FIJI PM OFFICE PERMANENT SECRETARY MEETS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SUVA 000223 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017 TAGS: ASEC AMGT CASC PREL FJ SUBJECT: FIJI PM OFFICE PERMANENT SECRETARY MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR DINGER ON EMBASSY BARRIERS ISSUE REF: A. SUVA 220 ¶B. SUVA 212 Classified By: Ambassador Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B) and (D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) PM Office Permanent Secretary Parmesh Chand told the Ambassador April 17 that interim PM Bainimarama issued the directive to remove barriers in front of the Embassy because he was very upset about U.S. comments against the interim government. These included the video conference DAS Davies held with reporters in March, the revocation of Bainimarama's visa, and statements made by DAS Davies during his visit to Fiji (which were after the first barriers notice). We responded to Chand's litany and provided U.S. arguments why the barriers need to stay in place. Chand asked how the United States might reciprocate if the interim government does not remove the barriers. Chand seemed to accept the Ambassador's statement that the United States does not link Embassy security issues with our political stance on the interim regime. Chand said that he hopes the U.S. and Fiji could find "a middle ground" to defuse the barrier issue. Perhaps there is a need "to buy some time," he said. The Ambassador raised the issue of visas for OBO employees to work on the NEC. Chand sought clarification on the status of the OBO people: USG employees or contractors? Chand said a possible "compromise" might be to focus attention on the U.S. commitment to construct the NEC, the long-term solution to the Loftus Street problem. Chand said he would discuss these issues with Bainimarama and contact the Ambassador again shortly. End summary. Ambassador Explains Why the Barriers are Needed -------------- -- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by reviewing why the United States believes the vehicle barriers are needed to stop a potential terrorist attack and are a bargain for Fiji. Even though there are no specific indications of international terror activity in Fiji at the moment, there have been indicators in the past, and experience tells us that no location is immune. If the barriers are taken down, the Embassy would be an easy target. Most victims of any attack would be Fiji citizens. It is in the interest of both the United States and Fiji to protect the Embassy. The barriers are clearly the best way to do that. The Ambassador noted that Fiji and the United States have worked together since 1998 to ensure the security of the Embassy. The current arrangement has worked well and should continue, at least for the next two years until a new embassy compound (NEC) can be completed. Per guidance from Washington, the Ambassador said the USG will not remove the barriers itself, will suspend visa operations during any removal operation, will need assurances that Fiji authorities will ensure sufficient security thereafter (an expensive proposition), and will make a fresh assessment of the embassy's security posture, impact on visa services, etc. (We are e-mailing the talking points to EAP/ANP). Interim PM's Anger At US Reached a Boiling Point -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Chand said the decision by Bainimarama to order removal of the barriers "happened at the spur of the moment." He said U.S. actions over the past several weeks "haven't helped Fiji at all, and the interim PM has become very upset." In the current environment, Chand continued, the U.S. should "exercise some sensitivity and caution in presenting its views. The situation in Fiji is tense, and we don't want people out there lecturing us." ¶4. (C) Chand specifically mentioned the video teleconference DAS Davies held with Fiji journalists in March, the cancellation of Bainimarama's visa, and comments made by DAS Davies during his recent visit to Fiji. Echoing statements Bainimarama made in his statement last week (ref B),Chand said DAS Davies' comments in the DVC were "made from thousands of miles away, without realizing the real situation here." The letter to the interim PM requesting that he bring his visa to the Embassy to be canceled showed a lack of sensitivity to the leader of a foreign country and was a violation of basic protocol. Finally, even though DAS Davies held meetings with two senior interim government officials (Foreign Minister Nailatikau and Finance Minister Chaudhry), he "made a big song and dance about the interim PM not seeing him." U.S. Responses -------------- SUVA 00000223 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The Ambassador responded that the U.S. has conveyed a consistent message about the coup and the interim government. DAS Davies held to that message, which emphasized agreement with the Pacific Island Forum countries on the way forward, in both his DVC and his visit to Suva. The cancellation of Bainimarama's visa was done privately, as far as the USG was concerned. It was the Commodore who publicized it, and he publicly said he understood that the embassy merely offered the option of bringing the visa in for cancellation, it was not a requirement. As for comments about the lack of a Bainimarama meeting, DAS Davies merely noted it was a "lost opportunity," which it was. Chand acknowledged that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a diplomatic note requesting removal of the barriers prior to Davies' visit, but insisted the visit contributed to the generally tense atmosphere that led to the Commander's decision to force removal of the barriers. Any Way to Make A Deal? -------------- ¶6. (C) Noting that the interim PM had already issued the directive publicly to remove the barriers, Chand said the only thing he could do would be to present the Ambassador's views. Chand said Bainimarama had asked him to find out how the U.S. might reciprocate if the interim government decided not to remove the barriers. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. political stance on the coup and the interim government is totally separate from the security issues facing the Embassy. A more appropriate question might be to ask what the U.S. might do if the barriers are indeed removed. The Ambassador inquired what specific U.S. steps the interim PM was suggesting? Chand did not answer, but said he understood that the political and security issues are not linked. A Middle Ground? -------------- ¶7. (C) Chand asked if there is any way, short of vehicle barriers, to adequately protect the Embassy. Road bumps or a ban on parking or stopping on Loftus Street? The Ambassador replied that the vehicle barriers appear to be the only reliable method to prevent a potential car bomb, since they force vehicles to stop and be checked. Chand said he was trying to think of a way out of the dilemma. "Maybe we need to buy some time," he said. "Perhaps there is a middle ground." The Ambassador expressed willingness to have experts explore if alternatives to the barriers could be effective, but he noted the embassy would likely have already implemented such alternatives if they were obvious. A Package Solution Involving the NEC? -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted that the ultimate solution to the problem of security at the Embassy is for the USG to construct its own building with set-back. That construction is ready to begin, but is being held up because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs won't confer diplomatic status on the new Embassy staff who will be overseeing the project. Chand said that Finance Minister Chaudhry had raised the issue (after his meeting with DAS Davies),but MFA had responded that the U.S. was asking Fiji to confer diplomatic status on contractors who were not employed by the Department of State. The Ambassador offered to seek clarification on that right away. (We are doing so via separate e-mail). Chand suggested that, if the visa issue could be resolved, construction of the NEC might offer a way out of the current dilemma. The interim government, he said, might highlight NEC construction as a solution to the Loftus Street problem while both sides could state that the construction illustrates continued U.S. involvement in Fiji. Chand stressed he was speaking informally. He said he would discuss these issues with Bainimarama and get back to the Ambassador by the morning of April 18. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Chand left no doubt that interim PM Bainimarama and his military colleagues frequently react in knee-jerk fashion to irritations. The U.S. strong stand against the coup and the interim government's activities is such an irritation. We provided the arguments for the vehicle barriers to stay in place, and Chand appeared to understand them. He clearly wants to find a "compromise" way out. Whether Bainimarama will accept such a "compromise" is not at all clear. If we can resolve the NEC visa flap and can advertise the construction project as the "compromise" there may be a way forward. We are not yet optimistic. DINGER