BILDT ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001453 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM PREF YI SW SUBJECT: BILDT ON KOSOVO REF: STATE 165486 Classified By: Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt discussed the way forward on Kosovo on December 11. Bildt said 26 of the EU states (except Cyprus) would likely recognize Kosovo independence in some form as early as February, but there were a number of important issues that remained to be addressed. Among these were Kosovo citizenship, northern Kosovo, debt, and refugee flows. Sweden as the largest EU donor and a major KFOR troop contributor continues to seek a role on the post-settlement steering board for Kosovo. End Summary. Sequencing the Settlement -------------- ¶2. (C) During a December 11 meeting, Ambassador and Foreign Minister Bildt discussed the way forward on Kosovo (reftel). Bildt said Kosovo would likely declare its independence by mid-February. The EU would likely be prepared to go ahead with 26 members in agreement (with Cyprus being the exception) to declare "something" in terms of recognition in February or March. Cyprus, Bildt said, was the EU country where the influence of Russia was the greatest. The EU position would have to be massaged, and the role of countries in the region -- Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece -- would be the key to an effective solution, particularly on practical issues such as recognition of Kosovo passports and enabling land travel. Otherwise, having a Kosovo passport means nothing for land travel, other than over the mountains to Albania. Legal Issues -------------- ¶3. (C) Bildt said Sweden continued to have concerns about legal issues concerning the recognition, and said "the U.S. approach seemed to be that international law does not count." He said the EU needed a legal basis for deploying its ESDP mission. There would be no new UNSC resolution. He said UNSCR 1244 contained provisions that needed to be enforced, and should be deemed to be actively in force. ¶4. (C) Kosovo would not be independent like the U.S. or Sweden, Bildt said. It would be supervised, and would not be able to join international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, or the Council of Europe. He added, however, that a way needed to be found for it to participate in international financial institutions. Swedish MFA's legal division was looking into potential precedents for countries not able to join the UN who are still able to become IFI members. Litany of Problems -------------- ¶5. (C) Bildt said Kosovo would also face problems that needed to be addressed "in order to avoid moving from one mess to another." The Ahtisaari plan assumes either agreement among the parties or a new UNSC mandate. The issue was how to address these problems without either one. Problems included: -- Serbs blocking the borders. -- Serbs likely cutting off electricity, and possibly water. -- Northen Kosovo. Without a special regime, northern Kosovo would declare its independence from Kosovo. Bildt said he responded to NATO SYG De Hoop Scheffer's question about what to do "if" Northern Kosovo declared independence by saying the issue was "when" not "if." -- Refugee flows would need to be anticipated and dealt with. -- Citizenship of Kosovo has not been defined and will be tricky. It cannot be left entirely to the Kosovars. In Bosnia, citizenship after the war was defined as those who were there pre-1991. This would not work in Kosovo. Limiting citizenship to those in Kosovo pre-1999 was contentious, as was applying citizenship only to those there now. 500,000 had left Kosovo since 1999, including Serbs and Romas, and there had been substantial inflows from Albania. Some Serbs who left before 1999 have centuries-old claims. -- Debt. Bildt anticipates that Belgrade would disavow some ongoing obligations from the assumption of its part of the debt of the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Serbia might demand repayment from Pristina for its share of Serbian service of former Yugoslavia debt. The Role of Russia -------------- STOCKHOLM 00001453 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Bildt said the dynamic has primarily been that Serbs sought support from Russia more than Moscow was self-motivated to assert itself on Belgrade, although Russia has become more proactive recently. The Serbs were very nervous about losing Russian support. Pay and Play -------------- ¶7. (C) Bildt re-emphasized a point he has previously made here and in Washington that Sweden should have a seat on the international steering group for Kosovo. He said Sweden was the largest European donor in Kosovo, plus had troops on the ground. The Brits, by contrast, were much less present in terms of donations or troops. The make-up of the group should be determined by current reality, not history, he said. Swedish contributions made no sense if they were not part of the settlement. The Ahtisaari plan envisions Russia being part of the new steering group, but not Sweden. This, per Bildt, makes no sense if Russia opposes the plan. (Note: Sweden will reduce Swedish troops in Kosovo under NATO command from 385 to 250 this coming year. We were told earlier by Bildt,s Executive Assistant Carin Olofsdotter that this was an explicit response to Sweden not being part of the steering group.) Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador had requested a short meeting to deliver a gift, and had taken the opportunity to raise Kosovo. Bildt spoke at length on Kosovo, and also touched on Iraq and Palestinian/Israeli issues (septels) during a cordial meeting that lasted 45 minutes. Kept waiting for most of that time were the Minister for Development Assistance Gunilla Carlsson, the Deputy Foreign Minister, and a dozen other MFA and SIDA functionaries who had come to discuss Palestinian assistance and other aid budget issues. Clearly, Bildt prioritizes the bilateral U.S.-Sweden connection. WOOD