BILDT ON GEORGIA MISSILE INCIDENT FOLLOW-UP,

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 001055

SIPDIS


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS GG SR SW
SUBJECT: BILDT ON GEORGIA MISSILE INCIDENT FOLLOW-UP,
KOSOVO, CHAD

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 988

B. STATE 109526

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (c) On August 28, the Ambassador raised the Georgia
missile incident and Kosovo with Foreign Minister Bildt in a
meeting devoted to other issues. On Georgia, Bildt
speculated on the context of the incident and said we need to
keep diplomatic pressure on, but that Zuzul was not the right
choice for OSCE's representative. On Kosovo, Bildt said we
need to keep quiet and let the process go forward. End
summary.

Georgia Missile Incident
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2. (s) Ambassador Wood discussed the Georgia missile
incident and its diplomatic follow-up (ref A) with Foreign
Minister Bildt August 28 in meeting at the Embassy. Bildt
said that it was clear that the reports of the experts on the
missile incident were accurate, and diplomatic follow-on had
so far been useful in putting pressure on Russia to which it
was paying attention. He added, however, that there seemed
to be context connected to the incident that had not been
disclosed by either Georgia or Russia. Bildt said the
Georgian radar against which the Russian's aborted attack may
have been directed "should not have been there." He said
that there was also "something else" going on in the incident
in the Kodori valley, though it was not clear what. Bildt
said Georgia had been importing lots of weapons from Ukraine.
He offered a hypothetical scenario where the Georgians could
have shot missiles "they were not supposed to have" at the
Russian aircraft; neither side would want to acknowledge what
really happened. Bildt thought the Russian incursion had
been ordered by Moscow and not by the Russian military
command in the North Caucusus, but it was not clear who in
Moscow was behind it.


3. (c) Bildt said the diplomatic follow-on needed to be
carefully managed. Bildt said he had dined with Georgian
President Sakashvili August 26 (apparently in Slovenia) and
told him that Georgia should let its friends handle this one.
The Georgians, Bildt said, appeared disposed to do so.
Bildt said he thought Croatian diplomat Miomir Zuzul, who had
been appointed Personal Representative of OSCE
Chairman-in-Office Moratinos for this matter was not the
right person. Bildt said that Zuzul, who was Croatia's
Ambassador to the UN at the time (and later Ambassador to the
U.S.),was implicated in the decision to go forward with the
Croatian government's 1995 ethnic-cleansing Operation Storm.
This would discredit him. He said Zuzul should not be the
OSCE's representative for Georgia.

Kosovo
--------------

4. (c) On Kosovo (ref B),Bildt said what was necessary now
was a period of quiet, including, he added, from the U.S. We
needed to see what technical fixes could be found. He was
not sure where Russia was. It would take weeks to evaluate
what is possible. The process had been engaged; it needed to
be allowed to work its way through undisturbed.

Chad
--------------

5. (c) Bildt said he will be traveling September 3 to Chad
in connection with a possible Swedish and EU role in a UN
mission there.
WOOD