KMT SECRETARY-GENERAL WU DEN-YIH ON NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000141 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/15/2032 TAGS: PGOV PINR TW SUBJECT: KMT SECRETARY-GENERAL WU DEN-YIH ON NEW RESPONSIBILITIES, CHALLENGES AHEAD Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Recently appointed KMT Secretary-General Wu Den-yih told AIT Deputy Director on January 12 that over the next year he will focus on liquidating the KMT's remaining party assets, improving relations with the KMT legislative caucus, and overseeing preparations for the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. Although the KMT lost the Kaohsiung mayoral race last month, Wu insisted the party's support in the south has actually grown, which should narrow the significant advantage enjoyed there by the DPP in the upcoming presidential elections. KMT Chairman Ma remains the KMT's best hope of retaking the Presidency in 2008, and (KMT) LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng is unlikely to mount a significant challenge for the nomination. Wu acknowledged the gravest threat facing Ma's presidential bid is his possible indictment by the prosecutor investigating his use of a special budget during his just-ended term as Taipei mayor. Nonetheless, Wu did not exclude the possibility that Ma could still mount a successful campaign even if indicted, given the questionable nature of the charges. End Summary. Wu on His New Job -------------- ¶2. (C) Wu Den-yih (Tun-yi) met with the AIT Deputy Director on January 12 immediately before he took office as the Kuomintang (KMT) Secretary-General. He told the Deputy Director that over the next year he will focus on implementing KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's top policy priorities within the KMT. A key task will be overseeing the liquidation of the KMT's remaining party assets by the end of June. Dealing with the assets issue promptly and effectively, Wu added, would not only enhance the KMT's anti-corruption image but also deprive the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of a weapon to use against the KMT in the coming elections. Wu told the Deputy Director that Ma has personally charged him with improving strained relations between KMT party headquarters and its Legislative Yuan caucus, a challenging task. Wu will also play a lead role in managing the 2007 legislative and 2008 presidential primaries and election campaigns this Spring. On the legislative elections, Wu said he hopes to work out a comprehensive nomination strategy in coordination with the People First 
Party (PFP) to minimize splits within the pan-Blue camp. Assessing the Kaohsiung Mayoral "Loss" -------------- ¶3. (C) Turning to the KMT's performance in the December 2006 mayoral elections, Wu suggested that the loss in Kaohsiung was a result several strategic and tactical blunders. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou's attempt to cast the local election as a national-level referendum on President Chen's alleged corruption backfired by creating a sense of crisis that energized DPP supporters but failed to attract more centrist voters to the KMT candidate. The KMT also made a poor decision in nominating Huang Chun-ying. Although Huang had served as a good deputy mayor under Wu's tenure as Kaohsiung mayor, Wu explained, Huang is too "friendly and naive" to succeed in southern Taiwan politics. The investigation into irregularities in KMT Chairman Ma's mayoral special budget and last-minute opposition allegations that Huang's campaign had engaged in vote-buying, Wu continued, further discouraged Blue-leaning supporters from going out to vote. KMT's Presidential Election Strategy -------------- ¶4. (C) Wu insisted the KMT's narrow loss in Kaohsiung did not mean that support for the KMT in southern and central Taiwan has eroded. On the contrary, he asserted, since the 2004 legislative election the KMT has been growing stronger even in the "deep south" districts south of Tainan. Although the party does not expect to win those districts in a presidential contest, it hopes to narrow the loss to 5-10 TAIPEI 00000141 002 OF 003 percent. By losing small in the south and winning big in the more heavily populated, KMT-leaning areas north of Miaoli, the KMT hopes to negate the DPP's built-in "southern advantage." In this strategy, he explained, central Taiwan would be a "key battleground" in which the KMT and DPP will likely come to a draw, although the KMT made significant gains there in the 2005 local elections. Premier Su Tseng-chang, if he wins the DPP presidential nomination, SIPDIS poses the greatest threat to this KMT strategy. Su's past experience as the highly popular magistrate of Taipei County could reduce the KMT's margin of victory in the north, making the overall race much closer, assessed Wu. ¶5. (C) In terms of campaign issues, Wu predicted Taiwan identity-related themes will be a major focus of the presidential race. The DPP will use the issue to attack KMT Chairman Ma, the most likely KMT presidential candidate, for being born in Hong Kong and not representing Taiwanese culture and society. Wu suggested that Ma will attempt to neutralize the DPP strategy by selecting an ethnic Taiwanese as his vice presidential running mate. Though southern rural voters may buy into the DPP's identity-related attacks, Wu argued that Ma enjoys enough support among southern urban youth and female voters to close the gap with any DPP candidate in the south. KMT Chairman Ma's Presidential Prospects and Challenges -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Wu told the Deputy Director that, as Secretary-General, he will remain neutral while overseeing SIPDIS the KMT's presidential primary this spring, but added that he is a strong supporter of KMT Chairman Ma. Ma, he insisted, remains the KMT's best hope of retaking the Presidency in ¶2008. LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, Ma's rival within the party, is unlikely to mount a significant challenge as the 2005 chairman contest was the party's "real" presidential primary. Although Wang has no peer as an LY Speaker, he lacks the necessary executive skills to serve as Premier, let alone President. Wang's best hope, continued Wu, is to become Ma's vice presidential running mate. Wang's supporters have been pressing for a VP slot on the KMT ticket, but Wang himself has no intention of pushing himself on Ma. ¶7. (C) The gravest threat to Ma's presidential bid, Wu told the Deputy Director, would be Ma's indictment by the prosecutor investigating Ma's use of a mayoral special budget during his term as Taipei mayor. If indicted, Ma's only recourse would be to follow through on his earlier pledge to resign as Chairman, leaving Vice Chairman Wu Po-hsiung in charge to oversee a new election to fill the chair vacancy. Secretary-General Wu posed two possible subsequent scenarios. SIPDIS In the first, KMT members would elect a proxy chairman for Ma and the KMT would support Ma as an independent presidential candidate. In the second, the KMT could elect one of Ma's rivals who would then use the chairmanship to launch his own presidential bid. The latter option is more unlikely, Wu believed, because KMT supporters are weary of improving the DPP's odds of winning by fielding two candidates from the pan-Blue camp. Moreover, he noted that there could be a public outcry against the indictment given Ma's general reputation as an ultra clean official and the rather questionable nature of the charges. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Eloquent, talkative, and frank, Wu has been widely viewed as an effective legislator who has refrained from the typical shenanigans, showmanship, and back-room politics indulged by many of his colleagues. His fellow legislators, however, also see him as distant and isolated, something of a loner (like Ma, they say). Some critics charge that as Secretary-General Wu will have a difficult time helping SIPDIS Chairman Ma bridge the strained relationship between the LY caucus and KMT headquarters. That task will be complicated and difficult as Taiwan moves to a single-member district system for the 2007 legislative elections. Wu was widely rumored to have been a prospective vice presidential running TAIPEI 00000141 003 OF 003 mate to Ma, but those prospects now appear slim given his new responsibilities. -------------- Appendix: Wu Den-yih Political Profile -------------- ¶9. (C) Wu Den-yih (Tun-yi),age 59, is a native of Nantou County in central Taiwan and a graduate of Taiwan National University. Initially a reporter and then editor with the China Times newspaper, Wu embarked on a political career in 1973 when he was elected to the Taipei City Council. Wu was viewed as a KMT rising star in the 1980s as the party sought to cultivate and promote a new generation of "ethnic Taiwanese" leaders. He was appointed Nantou County magistrate between 1981 and 1989, and then appointed Mayor of Kaohsiung, Taiwan's second-largest city. He ran in the first openly competitive Kaohsiung mayoral race in 1994, soundly defeating DPP challenger and Kaohsiung native Chang Chun-hsiung by 150,000 votes. Wu lost his re-election bid in 1998 by 3,000 votes to Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting)--now one of the two DPP front-runners for president--in part because of allegations that Wu was having an extra-marital affair. The cassette tape that supposedly recorded a conversation between Wu and his mistress was later found to have been forged. Wu was elected in 2002 and 2005 to the Legislative Yuan, representing Nantou County. Wu has served on the KMT's Central Standing Committee, the party's highest policy-making body, since 1997. KMT Insiders on Wu, Other Personnel Changes -------------- ¶10. (C) Outgoing KMT Secretary-General Chan Chun-po, promoted to be the sixth KMT Vice Chairman, told AIT on January 11 that Ma had made a "good decision" to select Wu as Chan's successor. As a "serious" legislator, very responsive to his constituency and collegial, Wu will be able to help Ma improve relations and oversight of the LY caucus, predicted Chan. Pointing to his own shortcomings, Chan noted that Wu would be a more eloquent and well spoken secretary-general. Chan assessed that in addition to Wu, Ma's appointment of Yang Tu as Director of Communications and Culture and Su Chun-pin as party spokesman would strengthen public relations and improve the party's image, moving it away from the "deep Blue" extreme toward the political mainstream ahead of the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. Some of the strongest critics of Wu's and Ma's recent personnel changes, remarked Chan, are people like KMT Legislator Ting Shou-chung, who are long-time supporters of former Chairman Lien Chan. ¶11. (C) In contrast to Chan, KMT Director of Mainland Affairs Chang Jung-kung told AIT on January 9 that Wu was a "poor choice." Wu's selection "complicates" Ma's relationship with KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan and LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, explained Chang. Wu had "alienated" Lien Chan by refusing to actively support Lien's 2000 presidential bid after PFP Chairman James Soong asked Wu to be his vice president running mate. Despite being ethnic Taiwanese, Wu does not enjoy close relations with Wang and is not considered part of Wang's "bentu" (ethnic Taiwanese) faction. Chang suggested that as a result Ma will have a more difficult time forging any consensus or compromise with his two erstwhile rivals within the party. Chang cynically implied that Ma's other personnel moves mainly aimed to strengthen his position within the party at the expense of his rivals. YOUNG