SCENE-SETTER FOR COMMANDER PACOM VISIT TO TONGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SUVA 000442 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM TN SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR COMMANDER PACOM VISIT TO TONGA REF: A. SUVA 435 ¶B. USDAO SUVA 131933Z AUG 07 ¶C. SUVA 405 (AND PREVIOUS) Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) A first visit to the Kingdom of Tonga is always fascinating, as is a meeting with eccentric King George V. The U.S. and Tonga have friendly relations, especially mil/mil, as evidenced by the new Tonga Defense Service (TDS) deployment to Iraq. Within Tonga, pro-democracy sentiments have been building for several years. The U.S. encourages a Tonga-managed transition to a Tongan-style democracy at as rapid a pace as Tongans can accept. Pro-democracy activists want major results yesterday. Conservatives want no change. Frictions led to a devastating riot last November that shocked everyone. It appears all now agree that major reforms are inevitable; the remaining questions are pace and "nut and bolt" details. The TDS will play a role. Historically its loyalty has been to the King, who is seemingly now ON board to limit his own powers dramatically. As the democratic evolution unfolds, it will be important for the U.S. to encourage the TDS to be a force that accepts, and helps ensure, a securely democratic future for Tonga. End summary. Friendly bilateral relations -------------- ¶2. (U) The U.S. relationship with the Kingdom of Tonga has been friendly for many years. The current six-month deployment of 55 TDS troops to Iraq, with plans for a follow-on deployment, illustrates the close mil/mil ties. The annual Exercise Tafakula is further proof. Many Tongans reside in the United States, especially in Utah, California, and Hawaii. Tonga often votes with the U.S. at the UNGA and in other international fora. Peace Corps has been active in Tonga since the 1960s. A monarchy with British touches -------------- ¶3. (C) The "friendly islands" of Tonga were not a united monarchy until the mid-1800s, when King George I accomplished that feat. Tonga then solidified its political system via the Constitution of 1875, which made the King head of state with broad powers over the Parliament that consists of the King's Cabinet (12-16 people),9 Nobles (elected by the 33 Nobles of the Realm),and 9 People's Representatives (elected every three years in general elections). The King chooses the Prime Minister, who, until recently, was almost always a royal or noble. The political system ensured Parliament would abide by the King's wishes. Britain took a fatherly interest in Tongan governance from the mid-1800s until recently, but Tonga was never formally a colony. The King has ruled. Anti-royal, pro-democratic stirrings in the populace -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Not surprisingly, some Tongans have chafed at the lack of genuine democracy. Since the late 1980s, the most prominent reform advocate has been Akilisi Pohiva, a People's Rep from the main island, Tongatapu. For many years, his calls for a more democratic system appeared futile. However, popular sentiment has been building, in part stimulated by royal insensitivity. King Tupou IV, who died at age 88 ON September 10, 2006, chose some very odd advisors, including an American "court jester" who reportedly squandered millions of dollars of Tonga investments. The late King's children made sweet-heart deals with government agencies. Now-King George V, gained the electricity monopoly, which he named "Shoreline." Princess Pilolevu gained TongaSat, which leases satellite slots to Chinese entities. The youngest child, now-Crown Prince Tupouto'a Lavaka'ata, has a lucrative land lease with the LDS Church. There are many more examples. The public noticed. ¶5. (C) A complicating factor was that the now-Crown Prince became Prime Minister in 2000. His instincts were very conservative, at a time when the public mood was stirring. In 2005, the Tonga Government began to implement civil-service reforms that inexplicably raised the wages for top-tier public servants before assisting those at the bottom. Civil servants hit the streets in a strike that lasted for seven weeks, became very bitter as the PM stone-walled, and became a rallying point for pro-democracy SUVA 00000442 002 OF 004 campaigners as well. In the end, Princess Pilolevu capitulated ON behalf of the government when the PM was abroad. Almost immediately, pro-democracy activists flexed their muscles with a demonstration that brought thousands to the streets of the capital. Signs and slogans were vehemently anti-royal. Sensing the inevitability of reform; U.S. view -------------- - ¶6. (C) As a result, for the first time, all elements in Tonga began to consider if a more democratic future was inevitable. The U.S. has encouraged a Tonga-managed transition to a meaningful Tonga-style democracy at as rapid a pace as Tongans can accept. In late 2005, Parliament established, with royal assent, a National Committee for Political Reform, headed by a royal cousin, Prince Tu'ipelehake. The NCPR held discussions throughout Tonga and in New Zealand, Australia, and the U.S. (Tu'ipelehake was killed in a car crash near San Francisco during the U.S. leg of the trip.) The late King initiated some reforms. He for the first time chose two People's Reps (one of them now-PM Fred Sevele) to be members of Cabinet. Later, ON advice of now-King George V, the late King removed younger son Lavaka'ata as PM and replaced him with Sevele, the first commoner to be PM since a Brit in the late 1800s. In September 2006, the NCPR issued a report to Parliament that recommended dramatic reform: a fully elected Parliament, with a majority of People's Reps and with Parliament selecting its Prime Minister. The King presumably would act ON "advice" of Parliament. Attempt at slowing pace results in riot -------------- ¶7. (C) Some in Tonga, including PM Sevele, worried conservative elements would forcibly resist any rapid reforms that caused power to flow from the King to commoners. Some presumed the King was egging Sevele on. Sevele proposed an alternative plan that might leave the King with a delicate balance of power in Parliament. The Government then slowed Parliament's deliberative process. Pro-democracy forces were outraged and began public demonstrations. Last November 16, pro-Government demonstrators also hit the streets. Some others with private agendas got involved. A riot erupted from the anti-Government throng that brought destruction to many businesses in the central district. Businesses of the King and PM Sevele were destroyed. Chinese-owned businesses were also targeted. Eight rioters died in a torched building. It was a shocking day for normally laid-back Tonga, and it sobered everyone. Dealing with crimes; TDS role -------------- ¶8. (C) Tonga Police were ineffective in responding to the riot. PM Sevele called ON the TDS, with some Australian and New Zealand assistance, to restore order and begin interrogating/arresting wrong-doers. Many Tongans blamed much of the violence ON "deportees" from the United States. Some "deportees" were probably involved, but almost certainly most of those who committed crimes were home-grown. There were reports of human-rights violations. Activists claimed many violations; the TDS claimed very few, and it says all were investigated and dealt with. PM Sevele was extremely embittered by the riot, and he blamed the pro-democracy leaders, his old friends. Those leaders have acknowledged stirring political pressure for the reform agenda, but they deny planning or instigating the riot. Criminal cases against alleged perpetrators, including five People's Reps, are moving through the courts. A state of emergency that gives the TDS special law-and-order powers has been renewed monthly, and probably will stay in place until after the trials conclude. Re-starting reform; real progress made -------------- ¶9. (C) Immediately after the riot, the King gave a forward-looking speech at the close of Parliament, expressing sorrow for the devastation but calling for continuation of inevitable reform. For many months, Sevele was visibly reluctant to re-start the reform agenda. However, it appears he came to realize, as others did, that popular resentment was beginning to stir toward the surface again. Nobody wanted another riot. In June, Parliament set up a "tripartite committee" (Cabinet, Nobles, People's Reps) to attempt to find the future. In a matter of weeks, the group announced agreement ON a proposal for a new Parliament with 9 Nobles, 17 People's Reps, and up to 4 members selected by the King, a clear People's Rep majority. The Parliament would SUVA 00000442 003 OF 004 choose the PM from within, and the PM would select the Cabinet from within. We hear the King is ON board with that plan. But tough issues remain -------------- ¶10. (C) Sticking points remain. The Constitution requires an election every three years. The next one is due in January ¶2008. People's Reps want to stick to that schedule. Sevele wants to put off the election to 2011, to let passions calm and perhaps to gain political and/or economic advantage in the meantime. Reportedly, People's Reps are now willing to accept 2009, and Sevele 2010. We hear the King would have OKed 2008. He wants to move on. The other big issues remaining are the details of electoral districts and voting processes. Those details matter to individual politicians as they calculate their futures. There has been no consensus, and the tripartite committee has referred unresolved issues back to Parliament to chew on. Until Parliament votes for a plan and the King approves, nothing is in final. Rebuilding is slow, costly, and controversial -------------- ¶11. (C) The process of rebuilding Nuku'alofa is off to a slow start. Insurance companies have been reluctant to pay. Some contracts have "insurrection" or "riot" clauses. Sevele, himself, reportedly has been under severe financial pressure, though we hear he may be reaching a settlement ON his insurance shortly. Commercial banks, unwilling to accept exchange-rate risk, will not bring in sufficient off-shore capital to finance most reconstruction. Australia and New Zealand are offering only modest sums to help make loans concessional. At one point, Sevele asked if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers might help rebuild infrastructure, though he never followed up. Tonga approached the PRC Government and has received a US$55 million loan. We hear it is tied aid, and that future exchange-rate revisions could make it very expensive. The King has taken a personal interest in rebuilding plans. He is working with Chinese architects ON a vision to tear down the heart of central Nuku'alofa and replace it with...some suggest the blueprint evokes the Italian Renaissance or London's Horse Guards Parade, not a South Pacific theme. Many details remain unresolved, including how Tonga businesses will be convinced to participate in the scheme by leasing space. Economy in trouble -------------- ¶12. (C) The strike settlement in 2005 raised the salaries of lower-paid public servants by 60-80% and put government finances under severe strain. In the best of times, the Tonga economy is fragile, based ON pumpkin exports to Japan, a smattering of tourists, and large-scale remittances from Tongans abroad. More Tongans live in Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. than live in Tonga, and remittances reportedly constitute more than half of Tonga's GDP, providing the only safety net for the poor. The Tonga Government has invoked creative means, including a 2006 redundancy package that reduced the civil service by over 20%, to keep fiscally afloat. Reportedly the IMF is worried that the Chinese loan for Nuku'alofa reconstruction will be unaffordable; but the Sevele government, seeing no other obvious means to finance reconstruction, pushed it through. The China factor -------------- ¶13. (C) Chinese relations are worth noting. For many years, Tonga had extremely close relations with Taiwan. The Crown Prince (now King George V) was particularly friendly. Then in 1998, relations suddenly switched to the PRC, most likely through efforts of Princess Pilolevu and her TongaSat connections. For several years, Tonga sold "investor" passports to Chinese citizens. To Tonga's surprise, a number of the passport holders actually came to Tonga. Then relatives and friends followed. Before the riot, most small retail shops in Nuku'alofa had become Chinese owned and operated. Many Tongans, including other businessmen like Sevele, resented the Chinese in-flow. Thus, the targeting of Chinese shops in the riot was not surprising. Many Chinese fled Tonga immediately afterward, though we hear some are trickling back. The Chinese Embassy cultivates the Tongan royal family (the King is rumored to have a $30 million interest-free loan); other Tongan leaders receive trips; and there are the usual PRC offers of heavily tied infrastructure projects. We hear the King has been frustrated at his Government's inability to untie post-riot reconstruction aid. SUVA 00000442 004 OF 004 Reconciliation versus riot control -------------- ¶14. (C) Many nerves in post-riot Tonga remain raw, ON all sides. The King is still seen by many commoners as detached, effete, profligate, and (perhaps unfairly) undemocratic. Many pro-democracy activists blame Sevele for the riot and for slowing change. The King and Sevele are clearly worried about the public mood. The King reportedly is insisting ON flat roofs in his architectural plans for Nuku'alofa, so snipers can easily position themselves to shoot future rioters. The King is seeking donor assistance for a "horse guards" unit, 200 horses strong, ostensibly for ceremony but primarily for future crowd control. Reconciliation is necessary, and some efforts are beginning. Sevele has named a Utah-Tongan to head the Government's effort, aimed to culminate this year during the week of November 16. Internal political-military dynamics -------------- ¶15. (C) The future of the TDS bears pondering. It has always been seen as the King's force. Its loyalty has always been to the Crown. That has worked to the advantage of the U.S. in the decision-making about Tonga contributing again to PKO in Iraq. All Tongan leaders understand the usefulness of Tonga helping us to achieve international peace and stability, but PM Sevele and Foreign/Defense Minister Tu'a are doubtful about Iraq. Sevele sees political peril if there are casualties. Tu'a perhaps figures that other nations are withdrawing from that cause. In Defense Board deliberations, the King, assisted by Brigadier General Uta'atu, trumped, and the deployments are to happen. However, Sevele and Tu'a have now called for a U.S. "quid pro quo": find a way to adjudicate visas for Tongan applicants in Tonga rather than in Suva, or Tonga "will not be disposed" to assist the U.S. "in the military and other fields." Washington is working ON a response. Nurturing the appropriate TDS role -------------- ¶16. (C) The day-to-day role the TDS has taken during the state of emergency has reportedly raised hackles among some in the public. BG Uta'atu has plans to dramatically expand the size and capabilities of his force. From the perspective of having more Tongan help in international PKO, that idea is very attractive. However, at times Uta'atu has given the impression he is getting quite comfortable with his powers under the state of emergency. He is a friend of Fiji's Commodore Bainimarama, and he has some sympathy for the Fiji military's assumption that it has a caretaker role over politics. As Tonga's transition from monarchy to democracy moves forward, it will be important for the U.S. to encourage the TDS, to the extent possible, to be a force that accepts and helps ensure a democratic future for Tonga. Themes for discussion -------------- ¶17. (C) In conversations with the King, PM Sevele (if he is on island),Foreign/Defense Minister Tu'a, and BG Uta'atu, the main topic presumably will be the close U.S.-Tonga military relationship. The politicians understand the usefulness of Tonga contributing to international PKO -- they have approved Tonga contributions to RAMSI in the Solomons and to UNAMI; but there is a need to counter what Sevele and Tu'a see as the domestic-political down-side of the Iraq deployment. As opportunities arise in discussions, it will be useful to reconfirm the USG's support for Tonga's inevitable transformation to a more democratic future, at as rapid a pace as Tongans can accept, with the TDS playing a constructive role in that process. Also, as the TDS expands in size, it will be in the U.S. interest to have that larger force deploying abroad to assist in PKO, rather than focusing internally ON domestic politics. DINGER