TAIWAN ANALYST COMMENTS ON PRC REACTION TO DPP UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002333

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION)

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2032
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ANALYST COMMENTS ON PRC REACTION TO DPP UN
REFERENDUM

REF: TAIPEI 2014

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Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang.
Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Taiwan cross-Strait expert Lin Chong-pin
told AIT that he assesses the PRC as very unlikely to
"overreact" to the ruling DPP's UN referendum. He
acknowledged, however, that Beijing is exerting direct and
indirect pressures on Taiwan authorities in opposition to DPP
the referendum. Professor Lin, who served as Vice Minister
of Defense in 2003-2004, is widely respected as an
independent analyst of military affairs and cross-strait
relations and has traveled regularly to mainland China. End
Summary.


2. (C) During a meeting on October 9, Foundation on
International and Cross-Strait Studies (FICSS) President Lin
Chong-pin told AIT Deputy Director that his own analysis
indicates the PRC is very unlikely to "overreact" to the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) referendum on joining the
UN under the name "Taiwan," despite its continuing direct and
indirect pressures on Taiwan authorities. Professor Lin, who
served as Vice Minister of Defense in 2003-2004, is widely
respected as an independent analyst of military affairs and
cross-strait relations and has traveled regularly to mainland
China. Lin, who is politically independent and not
affiliated with either the ruling DPP or the opposition KMT,
obtained his Ph.D in International Relations from Georgetown
University in 1986.


3. (C) Lin offered DDIR several reasons for his analysis.
First, he argued that Beijing currently appears to have a
number of other higher priorities, including internal CCP
party politics, sustaining domestic economic growth and
development, maintaining social stability and further
enhancing PRC-U.S. relations. Lin noted that his sources in
Beijing have told him that President Hu Jintao has met less
frequently with the Taiwan Leading Group than his predecessor
Jiang Zemin did. Moreover, Lin indicated that Hu and the
current Beijing leadership are more confident about
developments on all fronts despite continued cautiousness.
Hu is consolidating his power, the economy is doing
relatively well, and PRC-U.S. relations appear to be at an
all-time high. Lin said this means that Beijing does not
want to upset the current balance and does not feel under
great pressure to show strength with respect to its Taiwan
policy.


4. (C) More generally, Lin indicated that he and other
analysts tend to see Hu Jintao as either more flexible, or at
least wanting to be more flexible, on PRC policy toward
Taiwan. (Comment. Hu's speech at the opening of the current
17th Party congress may further support this view. End
Comment.) Hence, the expectation in Taiwan is that Hu would
be prepared to undertake diplomatic initiatives vis--vis
Taiwan after the March presidential election, whoever is
elected President here. Lin suggested that this would
involve greater flexibility in dealing with the Taiwan issue
in international organizations, among other moves. (Note:
Per reftel, Chairman of Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation
Hong Chi-Chang similarly voiced his expectation that
cross-Strait relations will likely expand further soon after
the March 2008 election, even in the case of a DPP victory.
End Note.) Assuming this is the case, Lin continued, Beijing
would want to make sure it does not overreact to developments
prior to the presidential election. In response to DDIR's
question as to whether he had actually seen any of these
points articulated in mainland documents, Lin said that he
has not. At the same time, he explained, the Beijing
leadership would not likely articulate these views, because
this would compromise its pressure on Taiwan to toe the line
on independence issues.


5. (C) Comment. Lin's analysis reflects very much the
essence of those of many other thoughtful observers in
Taiwan. Some note that the UN referendum itself does not
appear to be a "red line" issue because it is not likely to
pass and, even if it does pass, the referendum as currently
worded does not mandate any specific action toward formal
independence. Others also cite PRC concerns about not
disrupting the Beijing 2008 Olympics and the Shanghai 2010
World Expo, all variations on the same theme that the PRC has

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much more to lose than to gain from overreacting to current
developments in Taiwan. End Comment.
WANG