VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SU TSENG-CHANG ON DPP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002285

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2022
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SU TSENG-CHANG ON DPP
POLITICS AND U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with DPP vice presidential
candidate Su Tseng-chang on October 3, the Director stressed
the importance for President Chen and the DPP to avoid
further "surprises" beyond the UN referendum between now and
next May, when President Chen steps down. Su said Chen
selected the UN referendum as a campaign mobilization tool
because of the strength of public support in Taiwan for
joining the UN. Because Chen already has the campaign tool
he wants, he will not promote any more controversial
initiatives that could cost rather than add votes, Su argued.
Su suggested the recent controversy within the DPP over the
"Normal Country" Resolution, though bad for the campaign, had
helped educate party members about the responsibilities of a
ruling party. Su, a lawyer, maintained that passage of the
UN referendum would have almost no effect on what the
government does because it has already carried out the
initiative called for in the referendum. If the referendum
passes, he added, the President would be able to say that the
application to join the UN under the name "Taiwan" enjoyed
public support the next time Taiwan applies. End Summary.


2. (C) Comment: Su appeared relaxed and upbeat in this
meeting, and seemed quite open in speaking his mind. A
strong campaigner, Su will help the DPP ticket, including in
northern Taiwan, where he was highly popular as magistrate of
Blue-majority Taipei County (1997-2004),Taiwan's most
populous district. More broadly, Su is also popular with
moderate swing voters island-wide because of his pragmatic,
non-ideological approach to policy, his strong work ethic,
and his focus on getting things done, all qualities he
manifested when he served as Premier from January 2006 - May

2007. He seemed at pains to counter widespread speculation
that he could not work well with Frank Hsieh after having
been bested in the DPP primary. End Comment.


3. (C) The Director met with DPP vice presidential candidate
Su Tseng-chang at Su's campaign office on October 3 to
discuss DPP politics. The Director asked about party unity,
noting the challenge launched by outgoing DPP Chairman Yu
Shyi-kun and the Deep Green over the "Normal Country"
Resolution (NCR) at the recent party congress. The minority
will respect the majority after the vote on the NCR, Su
predicted. He pointed to his own example: he had lost a
contentious presidential primary battle to Frank Hsieh, but
was now back as Hsieh's running mate.


4. (C) Yu had his own motives for trying to reverse the
decision of the DPP Central Executive Committee (CEC) which
he chaired, Su suggested. During the high-level meeting on
the NCR at the Presidential Office, which Su attended, Yu had
agreed to the compromise consensus language, which he had
even read out loud at the meeting. Yu was the one who
presented the consensus NCR to the CEC, which approved it,
but then he changed his mind at midnight. Su believed Yu had
two reasons for his sudden reversal: he wanted to resign on
principle over the NCR to avoid having to resign over his
corruption indictment, and he wanted to go his own way.


5. (C) The efforts by President Chen and the party to
persuade Yu to stay on were not serious but intended merely
to save face for Yu, Su suggested. On filling the party
chairmanship vacancy, Su said the party would have to see
whether President Chen wants to resume the position. This
would be the smoothest arrangement, and Chen is the only
leader who can control the party. Even if the DPP does
poorly in the Legislative Yuan (LY) elections next January,
Su explained, Chen would not need to take responsibility and
step down because the party charter stipulates that a sitting
president is the natural party chairman.


6. (C) Chen has stated publicly that the DPP's goal for the
LY elections is 50 seats, Su continued, and even 47 seats
would be all right. If the DPP wins the presidency for a
third consecutive term, it should easily be able to gain
support from 7-8 non-DPP legislators and form a working
majority in the LY, which will have 113 seats under the new

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format. Taiwan society will not tolerate continued
obstructionism by the KMT if the DPP wins the presidency a
third straight time, Su predicted. Unlike a DPP win,
however, a KMT presidential victory would produce
instability, Su argued, because of DPP opposition, Ma's
character (he does not like to deal with problems),and the
contending forces within the KMT.


7. (C) While the DPP trails the KMT in presidential polling,
Su observed, the gap is within acceptable limits and much
less than the margin Chen Shui-bian faced when he began his
re-election bid in 2003. There are several reasons why polls
in Taiwan undercount the DPP vote. The Taiwanese are
cautious and sometimes unwilling to express their views to
poll takers, because of the psychological aftereffects of
long-term political oppression. In addition, the DPP relies
on supporters' enthusiasm at the end of the campaign to win
elections. Overseas Taiwanese from the U.S. play an
especially important role when they decide to come back at
election time. They are highly enthusiastic and have a big
influence on their relatives and friends in Taiwan, Su added.



8. (C) Taiwan business people in the mainland are another
key factor, Su said. While they want to focus on business
and avoid cross-Strait problems, they also hope Taiwan will
be strong. so they will have a place to return to if they
encounter difficulties. The Chinese do not want the DPP to
continue in power and will try to increase the influence of
those Taiwan business people who support the KMT. They will
also use policies such as buying Taiwan agricultural products
or giving benefits to Taiwan business people in their efforts
to influence Taiwan politics. While Beijing tries to avoid
counterproductive criticisms of Taiwan, they cannot always
control themselves. Thus, they reveal their true colors from
time to time. For example, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya
angered the Taiwanese people with his recent assertion at the
UNGA that of all the world's countries, China is the most
concerned about Taiwan. KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou has a
similar problem, Su contended, as he undermines his efforts
to appeal to the Taiwanese by referring to "China Taipei."


9. (C) The Director emphasized that the U.S. highly respects
Taiwan's democracy and will remain neutral toward the Taiwan
election. At the same time, the U.S., which is concerned
about increasing Chinese military capabilities, does not want
Taiwan to carelessly cause problems. The U.S. has expressed
its opinion about the UN referendum and we hope the DPP will
consider our views. Both Taiwan and the U.S. will be
electing new presidents, the Director pointed out, and our
two sides will want to enter the new period with good
relations.


10. (C) Asked about the effects of U.S. criticism of
President Chen, Su said the Taiwanese pay close attention to
what the U.S. says and are gradually learning how far they
can go. Vice Premier Chiou I-jen spoke to the party congress
on September 30, saying the DPP as the ruling party had to do
what was practical and refrain from promising things that it
could not deliver. While the DPP stressed ideals like
establishing a "Republic of Taiwan" when it was in
opposition, Su said, the party is gradually becoming more
practical and responsible after seven years in power. In the
past, the KMT promoted Chinese identity, but now Taiwan
identity is increasing. Beijing asserts that China is the
PRC, and they want Taiwan to be part of the PRC, but the
Taiwanese cannot accept this.


11. (C) While the debate and vote over the NCR at the party
congress was bad for the campaign and angered Hsieh, Su
observed, it was good for educating party members about the
responsibilities of a ruling party and the need to pay
attention to the international and cross-Strait situations.
As a result of intensive lobbying, most of those who
originally supported Yu's version, including legislators,
withdrew their endorsements. The DPP dealt responsibly with
the NCR, Su argued, and therefore the U.S. now should
carefully consider what it might say if the purpose is to
encourage DPP responsibility.

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12. (C) The Director and DDIR stressed U.S. concern that
President Chen might produce further "surprises" beyond the
UN referendum before he leaves office next May. Su responded
that he and Hsieh have discussed this directly with Chen, and
promised that there will be no other surprises. Similar to
the defensive referenda in 2004, Chen has selected the UN
referendum as a campaign initiative for this election,
because joining the UN enjoys strong public support. To keep
the issue hot, the DPP will hold a round-the-island torch
relay on October 24 and then a hand-in-hand rally next
February 28.


13. (C) The DPP has already won on the UN referendum issue,
Su argued, because Ma and the KMT have had to follow the DPP
lead with their own version of a UN referendum. For Chen,
the UN referendum is an election mobilization tool. He will
not add another, more controversial initiative because that
would be unnecessary and would hurt the election campaign.
Chen's goal is to fight for Hsieh's election victory on an
advantageous battlefield, Su observed.


14. (C) The Director questioned the wisdom of holding a UN
referendum that is difficult to pass because of the high
threshold. He also asked what the implications would be for
the government if the UN referendum does pass. Su, a lawyer,
responded that it would be hard for the government to do
anything because this is an international, not a domestic
matter. In addition, Chen has already applied to join the UN
in the name of "Taiwan." If the referendum passes, the only
difference would be that Chen (or his successor) could say he
has the support of public opinion to apply to join the UN
under the name "Taiwan."


15. (C) Chinese objections to the referendum are not based
on legal but political grounds, Su argued, suggesting that
the PRC goal is to intimidate Taiwan's democracy. For
Beijing to strongly attack this referendum is illogical, Su
maintained, because the referendum is only about doing
something that President Chen has already done. If the
referendum were about declaring independence or changing the
national title, Beijing's objections would be more
reasonable. In addition to intimidating Taiwan, China also
hopes to "confuse" the international community, Su suggested.


16. (C) According to Su, media theories that an activist
President Chen is marginalizing DPP candidate Hsieh are
wrong. The DPP is a team, Su explained, and Chen is the
"offense," whose role is to attack Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT.
In contrast to "bad cop" Chen, Hsieh plays the "good cop," Su
added. Chen and Hsieh, whose relationship goes back many
years, are a good team and share the same interest in Hsieh's
victory. Taiwan is small, and the people already have a good
understanding of both Chen and Hsieh. Voters know that Hsieh
has his own opinions and will be different than Chen, and
also that Hsieh will not allow Chen to control the situation
from behind the scenes after he steps down next May.
Furthermore, people will vote for Hsieh because they do not
want the KMT to win and not because of how they view Chen.

YOUNG