BILDT ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001453

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM PREF YI SW
SUBJECT: BILDT ON KOSOVO

REF: STATE 165486

Classified By: Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (C) The Ambassador and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt
discussed the way forward on Kosovo on December 11. Bildt
said 26 of the EU states (except Cyprus) would likely
recognize Kosovo independence in some form as early as
February, but there were a number of important issues that
remained to be addressed. Among these were Kosovo
citizenship, northern Kosovo, debt, and refugee flows.
Sweden as the largest EU donor and a major KFOR troop
contributor continues to seek a role on the post-settlement
steering board for Kosovo. End Summary.

Sequencing the Settlement
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2. (C) During a December 11 meeting, Ambassador and Foreign
Minister Bildt discussed the way forward on Kosovo (reftel).
Bildt said Kosovo would likely declare its independence by
mid-February. The EU would likely be prepared to go ahead
with 26 members in agreement (with Cyprus being the
exception) to declare "something" in terms of recognition in
February or March. Cyprus, Bildt said, was the EU country
where the influence of Russia was the greatest. The EU
position would have to be massaged, and the role of countries
in the region -- Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece -- would be
the key to an effective solution, particularly on practical
issues such as recognition of Kosovo passports and enabling
land travel. Otherwise, having a Kosovo passport means
nothing for land travel, other than over the mountains to
Albania.

Legal Issues
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3. (C) Bildt said Sweden continued to have concerns about
legal issues concerning the recognition, and said "the U.S.
approach seemed to be that international law does not count."
He said the EU needed a legal basis for deploying its ESDP
mission. There would be no new UNSC resolution. He said
UNSCR 1244 contained provisions that needed to be enforced,
and should be deemed to be actively in force.


4. (C) Kosovo would not be independent like the U.S. or
Sweden, Bildt said. It would be supervised, and would not be
able to join international organizations such as the UN,
OSCE, or the Council of Europe. He added, however, that a
way needed to be found for it to participate in international
financial institutions. Swedish MFA's legal division was
looking into potential precedents for countries not able to
join the UN who are still able to become IFI members.

Litany of Problems
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5. (C) Bildt said Kosovo would also face problems that
needed to be addressed "in order to avoid moving from one
mess to another." The Ahtisaari plan assumes either
agreement among the parties or a new UNSC mandate. The issue
was how to address these problems without either one.
Problems included:

-- Serbs blocking the borders.

-- Serbs likely cutting off electricity, and possibly water.

-- Northen Kosovo. Without a special regime, northern Kosovo
would declare its independence from Kosovo. Bildt said he
responded to NATO SYG De Hoop Scheffer's question about what
to do "if" Northern Kosovo declared independence by saying
the issue was "when" not "if."

-- Refugee flows would need to be anticipated and dealt with.

-- Citizenship of Kosovo has not been defined and will be
tricky. It cannot be left entirely to the Kosovars. In
Bosnia, citizenship after the war was defined as those who
were there pre-1991. This would not work in Kosovo.
Limiting citizenship to those in Kosovo pre-1999 was
contentious, as was applying citizenship only to those there
now. 500,000 had left Kosovo since 1999, including Serbs and
Romas, and there had been substantial inflows from Albania.
Some Serbs who left before 1999 have centuries-old claims.

-- Debt. Bildt anticipates that Belgrade would disavow some
ongoing obligations from the assumption of its part of the
debt of the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Serbia might
demand repayment from Pristina for its share of Serbian
service of former Yugoslavia debt.

The Role of Russia
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6. (C) Bildt said the dynamic has primarily been that Serbs
sought support from Russia more than Moscow was
self-motivated to assert itself on Belgrade, although Russia
has become more proactive recently. The Serbs were very
nervous about losing Russian support.

Pay and Play
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7. (C) Bildt re-emphasized a point he has previously made
here and in Washington that Sweden should have a seat on the
international steering group for Kosovo. He said Sweden was
the largest European donor in Kosovo, plus had troops on the
ground. The Brits, by contrast, were much less present in
terms of donations or troops. The make-up of the group
should be determined by current reality, not history, he
said. Swedish contributions made no sense if they were not
part of the settlement. The Ahtisaari plan envisions Russia
being part of the new steering group, but not Sweden. This,
per Bildt, makes no sense if Russia opposes the plan. (Note:
Sweden will reduce Swedish troops in Kosovo under NATO
command from 385 to 250 this coming year. We were told
earlier by Bildt,s Executive Assistant Carin Olofsdotter
that this was an explicit response to Sweden not being part
of the steering group.)

Comment
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8. (C) The Ambassador had requested a short meeting to
deliver a gift, and had taken the opportunity to raise
Kosovo. Bildt spoke at length on Kosovo, and also touched on
Iraq and Palestinian/Israeli issues (septels) during a
cordial meeting that lasted 45 minutes. Kept waiting for
most of that time were the Minister for Development
Assistance Gunilla Carlsson, the Deputy Foreign Minister, and
a dozen other MFA and SIDA functionaries who had come to
discuss Palestinian assistance and other aid budget issues.
Clearly, Bildt prioritizes the bilateral U.S.-Sweden
connection.
WOOD