RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000142 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, UN MEMBERSHIP, AND INDEPENDENCE VERSUS UNIFICATION Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (SBU) Taiwan ThinkTank, a pro-Green NGO with close connections to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has provided AIT the cross-tabulations for its recent poll on three issues: arms procurement, joining the UN, and preference for Taiwan independence or cross-Strait unification. The poll of 1,085 people was conducted by telephone December 27-28 by the well-respected Shan-shui Poll Survey Company in accordance with standard technical survey criteria. Respondents were asked three questions on arms procurement, seven on UN membership, and one on preference for unification or independence. The answers to the eleven substantive questions were cross-tabulated by Taiwan region age, sex, education, ethnicity, party preference, political camp (Blue or Green) preference, and position on the independence/unification issue. ¶2. (SBU) There were no major surprises in the overall poll results. On arms procurement, 46 percent of respondents believed the LY should approve arms procurement this session, while 31 percent disagreed. Significantly more people (61 percent) viewed the delay on arms procurement as affecting U.S.-Taiwan relations than saw the delay as affecting Taiwan's security (45 percent). Most respondents viewed joining the UN as important for Taiwan, with 63 percent believing that joining the UN would help the development of cross-Strait relations. Unlike many other polls, this one offered only independence and unification as options for Taiwan's future, leaving out maintaining the status quo as another possibility. Respondents preferred independence over unification 44 to 22 percent, but a significant number (18 percent) volunteered maintenance of the status quo even though that was not one of the choices. ¶3. (C) The cross-tabulated data highlight the distinctive positions on arms procurement and the independence/unification issue taken by Mainlander respondents (those who came to Taiwan when the Mainland fell to the Communists in 1949 and their descendants). The positions expressed by Mainlander respondents were similar to the positions taken by pan-Blue supporters, a possible indication of continued strong Mainlander influence (despite limited numbers) on setting the policies of the KMT and other pan-Blue parties. Arms Procurement -------------- ¶4. (C) According to the Taiwan ThinkTank poll, pan-Blue supporters (and Mainlanders) clearly differ with their pan-Green counterparts on the urgency of Taiwan's need to strengthen its self-defense capability. A majority of pan-Blue supporters (54%) and Mainlanders (52%) do not think the delay in arms procurement will affect Taiwan's security, and they also think the LY does not need to act quickly to pass the arms procurement budget this session (pan-Blue 54%, Mainlanders 56%). On the other side of the political spectrum, 74 percent of the pan-Green supporters believe the delay in arms procurement does affect national security, and the 82 percent of the same group want to see the arms procurement budget passed this LY session, which ends January ¶19. These results would suggest that one reason pan-Blue legislators have been quite willing to drag their feet on arms procurement is that they do not have to worry about constituent pressure on the issue. UN Membership -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The poll shows general agreement across the Green-Blue divide on the desirability of joining the UN. Perhaps more surprisingly, pan-Green and pan-Blue supporters, and Mainlanders and Taiwanese are also united in their support for holding a referendum to express popular support for Taiwan joining the UN. There is a clear divide, however, on what name to use in joining the UN: while 53 percent of Taiwanese and 88 percent of pan-Green supporters favor "Taiwan," 65 percent of Mainlanders and 63 percent of TAIPEI 00000142 002 OF 002 pan-Blue supporters want to use the name "ROC." Independence Versus Unification -------------- ¶6. (C) The poll also asked whether respondents supported independence or unification. (Unlike many polls, status quo was not offered as an option, though a substantial number of people volunteered that as their answer. In other polls that include the option of maintaining the status quo, that is always the top choice of a strong majority of respondents.) Fully 86 percent of the pan-Green supporters but only 27 percent of pan-Blue supporters favor Taiwan independence. While 48 percent of Taiwanese support independence and 19 percent unification, the figures are essentially reversed for Mainlanders -- 41 percent favoring unification and 23 percent independence. The poll results suggest that preference for independence may be one of the defining characteristics of DPP supporters: 86 percent favor independence against only 5 percent who prefer unification. ¶7. (SBU) According to this poll, support for independence is weaker in Blue-majority northern Taiwan and stronger in Green-leaning southern Taiwan. In the north, 38 percent favor independence and 32 percent unification, compared to 57 percent for independence and just 15 percent for unification in the southern area of Yunlin-Chiayi-Tainan. The poll also indicates that support for independence is strongest in the youngest age group. While 52 percent of respondents in their 20s expressed support for independence, the figure dropped to 39 percent for those aged 30-39. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) According to the Taiwan ThinkTank poll, the support base of the DPP remains at heart pro-Taiwan independence, despite the pragmatic and tactical adjustments by the party to lower its independence profile. The preference of DPP supporters for joining the UN under the name Taiwan rather than ROC is another reflection of their pro-independence leanings. According to this poll, the preference of KMT supporters for unification is much weaker than the preference of DPP supporters for independence. The KMT seems to be gradually shifting its position from pursuing unification to maintaining the cross-Strait status quo. Taking an increasingly centrist position on the independence/unification issue helps the KMT hold onto Taiwanese supporters whom the DPP is trying to take away. YOUNG