likely have a significant effect on Taiwan's heavily Catholic Central American allies. ¶6. (C) FM Huang told DIR that Taiwan's diplomatic ties with its five South Pacific allies remain stable. Recent presidential elections in the Marshall Islands and Kiribati had not negatively affected Taiwan's relations with either nation. Relations with the Solomon Islands (SI) were also in good shape, he said, thought he expressed concern that Australian policy concerns might undermine these relations. DIR responded that the Australians -- and the U.S. -- are indeed quite concerned about Taiwan's relations with the SI government, and he urged Taiwan to stay in close communication with Australia. Huang assured DIR that MOFA officials regularly meet and have a good working relationship with Australian representatives in Taipei. Playing with Taiwan Politics -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite the above current stability in Taiwan's foreign relations, Huang told DIR that he is concerned Beijing might try for another diplomatic strike against Taiwan before the January 12 Legislative Yuan (LY) or March 22 presidential elections in an effort to embarrass the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). DIR noted that such a move by Beijing might be conterproductive, much as its heavy-handed actions in 1996 and 2000 had actually helped the then-opposition DPP presidential candidates. Huang responded that Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and its foreign policy establishment were not in accord and often at odds. While the TAO had grown much more sophisticated in its understanding of democratic Taiwan, MOFA and company still resorted to harsh tactics, as in August 2006 when Beijing got Chad to break relations with Taiwan just before then-Premier Su Tseng-chang took off for a visit to Chad. Similarly embittering Taiwan, he said, Beijing coaxed Nauru to break relations with Taiwan on the very day in July 2002 on which Chen Shui-bian took over as DPP Chairman. ¶8. (C) The most critical period facing Taiwan diplomacy, Huang mused, could be the period between the March 22 presidential election and May 20 inauguration. If DPP candidate Frank Hsieh wins, he suggested, Beijing might try to humiliate Chen Shui-bian as a parting shot, so deep is Beijing's animosity toward Chen. DIR asked whether Chen himself might try to elicit a negative reaction from Beijing before or after the presidential election on the logic that heavy-handed PRC actions have historically benefited the DPP. Huang denied the possibility, insisting Chen would not consider trying to stir up a Beijing reaction before the elections, nor would he try to stir up controversy after the presidential election. Curiosity About DPRK -------------- ¶9. (C) FM Huang queried DIR on the state of North Korea negotiations. DIR explained that we are working to open DPRK nuclear facilities and move toward full disclosure. The actual destruction of nuclear weapons will be the most TAIPEI 00002459 003 OF 004 difficult phase of the negotiation process. Regarding reports that the six-party talks might be expanded into a more permanent regional grouping, DIR told FM Huang that Assistant Secretary Hill had made clear to Beijing that the purview of such a grouping would not include Taiwan. Huang asked if the U.S. has a timetable for removing the DPRK from the state terrorism list and for recognizing the DPRK. Reiterating that the six-party talks are now focused on the nuclear facilities issue and on disclosure, DIR asked why Huang was so focused on the DPRK issue. Because, Huang replied, the fate of Taiwan has twice been determined by Korea -- once in 1895, when the Sino-Japanese War started there and ended with Beijing ceding Taiwan to Japan, and in 1950, when the Korean War locked the U.S. into supporting the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Stresses in U.S.-Taiwan Relations -------------- ¶10. (C) Noting U.S.-Taiwan relations have been under considerable stress for some months, the DIR told Huang that the two sides should work closely to manage bilateral relations over the coming months. He explained that in their Oct. 31 phone conversation, Deputy Secretary Negroponte had asked him to assure Taiwan authorities that the U.S. has warm feelings toward Taiwan and great respect for Taiwan's democracy, economic development and bilateral security cooperation. The Deputy Secretary had emphasized that both the U.S. and Taiwan need to work together on issues of concern, such as the UN referenda. DIR also noted his meeting with Under Secretary Burns in Washington in September, in which the Under Secretary stressed the importance of preserving our close relations with Taiwan through this difficult period. Both of these conversations, DIR noted, reveal the level of concern in Washington over the stresses that have developed in the relationship and our determination to prevent this from producing any lasting damage to our historically very close ties. ¶11. (C) In response, FM Huang urged the U.S. to distinguish campaign rhetoric from government policy. For example, he said, President Chen's "four wants," which had disturbed Washington, really "have no impact on policy at all." PRC concern that President Chen might make some dramatic independence announcement in mid-September were unfounded, he argued, for President Chen had never even considered making such an announcement. DIR responded that President Chen is an energetic campaigner, but he sometimes tends to rhetorical excess and needs to understand that he is speaking at all times to several audiences, not just his immediate campaign rally audience. In the real world, Chen's campaign rhetoric does have an impact and can elicit responses. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) In his discussion of Taiwan's diplomatic situation, FM Huang was quite relaxed, despite the foreign policy crises he has weathered and the constant PRC pressure on Taiwan's diplomatic partners. Given the number of times Huang has made urgent requests for U.S. assistance upon getting wind of impending diplomatic changes, Taiwan apparently has no indication of any imminent threat to its remaining 24 diplomatic relationships. Huang's queries about DPRK negotiations, whether for the historical reasons he indicated or to reinforce Taiwan's own cross-Strait separation, enabled DIR to highlight the broad range of U.S. interaction and TAIPEI 00002459 004 OF 004 cooperation with the PRC on issues of high importance to the U.S. and to regional security. YOUNG