Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STOCKHOLM69
2007-01-19 15:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Stockholm
Cable title:
SWEDEN: DEMARCHE ON KOSOVO TIMELINE
VZCZCXYZ0022 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHSM #0069 0191520 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 191520Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1592 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0134 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0122 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0143 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0008 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1194 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0145
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 000069
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU OPDC SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN: DEMARCHE ON KOSOVO TIMELINE
REF: STATE 5652
Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 000069
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU OPDC SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN: DEMARCHE ON KOSOVO TIMELINE
REF: STATE 5652
Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (c) Polcouns made reftel demarche urging support for
Ahtisaari's proposed timeline 1/19 to MFA Deputy Director
General and Head of Department for Eastern Europe and Central
Asia Ambassador Mats Staffansson, who was joined by Western
Balkans Head Lars Wahlund. Polcouns also raised the issue
with Prime Minister Reinfeldt's State Secretary and Foreign
Policy Adviser Nicola Clase. Both Staffansson and Clase
said, with some nuances, that they expected that at the end
of the day Sweden would support UN Special Envoy Martti
Ahtisaari's plans and timeline.
2. (c) Clase underscored current divisions within the EU --
in particular the countries that were concerned about a
precedent effect on independence movements in their own
territories -- but noted that Sweden supported Ahtisaari and
would go with the rest of the EU, if these countries could be
brought along.
3. (c) Staffansson and Wahlund underscored the history and
personal engagement of Foreign Minister Bildt in Balkan
issues, noting that he had just returned a few days earlier
from a trip to Serbia. Wahlund had accompanied him, and
raised with us a litany of potential problems that could
arise following the 1/21 parliamentary elections in Serbia,
and that would make it desirable for Ahtisaari to wait until
a new government was formed before presenting his plan.
Pressed, Wahlund and Staffansson, who has been Ambassador to
Belgrade, said these concerns were views of some experts in
the MFA, but they expected that Bildt would fully support
Ahtisaari's proposed timing and plan. Bildt was personally
engaged and brought a wealth of personal experience to the
Balkan issues. In his briefing to the Parliament 1/19, Bildt
emphasized the importance of these elections, but did not
comment on the Ahtisaari plan.
4. (c) Asked about dynamics within the EU, Staffansson said
that France had expressed an openness to considering a delay
in of a couple of weeks in the Ahtisaari timetable, Italy
would prefer a postponement, the UK might consider one, and
German views were divided within the government.
5. (c) Staffansson noted that the expectations in Kosovo
were enormous and cited Bildt as saying that Kosovo's
independence would be good for Serbia and bad for Kosovo.
Without the drain of Kosovo, Serbia would qualify earlier to
become closer to the EU, whereas an independent Kosovo could
never reach its expectations. Staffansson added that Russia
was playing a cynical game. It had no real interests in
Serbia, in contrast to the investment it has made in
Montenegro.
Comment
--------------
6. (c) It was fairly clear that some of the working level of
the MFA would prefer to see a government formed before
Ahtisaari presents his plan; it was very clear from both the
MFA and Clase that Bildt will make this decision personally,
and is expected to support Ahtisaari's timeline and plan.
WOOD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
BELGRADE PASS PODGORICA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU OPDC SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN: DEMARCHE ON KOSOVO TIMELINE
REF: STATE 5652
Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (c) Polcouns made reftel demarche urging support for
Ahtisaari's proposed timeline 1/19 to MFA Deputy Director
General and Head of Department for Eastern Europe and Central
Asia Ambassador Mats Staffansson, who was joined by Western
Balkans Head Lars Wahlund. Polcouns also raised the issue
with Prime Minister Reinfeldt's State Secretary and Foreign
Policy Adviser Nicola Clase. Both Staffansson and Clase
said, with some nuances, that they expected that at the end
of the day Sweden would support UN Special Envoy Martti
Ahtisaari's plans and timeline.
2. (c) Clase underscored current divisions within the EU --
in particular the countries that were concerned about a
precedent effect on independence movements in their own
territories -- but noted that Sweden supported Ahtisaari and
would go with the rest of the EU, if these countries could be
brought along.
3. (c) Staffansson and Wahlund underscored the history and
personal engagement of Foreign Minister Bildt in Balkan
issues, noting that he had just returned a few days earlier
from a trip to Serbia. Wahlund had accompanied him, and
raised with us a litany of potential problems that could
arise following the 1/21 parliamentary elections in Serbia,
and that would make it desirable for Ahtisaari to wait until
a new government was formed before presenting his plan.
Pressed, Wahlund and Staffansson, who has been Ambassador to
Belgrade, said these concerns were views of some experts in
the MFA, but they expected that Bildt would fully support
Ahtisaari's proposed timing and plan. Bildt was personally
engaged and brought a wealth of personal experience to the
Balkan issues. In his briefing to the Parliament 1/19, Bildt
emphasized the importance of these elections, but did not
comment on the Ahtisaari plan.
4. (c) Asked about dynamics within the EU, Staffansson said
that France had expressed an openness to considering a delay
in of a couple of weeks in the Ahtisaari timetable, Italy
would prefer a postponement, the UK might consider one, and
German views were divided within the government.
5. (c) Staffansson noted that the expectations in Kosovo
were enormous and cited Bildt as saying that Kosovo's
independence would be good for Serbia and bad for Kosovo.
Without the drain of Kosovo, Serbia would qualify earlier to
become closer to the EU, whereas an independent Kosovo could
never reach its expectations. Staffansson added that Russia
was playing a cynical game. It had no real interests in
Serbia, in contrast to the investment it has made in
Montenegro.
Comment
--------------
6. (c) It was fairly clear that some of the working level of
the MFA would prefer to see a government formed before
Ahtisaari presents his plan; it was very clear from both the
MFA and Clase that Bildt will make this decision personally,
and is expected to support Ahtisaari's timeline and plan.
WOOD