RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, UN
MEMBERSHIP, AND INDEPENDENCE VERSUS UNIFICATION


Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (SBU) Taiwan ThinkTank, a pro-Green NGO with close
connections to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
has provided AIT the cross-tabulations for its recent poll on
three issues: arms procurement, joining the UN, and
preference for Taiwan independence or cross-Strait
unification. The poll of 1,085 people was conducted by
telephone December 27-28 by the well-respected Shan-shui Poll
Survey Company in accordance with standard technical survey
criteria. Respondents were asked three questions on arms
procurement, seven on UN membership, and one on preference
for unification or independence. The answers to the eleven
substantive questions were cross-tabulated by Taiwan region
age, sex, education, ethnicity, party preference, political
camp (Blue or Green) preference, and position on the
independence/unification issue.


2. (SBU) There were no major surprises in the overall poll
results. On arms procurement, 46 percent of respondents
believed the LY should approve arms procurement this session,
while 31 percent disagreed. Significantly more people (61
percent) viewed the delay on arms procurement as affecting
U.S.-Taiwan relations than saw the delay as affecting
Taiwan's security (45 percent). Most respondents viewed
joining the UN as important for Taiwan, with 63 percent
believing that joining the UN would help the development of
cross-Strait relations. Unlike many other polls, this one
offered only independence and unification as options for
Taiwan's future, leaving out maintaining the status quo as
another possibility. Respondents preferred independence over
unification 44 to 22 percent, but a significant number (18
percent) volunteered maintenance of the status quo even
though that was not one of the choices.


3. (C) The cross-tabulated data highlight the distinctive
positions on arms procurement and the
independence/unification issue taken by Mainlander
respondents (those who came to Taiwan when the Mainland fell
to the Communists in 1949 and their descendants). The
positions expressed by Mainlander respondents were similar to
the positions taken by pan-Blue supporters, a possible
indication of continued strong Mainlander influence (despite
limited numbers) on setting the policies of the KMT and other
pan-Blue parties.

Arms Procurement
--------------


4. (C) According to the Taiwan ThinkTank poll, pan-Blue
supporters (and Mainlanders) clearly differ with their
pan-Green counterparts on the urgency of Taiwan's need to
strengthen its self-defense capability. A majority of
pan-Blue supporters (54%) and Mainlanders (52%) do not think
the delay in arms procurement will affect Taiwan's security,
and they also think the LY does not need to act quickly to
pass the arms procurement budget this session (pan-Blue 54%,
Mainlanders 56%). On the other side of the political
spectrum, 74 percent of the pan-Green supporters believe the
delay in arms procurement does affect national security, and
the 82 percent of the same group want to see the arms
procurement budget passed this LY session, which ends January

19. These results would suggest that one reason pan-Blue
legislators have been quite willing to drag their feet on
arms procurement is that they do not have to worry about
constituent pressure on the issue.

UN Membership
--------------


5. (SBU) The poll shows general agreement across the
Green-Blue divide on the desirability of joining the UN.
Perhaps more surprisingly, pan-Green and pan-Blue supporters,
and Mainlanders and Taiwanese are also united in their
support for holding a referendum to express popular support
for Taiwan joining the UN. There is a clear divide, however,
on what name to use in joining the UN: while 53 percent of
Taiwanese and 88 percent of pan-Green supporters favor
"Taiwan," 65 percent of Mainlanders and 63 percent of

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pan-Blue supporters want to use the name "ROC."

Independence Versus Unification
--------------


6. (C) The poll also asked whether respondents supported
independence or unification. (Unlike many polls, status quo
was not offered as an option, though a substantial number of
people volunteered that as their answer. In other polls that
include the option of maintaining the status quo, that is
always the top choice of a strong majority of respondents.)
Fully 86 percent of the pan-Green supporters but only 27
percent of pan-Blue supporters favor Taiwan independence.
While 48 percent of Taiwanese support independence and 19
percent unification, the figures are essentially reversed for
Mainlanders -- 41 percent favoring unification and 23 percent
independence. The poll results suggest that preference for
independence may be one of the defining characteristics of
DPP supporters: 86 percent favor independence against only 5
percent who prefer unification.


7. (SBU) According to this poll, support for independence is
weaker in Blue-majority northern Taiwan and stronger in
Green-leaning southern Taiwan. In the north, 38 percent
favor independence and 32 percent unification, compared to 57
percent for independence and just 15 percent for unification
in the southern area of Yunlin-Chiayi-Tainan. The poll also
indicates that support for independence is strongest in the
youngest age group. While 52 percent of respondents in their
20s expressed support for independence, the figure dropped to
39 percent for those aged 30-39.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) According to the Taiwan ThinkTank poll, the support
base of the DPP remains at heart pro-Taiwan independence,
despite the pragmatic and tactical adjustments by the party
to lower its independence profile. The preference of DPP
supporters for joining the UN under the name Taiwan rather
than ROC is another reflection of their pro-independence
leanings. According to this poll, the preference of KMT
supporters for unification is much weaker than the preference
of DPP supporters for independence. The KMT seems to be
gradually shifting its position from pursuing unification to
maintaining the cross-Strait status quo. Taking an
increasingly centrist position on the
independence/unification issue helps the KMT hold onto
Taiwanese supporters whom the DPP is trying to take away.

YOUNG