PRESIDENT CHEN'S NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS: STANDARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000012 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2027 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHEN'S NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS: STANDARD PRO-INDEPENDENCE RHETORIC BUT NO "SURPRISES" Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In his annual New Year's address, President Chen Shui-bian discussed Taiwan's status separate from the PRC, economic development, cross-Strait economic policy, social welfare, and democratization, and he listed the major accomplishments of his administration. Chen defended established policies and well-known views, citing as evidence the record of his administration and selected public opinion polls. His speech contained no new "surprises," and he avoided a number of controversial topics, including the sensitive issue of constitutional revision. Dismissing the "illusory framework of 'one China' and 'unification with China'" promoted by previous KMT administrations, Chen claimed credit for returning the right to decide Taiwan's future to the people of Taiwan. Chen confirmed current cross-Strait gradualist economic policies. End Summary. Independence-Related Themes -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In the opening section of his January 1 address, Chen claimed credit for taking steps to return to Taiwan's people the right to determine Taiwan's destiny, breaking out of the "illusory framework of 'one China' and 'unification with China'" that had been promoted by previous Kuomintang administrations. These steps included holding Taiwan's first national referendum in 2004, and Chen's declaration last February that "the National Unification Council had ceased to function and the National Unification Guidelines had ceased to apply." Chen cited polls which he said indicated a substantial rise since 2000 in people's self-identification as Taiwanese rather than Chinese or both Taiwanese and Chinese. Chen also stated: "Our country, Taiwan, has a total land area of 36,000 square kilometers. The sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to its 23 million people, not to the PRC. Only the people of Taiwan have the right to decide Taiwan's future. Meanwhile, Taiwan is a part of the world, not of China." Cross-Strait Economic Policy -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Chen reaffirmed the more restrictive cross-Strait economic policy formulation he first announced in his New Year's address last year: "active management, effective opening," which contrasted with the previous formulation of "active opening, effective management." Chen cited selected statistics on economic performance and public opinion polls as justification for continuing his "active management, effective opening" policy. According to Chen, "the government is of one mind (on this issue),guided solely by the imperatives to put Taiwan first and strengthen Taiwan-centric consciousness." Departing from his prepared text, Chen stressed, "There is no such thing as a Su revisionist path (alluding to speculation that Premier Su Tseng-chang is taking the initiative to relax restrictions on SIPDIS economic relations with China)." Democracy and Other Topics -------------- ¶4. (SBU) After discussing sustainable economic development and social equity and welfare policies, Chen turned to the need to deal with the legacies of Taiwan's authoritarian past, including "vestiges of ideological and political dogmas based on a conceptual "Great China," idolization of former authoritarian rulers, and major problems of 'transitional justice' such as illegally acquired (KMT) party assets." Chen expressed hope for stepped up activities this year to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the February 28th incident (in which KMT troops deployed from the Mainland forcibly put down a Taiwanese uprising against a repressive KMT government). To help spread democracy, Chen announced plans to invite former national leaders of new democracies in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America to participate in the launch of a new "Global Forum on New Democracies." TAIPEI 00000012 002 OF 002 Chen's Major Accomplishments -------------- ¶5. (SBU) In the final section of his speech, Chen listed what he viewed as his administration's most important accomplishments since coming into power in 2000. These included the completion of several major projects: the world's tallest building (Taipei 101),the world's fifth longest tunnel, and the Taiwan High-Speed Railway. Chen also cited infrastructure projects and various policy achievements, such as establishment of a new labor pension scheme, nationalization of the military, ensuring an independent judiciary, and withdrawal of political parties, government, and the military from ownership or control over electronic media. Reactions to Chen's Speech -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Reactions to Chen's speech have been relatively limited. The KMT charged Chen with using a new exposition of Taiwan independence to "dope and kidnap" the Deep Green, the DPP party, and the four potential DPP presidential candidates, in hopes of forcing the "independence option" on the Taiwan people. Some KMT legislators criticized Chen for ducking the issue of the corruption scandals surrounding his administration and family. The greatest attention, however, has been focused on Chen's dismissal of "Su revisionism." Some have suggested this may be a warning to Premier Su not to go too fast in cross-Strait opening or even the beginning of a move to pressure Su to step down. Others have suggested Chen wanted to show he is in charge of the government's cross-Strait policy and that Su is not, and cannot, pursue different policies. Some politicians have even argued that Chen's rhetoric serves as political cover with the Deep Green as the DPP government continues to pursue cross-Strait opening. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Chen's rhetoric on Taiwan's status is an appeal to the Deep Green base of independence fundamentalists, the key bastion of political support he has relied on since being weakened by corruption scandals. There is little if anything new in Chen's rhetoric, however, as he has made very similar statements in a variety of previous speeches and press interviews. Unlike his 2006 New Year's address, this year Chen avoided the most sensitive programmatic issues, such as constitutional revision plans. Chen's relative restraint most probably reflects a desire to avoid antagonizing both the U.S. and the pragmatic wing within his own party. We will of course need to continue closely monitoring Chen's statements and also the DPP's actions on constitutional revision over the coming weeks and months. WANG