CORRECTED COPY OF STATE 091539:

UNCLAS STATE 091929 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PHUM EUN UNHRC SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY OF STATE 091539: DEMARCHE REQUEST: U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT IN UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 5TH SESSION REF: GENEVA 1609 ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2-6. OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (U) Action requested: Posts, except for Ottawa, Prague, Warsaw, Berlin, and London are requested to approach host governments at the highest appropriate level to convey deep USG unhappiness with the results of the Human Rights Council (HRC) institution building process concluded at the 5th Session June 11-19. In particular, posts are requested to convey the following points: -- Allowing the country-specific special rapporteur mandates on Belarus and Cuba to expire, and allowing a permanent agenda item on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) is a dismal outcome. -- Particular disgust at procedural irregularities that denied a fellow western group member the chance to call for a vote on a principled human rights concern. EU complicity in this move is deeply disturbing. -- Deeply pessimistic that the HRC will be able to take up difficult issues like Belarus, Cuba, Burma, DPRK, and even Darfur. (NB: To date resolutions on Sudan have been weak and subject to approval by Sudan, which in negotiations openly denied that killing, mass rape, and displacement were occurring and refused to cooperate with the fact-finding mission the HRC established last December.) -- Expect the EU to support the U.S. efforts to defend human rights through initiatives on country-specific situations at the UN Third Committee. Press the EU to run country-specific resolutions at the HRC next year. Recommend that the EU run the resolution on Belarus at the Third Committee and work with us to re-establish the Special Rapporteurs for Belarus and Cuba. Expect the EU to cooperate with allies and support them on initiatives intended to promote and protect human rights. -- As Israel and OPT are now a permanent agenda item, and given the extreme bias already demonstrated by the HRC on these issues, it will be extremely important for the EU - as a matter of policy - to stand up to attempts to turn the HRC into solely a venue for criticizing Israel. We would expect the EU to vigorously pursue urgent human rights matters around the world, especially those that threaten neighbors and larger regional interests. These would include Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and DPRK. -- The inability of the Council to follow up in a meaningful way on the already weak December 2006 resolution on Sudan, and the subsequent outrageous refusal of the GOS to cooperate with the UNHRC mission, is a stain on the reputation of the Council. The international community is pledged to prevent and stop genocide - yet the Council has done nothing in the past six months to stop the genocide in Darfur. -- If the Council continues to remain silent on these urgent matters it will only further prove the ineffectiveness of the structure and the unwillingness and/or inability of its membership to defend and protect citizens crying out for justice when deprived of basic freedoms by their governments. -- The UPR process must prove itself an effective tool with real teeth - platitudes and a "leveling" of assessments so that all countries come out of the process with equal assessments is a real danger. Norway and Belarus are not equal and the UPR must not treat them as such. -- Additionally the Council must prove that the UPR process is not the only means by which to hold gross human rights violators accountable. If the Council refuses to exercise the tools it has - including condemnatory resolutions, Special Rapporteurs, and strong Commissions of Inquiry with follow-up and implementation of recommendations - they will wither, and the international community will be poorer for it. For multilateral institutions such as the HRC to be useful they must act in the face of grave violations of human rights - to remain silent - failing to act - is to be complicit. IF RAISED: U.S. participation in the HRC henceforward: This is a matter under consideration at this time. However, EU members should not expect the U.S. to take an active role in a body that is already broken. ¶3. (U) Action requested for Warsaw and Prague: Please inform host governments of the demarche to the other 25 EU members at the highest appropriate level. Convey USG admiration that the two countries stuck to their principles under extreme pressure from the others. ¶4. (U) Action requested for London: Post is requested to convey the points in paragraph 2 at the highest possible level. Department understands London's decision-making was taken at the Ministerial level (but not by the Foreign Secretary). In addition to the points in paragraph 2, post SIPDIS is requested to add: -- Concern about the British role in coordinating the Western Group wherein, reportedly, the notion that there was consensus on the HRC institution building was conveyed, and the position of a Western Group member (Canada) was not defended. -- Disappointment in HMG for opting for consensus rather than principle, thereby compromising on significant human rights issues with Algeria, Egypt, Cuba, and Belarus. ¶5. (U) Action requested for Berlin: Post is requested to convey the points in paragraph 2 at the highest possible level and in addition to the following: -- Deep disappointment with German leadership of the EU, which directly resulted in the loss of mandates on Belarus and Cuba, and the establishment of a permanent agenda item on Israel. -- Concern about lack of transparency wherein the EU negotiates as if it were a regional UN bloc, much like the Africa Group, and to the exclusion of others in the Western Group, including the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway. Delegations seeking to promote and protect human rights in conjunction with close allies should not have to cajole partners in order to assist with lobbying efforts. ¶6. (U) Action request for Ottawa: Please inform host government of the content of this demarche at the highest appropriate level. Post is requested to convey to Canada USG admiration for its willingness to make the hard call to break consensus and stick to its principles. Post is requested to inquire after Canadian plans for future participation in the HRC. REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶7. (U) Posts are requested to report results of efforts by cable to DRL/MLGA - Laura Jordan and IO/RHS - Rachel Leatham or Amy Ostermeier before July 9. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶8. (U) In mid-May HRC President de Alba (Mexico) took over negotiations from the six working groups (agenda, special procedures, program of work, universal periodic review, criteria for selection of mandate-holders and establishment of mandates, methods of work) hoping to have consensus by June 11. Working groups had not been able to resolve the most contentious items - the agenda and country mandates. De Alba opened the 5th Session on June 11th without consensus and conducted intense, private negotiations. ¶9. (U) At the Sunday, June 17 plenary session, de Alba circulated a text on all institutional issues -- including those on which there was active controversy and disagreement -- on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The morning session of the June 18 plenary convened for 1/2 hour for Mexican FM Espinosa's speech. Prior to the suspension China indicated continued unwillingness to compromise on their controversial issues (supermajority for country resolutions and elimination of the Cuba mandate). Small group negotiations were conducted throughout the day. Canada, Poland, and the Czech Republic remained firm they would break consensus over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) agenda item and elimination of the Cuba and Belarus mandates. ¶10. (U) At five minutes to midnight on Monday, June 18, de Alba resumed the session. He announced "an agreement on a final text" encompassing all of the institutional arrangements, as well as pending agreement on the Code of Conduct and other matters. Due to the late hour, de Alba suggested the Council "accept this text as a compromise on the understanding that it includes also the Code of Conduct and that tomorrow the Council can take action on them." De Alba again falsely asserted that an agreement had been reached by the Council, and adjourned the meeting for the night. ¶11. (U) Delegations interpreted de Alba's comment to mean that the decision on whether to adopt the "consensus" package would occur on Tuesday the 19th, but by Tuesday morning OIC and others were asserting that most delegations understood de Alba to have declared that consensus existed and that a consensus decision could not be revisited. New Romanian HRC President Costea told Canada there could be no vote as the package had been adopted the night before. Canada challenged this assertion and began to search for support. (Note that the new HRC composition excluded Poland and the Czech Republic, as Slovenia and Bosnia replaced the two effective that day, June 19th). Canada requested and received U.S. assistance in an attempt to build support for their right to call a vote. Australia and New Zealand also assisted Canada. At the Western Group meeting UK Ambassador Thorne said he had defended Canada's right to call a vote but that he had not objected when de Alba and Costea said the ruling would be that ther e could only be a vote on the procedural question as to whether Canada could call a vote. ¶12. (U) Accordingly, when Costea convened the session he allowed a vote only on the procedural question - that is, on Canada's appeal of his ruling that the package had already been adopted the night before - and not on the merits of the package itself, or of any of its controversial provisions such as those related to Cuba, Belarus, and Israel/OPT. Canada lost this vote 46 - 1. It is important to note that all EU members voted against Canada - depriving it of its right to call a vote and challenge the substance of the package. A vote on the substance of the package, which would effectively have required each HRC member to take a stand on whether the Cuba and Belarus rapporteurs should have been terminated and on whether there should be a permanent anti-Israel item on the HRC's agenda, would almost certainly not have been so lopsided and might have produced a different outcome, at least on Belarus. Further details are available reftel. POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶13. (U) Please contact DRL/MLGA - Laura Jordan at 202-647-0293 or via email for further information to meet our objectives. Department appreciates posts' assistance on this important issue. RICE