AIT CHAIRMAN BURGHARDT DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL RACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001435 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MCAP TW SUBJECT: AIT CHAIRMAN BURGHARDT DISCUSSES PRESIDENTIAL RACE WITH LY SPEAKER WANG, KMT CHAIRMAN WU, AND ACADEMICS Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: KMT Legislative Yuan (LY) Speaker Wang Jin-pyng told AIT Chairman Burghardt that PAC-III missiles would stand a better chance of passage if included in the 2008 annual budget rather than a supplemental budget bill. Wang predicted a close 2008 presidential election, claiming Ma Ying-jeou is a weak candidate for the KMT, in part because of his indictment for misuse of Taipei mayoral special funds. In a separate meeting, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung argued that the majority of voters view Ma as "clean" and regard his prosecution as a DPP "dirty trick." Wu also asserted that the KMT would do better than the current DPP government in managing and improving cross-Strait relations. During a lunch, several Blue-leaning academics told Burghardt they believe Ma should avoid the sensitive unification-independence issue and work to sell the economic benefits of improved cross-Strait relations. They also said they view the DPP's planned UN referendum as a ploy to mobilize voters for the presidential election. End Summary. PAC-IIIs Maybe Next Year -------------- ¶2. (C) Legislative Yuan (LY) Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (KMT) and AIT Chairman Burghardt discussed the annual budget, including defense procurement, on June 14, one day before the LY passed portions of the budget. When pressed on the possibility of a supplementary budget to fund the purchase of PAC-III missile batteries, Wang demurred, insisting that it would be better to consider the PAC-IIIs in October, as part of next year's annual budget, thereby avoiding the "strong opinions" usually stirred by supplemental or special budget bills. Wang explained that the Executive Yuan must submit the 2008 proposed annual budget by August 2007 and the LY will begin deliberations on the new budget by October 2007. Wang Declines Vice Presidential Nomination -------------- ¶3. (C) Burghardt asked Wang why he declined to be Ma's running mate. Wang said he disagreed with many of Ma's ideas for governing the country, and had conditioned his acceptance of the vice presidential nomination on reaching an agreement with Ma on important policies. However, according to Wang, Ma refused to consult with him, making it impossible for him to join the ticket. After he declined the vice presidential spot, Wang continued, Ma invited him to take charge of his presidential campaign. Wang told Burghardt he declined this offer too because there was no clear chain of command, and it was unclear what resources would be available to the campaign. Wang added that this presidential race promised to be a dirty one, and being tied to a "smear campaign" would complicate his role as LY Speaker. Ma's Four Big Problems -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Wang, KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan has told others within the party that Ma suffers from four weaknesses: (1) he is a Mainlander, (2) he faces a possible conviction for misuse of Taipei mayoral office special accounts, and "as many as ten" other legal cases are also in the works, (3) Ma is perceived as weak and indecisive, and (4) the DPP can exploit government resources to bring him down. The public also doubts Ma's integrity, Wang explained, because Ma promised to reform the party, but instead, the party has been forced to amend its by-laws and charter to enable an indicted Ma to run for president. The DPP will exploit all of these vulnerabilities, Wang predicted, making for a very close and unpredictable race, which Ma might well lose. Both Presidential Candidates Vulnerable -------------- ¶5. (C) In fact, Wang continued, DPP candidate Frank Hsieh and Ma both could be rendered ineligible by corruption cases, throwing the whole presidential race into disarray. Unlike TAIPEI 00001435 002 OF 003 the KMT, Wang continued, the DPP will not change its party rules to enable an indicted Hsieh to continue his presidential run. According to Wang, President Chen does not trust Hsieh, and would be happy to see his favorite, former premier Su Tseng-chang, replace Hsieh as the DPP candidate. (Comment: It is an open secret in Taiwan politics that Wang himself is eager to take Ma's place should he stumble. End comment.) Hsieh More Partisan than He Projects -------------- ¶6. (C) Although Frank Hsieh is a "careful, clear thinker," Wang argued that the DPP candidate is "plagued by corruption problems from earlier in his political career that he cannot resolve." Wang claimed that Hsieh failed to solve many of Kaohsiung City's problems during the seven years of his mayoral tenure, and that he does not have the vision needed to solve the larger "national" problems of Taiwan. Before he became Premier, Wang continued, Hsieh promised to reconcile the differences between the ruling and opposition parties; instead, Hsieh was intensely partisan, contributing to the political deadlock he had promised to relieve. This damaged Hsieh's credibility with the public, insisted Wang. Hsieh's ability to work with the PRC is also hobbled by his steadfast refusal to accept the "1992 consensus" of "one China, different interpretations," which the KMT supports. Taiwan voters will discount Hsieh's promise to improve cross-Strait relations because they will not believe the PRC will work with him, Wang maintained. President Chen Will be Cautious to Ensure Hsieh Victory -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Burghardt asked Wang whether President Chen, during his last year in office, would do anything that might damage the future president's chances of advancing cross-Strait relations. Wang remarked that Taiwan's political landscape is highly unstable because both presidential candidates are at risk of being forced from the race by possible convictions. President Chen, however, is relatively weak and focused on self-preservation. Antagonizing the PRC could damage Hsieh's "moderate" image and his chances of winning the presidency. If the KMT retakes power, Wang explained, Chen's legal problems will certainly multiply. Because it serves his personal interests, Chen will do whatever he can to ensure Hsieh's victory, including laying low on cross-Strait affairs. Hsieh is by nature both "more predictable and less troublesome" than his predecessor, Wang added, making a repeat of earlier cross-Strait crises unlikely. At Least One Referendum on Ballot -------------- ¶8. (C) Wang told Burghardt the DPP is currently pushing two referenda; one to force the KMT to disgorge its "illicitly gained assets," and the other proposing UN membership under the name "Taiwan." Burghardt stressed that the U.S. would publicly oppose any referendum touching on sovereignty. Wang derided the U.N. bid as folly, but admitted a referendum on the idea would help the DPP attract supporters to the polls. The KMT is also considering one or more referenda of its own, including one to crack down on the kind of "official corruption" for which President Chen was cited, but not indicted. Overcoming the procedural hurdles will not be easy for either party, Wang continued, but it is probable that at least one referendum will be on the presidential ballot. Meeting with KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung -------------- ¶9. (C) In a separate conversation on June 15, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung suggested to Chairman Burghardt that Hsieh is a clever opponent and better natural campaigner than Ma, but argued that Hsieh's "shady reputation" and related legal problems will surface and prevent him from winning the presidential election. Wu acknowledged that Ma Ying-jeou's popularity has suffered as a result of his indictment, but argued that the majority of voters still view Ma as "clean" TAIPEI 00001435 003 OF 003 and as a victim of DPP dirty tricks. Ma's presidential campaign will survive the mayoral accounts scandal, Wu predicted, and a second possible prosecution for other alleged wrongdoing might end up backfiring on the DPP by persuading to the public that the various prosecutions of Ma were all politically motivated. KMT Will Seek to Improve Cross-Strait Relations -------------- -- ¶10. (C) The KMT is pursuing a "peace and development" campaign strategy for both the presidential and legislative elections, KMT Chairman Wu said. President Chen's independence agenda has resulted in Taiwan's increasing economic and diplomatic isolation, Wu argued, adding that a KMT president will not pursue independence, which will reduce tensions and foster cross-Strait dialogue. Based on the "1992 Consensus," Wu continued, a KMT government will use dialogue to win economic and diplomatic concessions from Beijing, making Taiwan a more attractive place for foreign investment. A KMT government would be better for U.S. interests, Wu argued, since Taiwan would no longer be the "troublemaker it has been under Chen. ¶11. (C) Director Young expressed concern that the KMT may be too optimistic as Beijing might reduce its willingness to cooperate with the KMT if it becomes the ruling party. Wu responded that the PRC is preoccupied with developing its economy and reducing systemic inequities. As long as Taiwan doesn't move toward independence, Beijing will remain flexible, Wu suggested, adding that the KMT in power will not give Chinese hard-liners any excuse to put pressure on Taiwan. Lunch with Pro-Blue Academics -------------- ¶12. (C) In a June 15 lunch meeting with Chairman Burghardt, several Blue-leaning academics suggested that the great challenge facing the KMT is its inability to reconcile the deep differences between the central party elite and local KMT political leaders. Although acknowledging that Ma's legal problems have weakened his bid for the presidency, the academics said their main concern about Ma's campaign is the lack of coherence in his political message, a problem they attributed to the fact that no one person is really running Ma's campaign. The academics agreed that Ma should avoid the unification-independence question and focus instead on the practical and economic benefits the KMT can deliver through improved cross-Strait relations. They also viewed the DPP's plan to hold a referendum on the UN together with the presidential election as a ploy to mobilize voters. YOUNG