SWEDEN: DEMARCHE ON KOSOVO TIMELINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 000069 SIPDIS SIPDIS BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU OPDC SW SUBJECT: SWEDEN: DEMARCHE ON KOSOVO TIMELINE REF: STATE 5652 Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (c) Polcouns made reftel demarche urging support for Ahtisaari's proposed timeline 1/19 to MFA Deputy Director General and Head of Department for Eastern Europe and Central Asia Ambassador Mats Staffansson, who was joined by Western Balkans Head Lars Wahlund. Polcouns also raised the issue with Prime Minister Reinfeldt's State Secretary and Foreign Policy Adviser Nicola Clase. Both Staffansson and Clase said, with some nuances, that they expected that at the end of the day Sweden would support UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plans and timeline. ¶2. (c) Clase underscored current divisions within the EU -- in particular the countries that were concerned about a precedent effect on independence movements in their own territories -- but noted that Sweden supported Ahtisaari and would go with the rest of the EU, if these countries could be brought along. ¶3. (c) Staffansson and Wahlund underscored the history and personal engagement of Foreign Minister Bildt in Balkan issues, noting that he had just returned a few days earlier from a trip to Serbia. Wahlund had accompanied him, and raised with us a litany of potential problems that could arise following the 1/21 parliamentary elections in Serbia, and that would make it desirable for Ahtisaari to wait until a new government was formed before presenting his plan. Pressed, Wahlund and Staffansson, who has been Ambassador to Belgrade, said these concerns were views of some experts in the MFA, but they expected that Bildt would fully support Ahtisaari's proposed timing and plan. Bildt was personally engaged and brought a wealth of personal experience to the Balkan issues. In his briefing to the Parliament 1/19, Bildt emphasized the importance of these elections, but did not comment on the Ahtisaari plan. ¶4. (c) Asked about dynamics within the EU, Staffansson said that France had expressed an openness to considering a delay in of a couple of weeks in the Ahtisaari timetable, Italy would prefer a postponement, the UK might consider one, and German views were divided within the government. ¶5. (c) Staffansson noted that the expectations in Kosovo were enormous and cited Bildt as saying that Kosovo's independence would be good for Serbia and bad for Kosovo. Without the drain of Kosovo, Serbia would qualify earlier to become closer to the EU, whereas an independent Kosovo could never reach its expectations. Staffansson added that Russia was playing a cynical game. It had no real interests in Serbia, in contrast to the investment it has made in Montenegro. Comment -------------- ¶6. (c) It was fairly clear that some of the working level of the MFA would prefer to see a government formed before Ahtisaari presents his plan; it was very clear from both the MFA and Clase that Bildt will make this decision personally, and is expected to support Ahtisaari's timeline and plan. WOOD