MAINLAND AFFAIRS CHAIR ACKNOWLEDGES HU JINTAO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002347 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2032 TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW SUBJECT: MAINLAND AFFAIRS CHAIR ACKNOWLEDGES HU JINTAO FLEXIBILITY; EXPECTS NO PROGRESS UNDER CHEN SHUI-BIAN REF: TAIPEI 2343 Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang. Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman Chen Min-tong acknowledged to AIT that PRC President Hu Jintao's October 15 CCP Party Congress statement was somewhat more conciliatory than previous statements on Taiwan. He speculated, however, that this "softer" message was intended at best to signal possible flexibility in the post-Chen Shui-bian period, since Beijing distrusts Presient Chen too deeply to deal with him. MAC press guidance issued October 16 expressed Taiwan's desire for peace, parallelling Hu's language, but rejected Hu's insistence on the "one-China Principle" as a precondition for negotiations and called on the PRC to repeal its Anti-Secession Law and stop pressuring Taiwan in the international community and threatening Taiwan militarily. End Summary. A Softer Touch -------------- ¶2. (C) MAC Chairman Chen Min-tong met with AIT Acting Director on Oct. 16 to discuss Taiwan's response to Hu Jintao's 17th Party Congress statement in Beijing the previous day. Chairman Chen acknowledged that Hu's statement was somewhat "softer" and more conciliatory than previous PRC statements toward Taiwan insofar as it avoided references to the UN Referendum and Anti-Secession Law and proposed a "peace agreement." Chen sees Hu as a more "practical" leader who "sincerely" wants to resolve the cross-Strait issue and may be willing to be more flexible, especially in dealing with Taiwan in international organizations. While acknowledging that Hu has strong leadership qualities, Chen said Taiwan is still uncertain whether Hu has consolidated his party and government leadership sufficient to allow him this increased flexibility. In any event, Chen continued, Hu does not appear in a hurry to negotiate with Taiwan and seems content to wait until after Taiwan's March 2008 presidential election. ¶3. (C) Chairman Chen assessed that Hu Jintao has a dual purpose behind his comments on Taiwan. On the one hand, Hu was actually speaking to Chen Shui-bian's successor. Beijing, Chen said, deeply distrusts President Chen, has already broken off negotiations on tourism and charter flights, and has no intention of dealing with Chen for the remainder of his term. On the other hand, Chairman Chen continued, Hu was also talking to the U.S. and the international community seeking to portray China as conciliatory, in part, he argued, so they would be on China's side in the event China felt compelled to take action against Taiwan. Taiwan Responds -------------- ¶4. (C) Chairman Chen then handed ADIR a copy of MAC's just-completed press release, which was less negative and dismissive of Hu's statement than the initial reactions by both MAC officials and government spokesman Shieh Jhy-wey the previous day, Oct. 15 (see reftel). Chen acknowledged that the MAC press statement had not been approved by the President, who had strongly criticized the Hu statement that morning, Oct. 16, as tantamount to Taiwan surrendering to the PRC. The basic points, however, are identical. The MAC press release began on a more conciliatory note: "Peace is the common language of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait." It then lamented that Hu Jintao had waited for five years to respond to Chen Shui-bian's January 2003 proposal to establish a "reciprocal framework for building peace and stability." Hu's "one China principle," the statement continued, remained the main obstacle to peace talks. It must be dropped, the Anti-Secession Law rescinded, and the missiles removed before cross-Strait negotiations could proceed TAIPEI 00002347 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) More generally, Chairman Chen told ADIR that he saw the possible emergence of a virtuous cycle, beginning with President Bush's positive statements on Taiwan democracy at the APEC summit in Sydney last month. President Chen, he maintained, had responded by working to moderate the DPP's "normal country" resolution despite strong resistance from the "deep green" faction. Now, Hu Jintao has made what appears to be a more conciliatory speech in Beijing. Chairman Chen expressed the hope that this might end the vicious downward cycle of statements, of which President Chen's "four wants" were a part, though, he hastened to add, wholly caused by PRC provocation. Flexibility on UN Referenda? -------------- ¶6. (C) In this connection, Chen then discussed the possibility of the Legislative Yuan (LY) coming up with a third referendum that could be more acceptable to the United States and/or the PRC. (Note: Section 16 of the 2003 Referendum Law empowers the LY to directly initiate referenda by majority vote.) Chen stressed that the two current UN referenda are not likely to pass next March. He said that he had just come from a day at the LY, which is actively discussing a third, more generic UN referendum on Taiwan joining the UN but without specifying under what name. Chen said this alternative is more likely to be approved in the referendum and suggested it may be more acceptable to the U.S. ADIR reminded him that U.S. policy continues to be that we do not support Taiwan membership in international organizations that require statehood as a prerequisite for membership. At the same time, ADIR remarked personally that such an alternative would at least address the "name change" issue to some extent. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) MAC Chairman Chen Min-tong and SEF Chairman Hong Chi-chang (reftel) are interpreting Hu Jintao's Oct. 16 statement as a softer, more conciliatory approach by Beijing. They acknowledged that both Beijing and President Chen appear to have given up on cross-Strait prospects during the remainder of Chen's term. They do, however, see possible signals to Taiwan's next president, who will be elected in March 2008. MAC's Oct. 16 press release was more positive in tone than the initial rejection the previous day. WANG