SWEDEN'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ, IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001239

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV SW AF CY BM IR IZ YI SU CD
SUBJECT: SWEDEN'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ, IRAN,
AFGHANISTAN, CYPRUS, KOSOVO, BURMA, SUDAN, AND CHAD

REF: A. HELSINKI 753

B. NICOSIA 754

Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary and Comment
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1. (c) During an October 4 tour d'horizon, MFA Political
Director Bjorn Lyrvall reviewed Sweden's meetings on the
margins of the UNGA and its activities and views on key
issues:

-- Afghanistan. Sweden is considering a proposal from the
Finns for the Finns to take over command of the Mazar e
Sharif PRT. No decision has been taken on this switch, nor
on whether it would entail a decrease of Swedish troops. DCM
said he hoped it would not involve a decrease of Swedish
troops.

-- Iraq. Sweden has been approached by France and the UK
about joining a three-way effort to get the EU more involved
in Iraq; increasing the EU role in Iraq is on the October 15
GAERC.

-- Iran. Sweden wants to wait for a decision in the UNSC on
a third resolution before supporting EU sanctions.

-- Kosovo. The Troika-led process should be credible and
allowed to play itself out. This will promote necessary EU
unity in taking a position later.

-- Cyprus. Sweden is pushing for a renewed UN effort
following the February presidential elections.

Comment: Sweden had declared its intention to double its
troops in international deployments, from the current 850 to
as many as 2,000. At the same time, potential defense budget
cuts may put strain on some deployments -- possibly including
the PRT in Afghanistan. Sweden has not yet made that
decision, according to Lyrvall. End Summary and Comment.

Afghanistan
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2. (c) DCM noted that we had heard that Sweden was
considering a reduction of its troops in Iraq (ref A).
Lyrvall said no decision had been taken yet. Sweden was
working in close cooperation with its Nordic partners, and
particularly Norway and Finland. Lyrvall said the Finns had
told Sweden they were considering greatly increasing their
contribution to the Mazar e Sharif PRT and asked about the
possibility of Sweden handing off the command of the PRT to
Finland. Lyrvall said this could possibly be done with no
reduction of troops by Sweden, but emphasized again that no
decision had been taken. DCM urged Sweden not to decrease
its troop strength.

Iraq
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3. (c) DCM inquired on follow-up to the successful visit of
FM Bildt and Lyrvall to Iraq. Lyrvall said Sweden had been
approached to join what could become a French, British,
Swedish initiative on strengthening EU involvement in Iraq.
This followed on the Bildt and Kouchner visits to Iraq. In
response to the DCM's query, Lyrvall said Sweden would like
to see the appointment of an EU Special Representative on
Iraq, but the time was not right. Iraq was on the agenda at
the GAERC.

Iran
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4. (c) Lyrvall said the EU had discussed in New York the
prospect of EU sanctions against Iran, and were expecting a
report from French FM Kouchner in this regard. Lyrvall said
Sweden had "no big appetite" for sanctions against Iran,
particularly in view of the prospect of a third UNSC
resolution on Iran that could clarify next steps. In
Sweden's view, the UNSCR should precede sanctions. To be
effective, sanctions needed stronger international support.
Otherwise, the Iranians would simply shift their purchases to
other sources. Lyrvall noted that Swedish trade with Iran
was down to one-third the level of 2005. He said this slack
had been taken up by exports to Iran from others. Iran had
continued to be able to supply itself, but from other
sources. (Comment: It was clear that Sweden's reservation
on sanctions against Iraq owed much to its threatened
commercial interests there. In 2006, Sweden's exports to
Iran totaled about 540 million USD, with the major items
being power generating machinery, telecoms, chemical
products, including pharmaceuticals. and trucks and busses.
End Comment.)

Kosovo

STOCKHOLM 00001239 002 OF 002


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5. (c) Sweden was waiting to see what the Troika could
achieve, Lyrvall said. We should not prejudge the outcome.
Lyrvall said that following the November elections, the
prospects would be more clear. He emphasized, however, that
the December 10 deadline was for the CG report to be
presented. "We will still see what we do on the 11th," he
said. It was important that the process leading up to the
report and following it be credible; this was necessary not
only for the Serbs and the Russians, but to make the EU come
together. If there was a credible perception that "we tried,
but failed," Sweden hoped the EU would unite.

Cyprus
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6. (c) Lyrvall said Foreign Minister Bildt had, on the
margins of the UNGA, discussed with other interested
countries (U.S., Denmark, Finland, Italy, UK, The
Netherlands, Poland, Greece) and UN USYG for Political
Affairs Lynn Pascoe Swedish proposals intended to revive a
"Gambari process" in Cyprus after the February presidential
elections. These proposals would include sending a UN
assessment mission, invitations from the UNSYG, and the
appointment of a new Special Representative of the Secretary
General. If the elections resulted in a new president,
something even bolder could be considered.

Burma
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7. (c) Lyrvall reviewed the activities of the international
community in regard to Burma and noted that the issue of EU
sanctions is on the agenda of the October 15 GAERC. He said
Sweden was awaiting further information on the practical
impact of sanctions, including those on timber, metals, and
luxury items. He said it was important to work out what
could be done in concrete terms, and that the EU should work
jointly with the US on actions on Burma.

Sudan/Chad
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8. (c) Sweden as part of the UN mission was awaiting the
green light from the African Union to deploy the joint
Swedish/Norwegian engineering battalion. The design of the
Chad mission was still being discussed; Sweden anticipated
contributing 200 troops.

EU Presidency
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9. (c) DCM said we hoped to work closely with the Swedes in
the run-up to their EU presidency in the second half of 2009,
particularly in connection with Sweden's focus on global
climate change. Lyrvall expressed Sweden's deep appreciation
for Ambassador Wood's and the Embassy's working on fostering
bilateral cooperation on alternative energy. He said the GoS
would work with us on how to take forward this dialogue as
Sweden prepared for its presidency.
WOOD