TAIWAN UN REFERENDA: BLUE PERSPECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002078 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2032 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN UN REFERENDA: BLUE PERSPECTIVE Classified By: Acting Director Robert S. Wang, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The KMT was forced to float its own UN referendum to counterbalance the DPP version, and to deflect DPP accusations that the KMT does not "stand up" for Taiwan. The DPP UN referendum is an attempt to exploit the growing sense of "Taiwan identity," and KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou is using the KMT referendum to shore up his "Taiwanese" credentials. KMT Secretary General Liao Feng-te told AIT the internal debate over the referendum has split the KMT into two camps, with those facing an election in favor, and those hoping to maintain good KMT RELATIONS with Beijing opposed. The KMT leadership sees the DPP similarly divided over its own referendum, with Deep-Green hardliners like DPP party chairman Yu Shyi-kun squared off against relative "moderates" like DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh. Deep-Blues hope President Chen's anti-U.S. rhetoric will cause "swing" voters to believe the DPP has damaged Taiwan's relationship with its chief benefactor. According to KMT insiders, if Chen withdraws the DPP referendum, the KMT will promptly follow suit. End Summary. KMT SEES DPP REFERENDA AS A THREAT... -------------- ¶2. (C) KMT Deputy Secretary General Liao Feng-te, who doubles as the KMT's campaign policy director, told AIT on September 5 that the KMT learned its lesson on referenda during the 2004 presidential election. At that time, when confronted with the DPP referendum on improving Taiwan's missile defenses, the KMT simply urged its voters to boycott the proposal. Although the referendum failed to pass, it succeeded in drawing thousands of deep-Green voters to the polls. Thus, Liao concluded, the KMT decision in 2004 to forego a referendum of its own put the party at a serious disadvantage. The lesson was especially bitter since the 2004 presidential race was decided by less than three-tenths of a percent. This time around, the KMT strategy is to counter each DPP referendum with an equal and opposite KMT version. ...COUNTERS WITH ITS OWN INITIATIVES -------------- ¶3. (C) The DPP currently has proposed two referenda: one on seeking UN membership as "Taiwan" and another for the return of "illicitly gained KMT assets." The KMT plans to counter the DPP referenda with two of its own. The first proposes to �A;increase Taiwan's participation in international organizations (including the UN) under "any practical name," and the second to stamp out "official corruption" in government (i.e. the DPP administration). If the DPP pushes a third referendum to improve Taiwan's "defense" against "PRC aggression," Liao stated, the KMT will offer voters the alternative to endorse direct cross-Strait flights. The KMT referenda may not actually draw Blue voters to the polls, Liao conceded, but they should help prevent Blue voters from inadvertently helping to pass the DPP measures (i.e. even voting against a referendum helps it cross the 50 percent participation threshold required for validity). With the votes thus split among competing Blue-Green referenda, Liao predicted, the odds are very low that any of them will garner the fifty-percent participation required for passage. Liao also ruled out the possibility that the DPP would encourage its voters to support the KMT UN referendum, which the DPP leadership has publicly and repeatedly characterized as a "fraud" on the Taiwan people. BUT KMT SPLIT OVER UN REFERENDUM -------------- ¶4. (C) Liao admitted there had been intense debate inside the party on whether the KMT should offer its own referendum on UN membership. The party divided into two camps -- those who are facing an election and those who are not. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT's legislative candidates all realized that a KMT-sponsored UN referendum would help deflect DPP accusations that the KMT does not "love Taiwan." Others, including former KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James Soong, feared the negative impact such a proposal would have on the KMT's relationship with TAIPEI 00002078 002 OF 003 Beijing. Beijing has sought to discourage the KMT from pushing its own UN referendum, Liao acknowledged, using back channels to convey its message to Lien Chan and others. ¶5. (C) Liao denied press reports that Beijing had sent a strong letter to former KMT Chairman Lien Chan opposing the KMT UN referendum. He explained that Beijing has many subtle methods to communicate with Lien and the KMT, and would not have been "so stupid" as to send a letter which could be discovered and exploited by DPP opponents. (Note: PFP Executive Policy Director Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao),however, separately insisted to AIT that the press reports were true, and that the letter was essentially Beijing's "last warning" to the KMT to withdraw its referendum; see para. 8 below. End Note.) BEIJING KNOWS KMT REACTING TO POLITICAL PRESSURE -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Liao insisted that despite Beijing's objections, the CCP leadership understands that a growing sense of "Taiwan identity" among voters forced Ma and the KMT to demonstrate their sensitivity to "Taiwan-centric thinking." Beijing, he claimed, understands the objective of the KMT referendum is not to promote Taiwan's accession to the UN, but rather to increase Ma's appeal to Taiwan-minded voters and to defeat the DPP's pro-independence UN referendum. UN REFERENDUM ISSUE MAY LOSE URGENCY -------------- ¶7. (C) Voters will lose interest in the UN referendum issue after Taiwan's current bid to join the UN is rejected by the General Assembly in mid-September, Liao predicted, and an increasingly weak President Chen will be forced to turn to other issues. Chen and DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun spent much of their limited remaining POLITICAL capital to overcome objections to the UN referendum from Frank Hsieh and other "moderates" in the DPP. Hsieh will grow stronger (and Chen weaker) as the presidential election draws closer, strengthening Hsieh's hand to suppress more radical "deep-Green" proposals which could alienate him from Taiwan's centrist, or "swing," voters. DEEP-BLUES UNHAPPY WITH MA, KMT REFERENDUM -------------- ¶8. (C) PFP Executive Policy Director and James Soong advisor Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao) complained to AIT that Ma Ying-jeou wrongly views Beijing as the monolithic CCP of twenty years ago, where one person could decide issues unilaterally. Ma also mistakenly reasons that, because the KMT opposes independence, it is entitled to and can count on Beijing's support. In reality, Chang argued, Beijing does not understand the KMT UN referendum to be merely a "campaign tactic," but rather, a major concession by the KMT to the DPP's pro-independence agenda. Beijing, Chang argued, does not care who wins the presidential election, as long as the winner is "pragmatic" and does not push independence. (Note: Chang is negotiating terms for PFP legislators, including himself, to run as KMT candidates in the next LY election, and claims to be in frequent contact with KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung and KMT Secretary General Wu Den-yih. End note.) Chang expressed concern that Chinese President Hu Jintao would be under enormous pressure to respond forcefully to Taiwan's UN referenda before Taiwan's presidential election takes place in March 2008. DPP WILL NOT EASE UP ITS UN OFFENSIVE -------------- ¶9. (C) With few successes to his credit, Chang told AIT, President Chen is now looking to earn his place in history by "protecting Taiwan's dignity" in the face of pressure from both the U.S. and the PRC. Chen hopes to replace former president Lee Teng-hui as the "father of Taiwan independence" by standing up to the same kind of pressure which caused Lee to knuckle under in 1996. The deep-Blue Chang argued that everything, including the presidential election, is of secondary importance to Chen, and that this single-mindedness makes him less likely to compromise. U.S. admonitions TAIPEI 00002078 003 OF 003 against the DPP UN referendum have had little effect, Chang asserted, because President Chen believes they have not come from a "high enough level" to be taken seriously. The DPP can always score points with voters by standing up to Chinese, or to some extent, even U.S. pressure, but with his recent anti-American rhetoric, Chang continued, President Chen runs the risk of turning the DPP into the "anti-American" party, which could hurt public confidence in the DPP and its presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting). Hedging their bets, the PFP (with KMT support) has challenged the DPP UN referendum in administrative court, arguing that it falls outside the intended scope of Taiwan's referendum law. Chang expressed cautious optimism that the court could return a favorable verdict, but could not say when this might happen, or whether such a verdict would be "final." COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Deep-Blues view the KMT's UN referendum as a betrayal of the party's "pro-China" fundamentals, and they would like Ma to kill it. But Ma's greatest vulnerability continues to be his "mainlander" status. His "long-stay" program and the KMT UN referendum, therefore, are essential elements of his strategy to appeal to "Taiwanese," especially centrist, voters. Therefore, as long as the DPP continues its "UN for Taiwan" push, Ma and the KMT dare not retract their own, for fear of appearing to "kowtow" to Beijing. The deep-Blues want the U.S. to pressure President Chen into withdrawing the DPP referendum, to give Ma and the KMT the POLITICAL cover they need to withdraw the KMT UN referendum. There is no consensus on this issue even among the Blues. WANG