Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI1273
2007-06-07 07:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

BATTLING BEIJING THROUGH FOREIGN AID DIPLOMACY

Tags:  PGOV PREL TW 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5538
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6879
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4528
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO 0019
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0159
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RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0144
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8702
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RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0146
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8838
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1801
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1934
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0314
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8133
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1141
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5902
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001273 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: BATTLING BEIJING THROUGH FOREIGN AID DIPLOMACY

REF: TAIPEI 390

Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001273 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL TW SUBJECT: BATTLING BEIJING THROUGH FOREIGN AID DIPLOMACY REF: TAIPEI 390 Classified By: AIT Deputy Director Robert S. Wang, Reason 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Taiwan's robust foreign aid and assistance programs play a key role in preserving ties with many of the 24 countries that recognize Taipei rather than Beijing. MOFA spends approximately US$300 million a year, close to a third of the ministry's annual budget, on direct aid and development programs in countries where Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations or is working to establish them. Many of these assistance programs help alleviate poverty, encourage economic development, and improve overall living standards. Taiwan, however, also continues to funnel "assistance" money to key political leaders, influential businessmen, and industries in ways that are not fully transparent, and sometimes problematic for the interests of the U.S., Australia, and other like-minded nations. The lack of transparency, Taipei argues, is necessary to avoid a "bidding" war with Beijing. End Summary. Show Me the Money -------------- ¶2. (C) Taiwan maintains a robust portfolio of foreign aid and assistance programs targeting the 24 countries that formally recognize Taipei. These programs ostensibly aim to alleviate poverty, encourage economic development, and improve overall living standards. In practice, a key objective of the aid is to preserve diplomatic ties in the face of Beijing's ongoing efforts to persuade countries to switch recognition to the PRC. ¶3. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Assistant Director-General for Economic and Trade Affairs Andrea Lee told AIT that MOFA spends approximately US$300 million a year, or close to a third of the ministry's total annual budget of NT$28 billion (US$850 million),on direct aid and development programs in countries where Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations or is working to establish them. In addition, other government agencies run their own smaller foreign assistance programs. Taiwan's foreign assistance totals only about 0.15 percent of GDP, Lee said, one-third of the level the UN recommends developed countries should contribute. Lee acknowledged that Taiwan can do more in terms of total assistance. It also needs to work harder to correct the "misperception" that it engages in "dollar diplomacy" with no accountability. ¶4. (C) Lee told AI
T that all of Taiwan's foreign assistance spending is reviewed and supervised by the Legislative Yuan (LY),and hence ultimately accountable to the Taiwan public. Lee asserted that Taiwan distributes its foreign assistance in two different ways. The first way is through transparent and open means, such as the work of the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF),which focuses on loan, humanitarian, medical, and technical assistance. The second way is through direct government-to-government assistance, such as loans for infrastructure projects and manufacturing parks, which may be less transparent in part because Taipei needs to hide the figures to avoid a "bidding" war with Beijing. Lee indicated that while aid grants are closely supervised by Taiwan's elected representatives, Taiwan officials have difficulty keeping tabs on this money once it is disbursed and are reluctant to dictate stringent terms of use for fear of alienating Taiwan's partners. ¶5. (C) Foreign policy experts here told AIT that Taiwan also resorts to a third way of distributing "assistance" by providing loans and even cash payments to key political leaders, influential businessmen, and industries of the TAIPEI 00001273 002 OF 003 receiving country. Accusations that the Taiwan government engages in dollar diplomacy surface from time to time in local media, most prominently last year when Taipei was accused of fueling instability in the Solomon Islands by providing cash payments to parliamentarians (reftel). The Presidential Office itself has hinted at the existence of less-than transparent spending on diplomatic partners when President Chen Shui-bian defended himself last year against an investigation into the misuse of Presidential Office funds by claiming that the money in question was used to conduct "secret diplomacy." ¶6. (C) According to Lee, the MOFA-directed part of Taiwan's foreign assistance consists of three pillars. The first is the ICDF, which supervises most development and humanitarian assistance programs. The second is overseas development loans that are arranged between MOFA's regional departments and the respective foreign allies, but coordinated and implemented by Lee's Department for Economic and Trade Affairs. The third consists of financing for eight industrial parks set up by Taiwan overseas to encourage Taiwan investment in areas outside of China. Lee noted, however, that these industrial park projects have proven unable to attract many high-tech companies and are faring poorly. (Note: Lee demurred specifying how the USD 300 million is broken down between these three components.) ICDF: The Public Face of Taipei's Giving -------------- ¶7. (SBU) While technically a non-government foundation, the ICDF is directed by MOFA and serves as a conduit of public, open foreign assistance from Taiwan to over 50 countries. ICDF programs focus on loan, technical, and humanitarian assistance. As of the end of 2005, the ICDF had USD 450 million in total assets and aggregate loan agreements totaling USD 500 million, with 55 percent of the capital channeled to Central America and the Caribbean, followed by 26 percent for the Pacific region. ICDF also spent approximately USD 54 million funding 35 overseas medical and technical missions. ¶8. (C) ICDF Secretary General Chen Cheng-chung told AIT that his organization was created as a foundation in 1996 from two entities supervised by the Ministry of Economics, in part because of Taiwan's unique diplomatic constraints. As an "NGO" the ICDF can facilitate the channeling of aid to both diplomatic allies and other developing countries that do not recognize Taiwan. Nevertheless, ICDF's focus remains on those diplomatic partners, with most of its aid being concentrated in Central America, Africa, and the South Pacific, Chen explained. ICDF's close working relationship with Taiwan's diplomatic partners is also evident from its co-location in the same building that houses the embassies of most of Taiwan's 25 allies. ¶9. (C) Chen told AIT that ICDF has demonstrated the capacity to substantially improve the lives of citizens living in the recipient countries. For example, Chen pointed to the success of Taiwan's anti-malaria program in eradicating malaria in Sao Tome and Principe. The ICDF also funds schools, scholarships, and training workshops. In 2005 the ICDF supported 71 students from developing countries pursuing M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Taiwan -- 40 from Latin America and 27 from Africa. ¶10. (C) Chen emphasized that the ICDF is known for the transparency and efficiency of its programs, despite their focus on diplomatic allies. Given Chinese unrelenting pressure to restrict Taiwan's space and its efforts to limit ICDF's scope of operations, Chen said, ICDF transparency TAIPEI 00001273 003 OF 003 helped counteract the stereotype that Taiwan is engaging in "dollar diplomacy." While the ICDF's work is completely transparent and in accord with World Bank standards, Chen acknowledged that "other Taiwan agencies" sometimes engage in "under-the-table" activities. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) While Taipei and Beijing's ongoing battle over diplomatic recognition in the international arena motivates both sides to continue behind-the-scenes "assistance," AIT has been underscoring to Taiwan officials at all levels that moving toward a more transparent, accountable system and expanding aid beyond official diplomatic partners will enhance Taipei's international stature as a responsible donor. Among Taiwan's government foreign assistance providers, ICDF is notable both for its relative transparency and for the substantive assistance it provides. YOUNG

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