ANTI-IMMIGRATION SWEDEN DEMOCRATS ON THE RISE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 000008 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/NB E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV SOCI PHUM SW SUBJECT: ANTI-IMMIGRATION SWEDEN DEMOCRATS ON THE RISE ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: The nationalistic Sweden Democrats gained 2.9% of the national vote in September, capitalizing on anti-immigration sentiment. The party and its views on restricting immigration are treated with suspicion by the mainstream parties and media. The Sweden Democrats claim that they are only proposing policies similar to existing laws in Denmark. The party's relative electoral success will give it a more visible role in questioning Swedish immigration policy. End Summary. ¶2. (U) In September, the Sweden Democrats had their best election result ever, receiving 2.9% of the national vote, doubling their result compared to the national election in 2002. They have increased their support more than eightfold since 1998. Today, the party holds 280 elected posts in 140 municipalities, up from 49 mandates in 29 municipalities in 2002. The party's growth in power has happened despite a weak party organization, poor economic resources, and the lack of a strong charismatic leader. This increase also happened despite the party largely being shunned by the mainstream media and excluded from the political debate. The Reasons behind the Sweden Democrats' Rise -------------- ¶3. (U) Critics claim that the party is xenophobic. At the same time many politicians and opinion makers explain the success of the Sweden Democrats as a phenomenon of people voting in protest against the establishment. Although a significant number of working class voters in southern Sweden abandoned traditional Social Democrat loyalties to vote for the Sweden Democrats, it is an oversimplification to characterize this merely as a protest against the establishment. The Sweden Democrats enjoy genuine support for their policy line on immigration and integration. According to a Gallup poll published in October, 49% of Swedes agreed that "Immigrants should adapt to Swedish society, and not the other way around," 31% supported the idea that "Sweden has received far too many immigrants in a too short a period of time," 12% agreed that "Foreign citizens who cannot support themselves financially should return to their home countries," and 40% adhered to the view that "The burden of proof in cases concerning refugee status and residence permits should be tightened." ¶4. (U) A significant proportion of the electorate supports a more restrictive line on immigration; yet none of the seven parties in parliament advocate this view. With 12.8% of the population born abroad, Sweden is one of the EU states with the highest proportion of "immigrants." The rising strength of the Sweden Democrats indicates that Sweden is following a wider European trend of increased support for nationalistic parties opposed to immigration. ¶5. (U) On the municipal level, it appears that factors such as immigration, crime, and the degree of welfare dependence correlate with support for the Sweden Democrats. The municipality of Landskrona is a perfect example, where the Sweden Democrats registered their strongest election performance nationwide by gaining 22.3% of the total vote and becoming the third largest party. Landskrona has a large proportion of immigrants, with almost a quarter of the population born abroad, a reported crime rate 60% higher than the national average, and welfare payments more than double the national average, according to the leading daily Dagens Nyheter. Prime Minister Reinfeldt's visit to Landskrona on December 11 is also indicative of the seriousness with which the Government views the challenge from the Sweden Democrats. ¶6. (U) In a broader study of all municipalities the newsmagazine Fokus compared municipalities where the Sweden Democrats have received a mandate to those in which they had not. Crime rate levels were on average 19% higher, welfare dependence 27% higher, and the net numbers of refugees per 1000 inhabitants was three times higher in municipalities where the Sweden Democrats were elected to city council posts. Strong Reactions against Policies Opposing Immigration -------------- -------------- ¶7. (U) Politics in Sweden are in general less confrontational than in many other European states. A consensual approach where parties on opposite sides unite around a common policy is not unusual. The political debate is consequently not as broad and confrontational as in other countries. The consensual approach is also reflected in the public debate. On immigration there appears to be a tacit agreement that none of the established parties will overtly try to capitalize on sentiment opposed to further immigration. Sweden's strongly embedded egalitarian values also appear to have set definite limits to the media debate, making a tough line on immigration policy a controversial, and almost suspect view. This is in contrast to Sweden's neighbors Norway and Denmark, which have established parliamentary parties advocating restrictions on immigration. STOCKHOLM 00000008 002 OF 003 Strong Reactions against the Sweden Democrats -------------- ¶8. (U) Opposition to the Sweden Democrats as a political movement has manifested itself in various forms. The Sweden Democrats were largely frozen out of the political debate and given minimal media coverage before the election. Following the strong showing of the party in the September election, many opinion makers have voiced the view that this was a mistake. However, the united opposition to the Sweden Democrats across the political spectrum remains intact. According to Dagens Nyheter, the Sweden Democrats hold the potential balance of power in 41 municipalities. In 30 of these, alliances between mainstream center-left and center-right parties have arisen to keep the Sweden Democrats out. And in none of the 41 municipalities has any party formally formed an alliance with the Sweden Democrats. ¶9. (U) Left wing extremists have long targeted the Sweden Democrats. As a result, party meetings are usually not announced publicly to avoid trouble, and members of the party have been physically assaulted. The party leadership also claims that its email has been intercepted. Just before the election, some candidates for the party were without their knowledge reregistered with the national tax authority as living at new addresses, apparently in an attempt to prevent them from being elected. In October the Sweden Democrats held a meeting for newly elected local government representatives. Even though the meeting's location was changed to avoid conflict, left-wing demonstrators attacked it, destroying two cars, breaking windows, and injuring the Party Secretary. Later in November one member of the Sweden Democrats SIPDIS stepped down from his elected position in Skurup municipality, stating the threats against the party as the reason for the resignation. ¶10. (U) Members of the party also report that association with the party is widely viewed as a disadvantage in professional life. A recent high profile example was an incident in October when the Swedish Ambassador in Tel Aviv asked an intern to immediately leave the embassy after it came to his knowledge that he was an active member of the Sweden Democrats. Ambassador Rydberg told Dagens Nyheter that the intern should have openly declared his political engagement and that "...an active engagement in a party which all Swedish parliamentary parties view as undemocratic and xenophobic is not compatible with working for a Swedish mission abroad." ¶11. (U) In February, the Government shut down websites run by the Sweden Democrats, following the eruption of public anger in the Muslim world against a Danish newspaper's publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. In January, the Sweden Democrats' party paper SD-Kurriren had announced a cartoon competition. In early February, the Sweden Democrats' Youth League and SD-Kuriren published some of these drawings on their websites. On February 8, a government representative from the Foreign Ministry and members of the Security Police contacted the internet service provider Levonline warning them that the Sweden's Democrats website may pose a threat to national security. The next day Levonline made the domains belonging to the Sweden Democrats inaccessible. On February 9, the Lebanese TV channel al-Manar reported that Sweden was heckling the Prophet. Afterwards the Government came under sharp criticism for its handling of the situation, which eventually contributed to the resignation of then Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds. What Do the Sweden Democrats Really Want? -------------- ¶12. (SBU) There is little public sympathy for the Sweden Democrats, and the party is still associated with its xenophobic views of the late eighties and early nineties (and with some of the party's former leaders from that era). Some of the party's action program is strongly nationalistic. Today's Sweden Democrat party has evolved and seen a change in leadership. The Sweden Democrats still reject multiculturalism and advocate assimilation, but distance themselves from racism. In October, party leader Jimmie Akesson told Poloff the Sweden Democrats are not against immigration per se, but rather want it well regulated, and significantly reduced. Akesson says the Sweden Democrats view Denmark as a model for the application of restrictive policies that successfully reduced a large immigrant influx. ¶13. (U) Akesson commented on the new Swedish Government's policy declaration (October 2006) on his blog. He was most opposed to the proposed labor migration legislation, but also expressed reservations about increased integration with the EU. He complained that there was no mention in the entire speech of the growing threat of Islam. The Sweden Democrat's policy on topics other than immigration is not very developed. Foreign policy positions include adherence to non-alignment (cooperation with NATO is OK, but membership is out of the question),and skepticism of an overly STOCKHOLM 00000008 003 OF 003 powerful EU. On domestic policy, the party has profiled itself on tougher crime policy and strong provisions for the elderly. It is also clearly conservative on values. ¶14. (U) Many suspect the Sweden Democrats have a hidden agenda. Until Mikael Jansson, formerly of the Center Party, assumed leadership of the party in 1995, the Sweden Democrats had a significant extremist following. Jansson initiated a shift towards becoming a more "normal" party, and the current leader Akesson has continued in this tradition. However, over the past years the NGO Expo has continued to identify individuals active in the Sweden Democrats who have also had connections to extremist organizations. The Sweden Democrats have expelled some of these people, and a significant group of more extreme Sweden Democrats left the party in 2001 to form the National Democrats. In an effort to increase its support the Sweden Democrat party is working to come across as a normal and non-extremist party. The Future of the Party -------------- ¶15. (U) The fact that no party is collaborating with the Sweden Democrats means that the party will be able to continue to play an "outsider" role, allowing it to attract those discontented by what they see as "the establishment parties." The strategy of ignoring the Sweden Democrats appears to have failed, and many mainstream columnists have advocated a more confrontational approach. ¶16. (U) The Sweden Democrats' party organization is weak. There are only approximately 2,500 registered members of the party. With its 2006 electoral success, the party is now entitled to 41 million SEK (approx. 6 million USD) in state aid over the next years until the 2010 election. This represents an enormous increase for the party, which plans to channel one quarter of the funds to strengthen the national organization. ¶17. (SBU) Comment: The fundamental reason behind the Sweden Democrats' growing success is popular discontent among a small but growing minority of the population with immigration policies accepted by all Swedish mainstream political parties. Support for the Sweden Democrats has the potential to increase as long as immigration and integration continue to be viewed as problems that, in the eyes of some of the electorate, remain unaddressed by the mainstream parties. Until the next election (2010),mainstream parties are unlikely to make debate with the Sweden Democrats a front-burner issue. However, with several political commentators having predicted that the Sweden Democrats could in 2010 pass the 4% threshold required for parliamentary representation, the Sweden Democrats will play an increasingly visible role in questioning Sweden's immigration policies. End Comment. KOLLIST