MIXED REACTIONS TO PRC PRESIDENT HU JINTAO'S 17TH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002343

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: MIXED REACTIONS TO PRC PRESIDENT HU JINTAO'S 17TH
PARTY CONGRESS REMARKS ON TAIWAN POLICY

REF: BEIJING 6673

Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In response to PRC President Hu Jintao's
proposal to negotiate a cross-Strait peace agreement
(reftel),Taiwan's DPP government argues that such an
agreement is impossible so long as Beijing insists that
Taipei accept its "one China principle." While comments by
most DPP leaders were measured albeit negative, government
spokesman Shieh Jyh-wei went overboard in blasting Beijing
for human rights violations and backing the military junta in
Burma. Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Chen Ming-tong told
the Acting Director that Hu's speech was somewhat more
conciliatory than previous statements about Taiwan. He
attributed this softening to an initiative to reach out to
Taiwan's next president, who will be elected in March 2008,
and to win the international community over to Beijing's
side. Two contacts close to DPP presidential candidate Frank
Hsieh saw the softer tone of Hu's message as reflecting a
desire to maintain a stable, low-key Taiwan policy at this
time, while keeping room open for the future development of
cross-Strait relations. KMT presidential candidate Ma
Ying-jeou was reluctant to endorse Hu's remarks, both for
policy reasons and to avoid being portrayed as Beijing's
candidate, which could hurt his presidential chances. End
Summary.


2. (C) From Taiwan's perspective, PRC President Hu Jintao's
17th party congress remarks on Taiwan were most noteworthy
for refraining from threatening language and for calling for
consultations on the basis of the one-China principle to
negotiate a formal end to the state of cross-Strait
hostilities and reach a peace agreement. Despite Hu's
seemingly conciliatory message, the initial official
responses here were negative to a greater or lesser extent.

DPP Reactions to Hu's Speech
--------------


3. (SBU) The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) issued a
five-paragraph statement on October 15, asserting that
Taiwan's sovereignty and decisions about the future belong to
the 23 million people of Taiwan. According to MAC, the
biggest obstacle in cross-Strait relations is China's effort
to force the "one-China principle" on the Taiwan people. MAC
urged Beijing to abandon the one-China framework, abolish the
Anti-Secession Law (ASL),stop suppressing Taiwan
internationally, and remove weapons targeting Taiwan.
Without any preconditions, Beijing should open discussions
with the elected government of Taiwan for the normal
development of cross-Strait relations, the elimination of
cross-Strait hostility, and the achievement of genuine
cross-Strait peace and stability.


4. (SBU) President Chen on October 16 charged that Hu's
offer was an agreement for Taiwan to surrender to the PRC.
Similar to the MAC statement, Chen raised three conditions
for cross-Strait peace talks: China must renounce its
"one-China" principle, revoke the ASL, and remove its 988
missiles targeting Taiwan.


5. (SBU) Shieh Jhy-wey, Taiwan's controversial government
spokesman, was typically outspoken in comments on October 15:
"The Taiwanese and Chinese can stand together for democracy
and human rights, but we will never discuss peace,
unification or any other issues with a regime that bullies
and suppresses Tibet, kills its own people and backs the
military junta in Myanmar." Outgoing DPP International
Affairs Director Lai I-chung stated that Hu's remarks were
not new and were unrealistic as majority public opinion does
not support one China; one country, two systems; or peaceful
unification. "Both sides can only reconcile if China stops
its military intimidation and diplomatic oppression and
recognizes Taiwan's existence," Lai argued.


6. (C) In a meeting with AIT Acting Director Robert Wang on
Oct. 16, MAC Chairman Chen Ming-tong acknowledged that Hu's

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statement was somewhat softer and more conciliatory than
previous PRC statements toward Taiwan. Chairman Chen
assessed Hu's motives as twofold. First, Hu was actually
speaking to Chen Shui-bian's successor rather than to Chen
himself, since Beijing does not trust President Chen and has
no intention of dealing with him for the remainder of his
term. Second, Hu was speaking to the U.S. and the
international community seeking to project a conciliatory
image so that the international community would be on China's
side should Beijing feel provoked into taking action against
Taiwan. Chairman Chen handed the Acting Director a press
release his staff had prepared earlier on Oct. 16, which was
more conciliatory in tone than the previous day's MAC
statement. The Oct. 16 statement began by observing that
"Peace is the common language of the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait." It then lamented that Hu Jintao had waited five
years to respond to Chen Shui-bian's January 2003 proposal
for establishing a "reciprocal framework for building peace
and stability," and argued that Hu's continued insistence on
the "one China principle" was the political obstacle to peace
talks. The statement then concluded by restating the four
demands from the previous day's statement (see para 3).


7. (C) In comments to AIT, TECRO Council Member Corey Chen,
a close advisor to DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh,
criticized Spokesman Shieh Jyh-wei for going overboard in
responding to Hu's remarks. The Hsieh camp sees no reason to
stir up Beijing with emotional overreactions, which could
lead the PRC to raise the position of Taiwan on its list of
priorities. In Hsieh's view, Corey Chen said, Beijing is
focused on leadership realignment and difficult domestic
issues at this time, and Taiwan is not Hu's top priority.
While he deals with other issues, Hu wants to keep the Taiwan
situation stable, Corey Chen maintained, adding that not too
much should be read into Hu's remarks on Taiwan. The
cross-Strait issue needs to be managed carefully but there is
no hurry to find an ultimate resolution. The two sides
should not force each other to reprioritize the cross-Strait
issue. Hu's remarks are a positive gesture, which helps
preserve space for the two sides to develop relations in the
future. By not issuing a (critical) statement in response to
Hu, Hsieh wants to preserve room for future flexibility.


8. (C) Legislator Bikhim Hsiao, Frank Hsieh's international
affairs director, noted to AIT that some people in Taiwan had
been expecting Hu to deliver a threatening message to Taiwan
in response to the DPP's UN referendum. The absence of
strong language was a good sign, despite the standard
rhetoric of Hu's message. The UN referendum is just one
issue, and as a big country, the PRC needs to think broadly
and long-term. Hsiao said it was positive that Hu's speech
did not cut off room for future possibilities.


9. (C) The Blue take on the "official" DPP reaction
reflected their theory that Chen wants to stir up
cross-Strait tensions to undermine the KMT and help the DPP
election campaign. In a discussion with AIT, National Taiwan
University Professor Philip Yang argued that the strong DPP
rejection reflected the frustration of President Chen and his
party that Hu's statement was "too mild." Thus, the
government spokesman moved to highlight the PRC's mean side
by pointing to human rights problems and Beijing's support
for the oppressive Burmese regime. Along similar lines,
pro-Blue CCK Foundation President Chu Yun-han expressed
concern that a frustrated President Chen might further
escalate his rhetoric in hopes of eliciting more negative
responses from Beijing.

KMT Reactions
--------------


10. (SBU) KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's initial
response on October 15 to Hu's speech was cautious and rather
negative, stressing that "one China is the Republic of China,
and to have meaning, cross-Strait consultations must be
conducted in accordance with this principle." Ma also
declared that "it should be the Taiwan people who determine
Taiwan's future, no matter what decision they arrive at,"
without CCP intervention. The next day (Oct. 16),Ma

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repeated the same ideas, but was somewhat more positive,
crediting Hu for making some progress by offering to talk
with Taiwan on the conclusion of a peace agreement, which he
noted had become his and the KMT's platform. He suggested
that the two sides use the "1992 consensus" and "one China,
different definitions" as the basis for resuming talks on an
agreement to end cross-Strait hostilities.


11. (C) Comments by other KMT leaders were more positive.
Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung affirmed Hu's support for cross-Strait
consultations and a peace treaty to end hostilities. KMT
legislator Su Chi, who is close to Ma, pointed out that Hu's
language on the cross-Strait peace agreement came from the
April 2005 joint press communique released by Hu and KMT
Chairman Lien Chan. Su Chi told AIT that Hu's speech was not
bad, though Hu maintained the standard line toward Taiwan.
Su predicted that Hu's authority to deal with Taiwan policy
would be strengthened during his second five-year term. He
also observed that the PRC, which does not agree with the
KMT's UN referendum, is still blinded by ideology and does
not understand electoral politics despite its increased
contacts with the KMT.


12. (C) Ma Ying-jeou's reluctance to endorse Hu's statement
was "to be expected," Chu Yun-han told AIT, as Ma needs to
avoid being perceived as a PRC "fellow traveler," which could
hurt his election campaign. However, many KMT supporters
were dismayed by Ma's less than positive reaction to what
they saw as Hu Jintao's generally accommodating statement on
Taiwan. According to Chu, Ma has shifted away from a "Taipei
mindset" during his ongoing island-wide "long-stay" campaign
as he focuses on trying to boost support for his presidential
campaign from Taiwanese voters, who are often sympathetic to
Green arguments.


13. (C) Philip Yang, who is in Taipei this week between
visits to Beijing, told AIT he believes Beijing "understands
Taiwan political dynamics" better now than in previous
elections. Hu's relatively accommodating statement on Taiwan
demonstrates that the PRC realizes threats against Taiwan
tend to backfire and, in this case, would only boost Frank
Hsieh's campaign. Hu's softer rhetoric also indicates that
he is comfortable with his power position and does not need
to beat up on Taiwan to consolidate his leadership, Yang
suggested, adding that he did not expect Beijing to make
further strong negative statements before the presidential
election that could play into DPP hands.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Most people here appear relieved at the relatively
moderate tone of Hu's speech. The DPP government will work
to convince the public that the PRC position has not changed,
and that Beijing, not Taipei, is responsible for the standoff
in cross-Strait political relations. President Chen and the
DPP may take Hu's soft tone as an indication that it is safe
to proceed with the controversial UN referendum. Frank
Hsieh, who supports the UN referendum, will see Hu's message
as signaling a possible cross-Strait opening if he is elected
president, and therefore he will resist further Deep Green
moves that could provoke cross-Strait tensions. Ma Ying-jeou
will of course see Hu's speech as a positive development but
he must avoid being perceived as Beijing's candidate in order
to convince Taiwanese voters that he and the KMT will not
sell them out to the PRC. No one here, however, sees much of
a chance that serious cross-Strait negotiations will resume
before President Chen steps down next spring.
WANG