SUDAN: Additional Sanctions Over Lack of Progress

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 073693 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017 TAGS: PREL ETRD ETTC UN SU EUN SUBJECT: SUDAN: Additional Sanctions Over Lack of Progress (S/ES: 200708730/1) CLASSIFIED BY: AF A/S Jendayi E. Frazer for reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Posts are requested to draw from the following and demarche host governments at the highest level appropriate. -------------- -------------- OBJECTIVES: Notification of Additional Sanctions and Request to Follow Suit -------------- -------------- This cable includes the following instructions: ¶2. (U) Announce new U.S. sanctions on 3 individuals and 31 Sudan government-owned or controlled companies due to lack of progress in Darfur. The President announced additional sanctions on May 29, including an asset freeze and travel bans for the individuals. ¶3. (U) Call upon European partners to enact sanctions of their own, either through the EU or bilaterally. Given the level of European investment in Sudan, economic sanctions would be particularly effective. ¶4. (C) For London and Paris and USUN: Urge moving forward with a sanctions resolution in New York. Our delegations at the UN should consult urgently to finalize a P-3 text that would designate additional individuals responsible for abuses in Darfur and government-owned or controlled entities for sanctions, widen the arms embargo against the Government of Sudan, introduce a binding Chapter VII ban against military overflights of Darfur, and expand criteria for future designations of individuals and entities available under UNSCR ¶1591. We will also need to reach agreement on the accompanying annex of individuals and entities to be sanctioned and on next steps for building support among Council members. Separately, we will also need to work together in the near future to ensure the UN/AU hybrid force is properly authorized with a robust mandate. We believe the optimal way forward is on the basis of 1706 and see no need at this time for a new resolution to mandate the hybrid force. To be effective the hybrid force must have the authority under Chapter VII of the charter to use all necessary means to protect civilians. ¶5. (C) For Brussels, Rome, and Bratislava: We also request European members of the UN Security Council to support the sanctions resolution described in para 4 above and to work with us in ensuring a robust chapter seven mandate for the hybrid force as outlined. -------------- BACKGROUND: The Time to Act is Now -------------- ¶6. (U) On April 18, President Bush gave a speech at the Holocaust Museum warning that the United States would enact more sanctions if the GOS did not quickly accept the UN/AU hybrid force, allow deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP),end support to the Janjaweed, observe existing ceasefires, support the ongoing political process, and enable delivery of humanitarian aid. ¶7. (U) Because of the lack of progress, the USG has announced new U.S. sanctions through existing executive orders against 3 individuals and 31 Sudan government-owned or controlled companies. Sanctions include an asset freeze and travel bans for the individuals. ¶8. (U) The individuals include Sudan's State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Harun (also indicted by the International Criminal Court) and Chief of Military Intelligence and Security Awad Ibn Auf. The USG also sanctioned Khalil Ibrahim, a rebel leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) who has obstructed the peace process. ¶9. (U) The President's speech was a "last chance" for the Sudanese and we have given them the past month to indicate a genuine change. In that month, the Sudanese government has bombed villages, disrupted a rebel conference on the peace process, and indicated they will not accept the UN/AU hybrid force with the command and control systems agreed upon last November in Addis Ababa. The GOS has also discouraged potential troop contributors through its belligerent statements regarding UN involvement, and delayed key force planning missions such as an important water survey to help determine camp locations. They have failed to take action to disarm Janjaweed fighters and STATE 00073693 002 OF 002 continued to move military equipment into Darfur in violation of existing ceasefires and UNSC resolutions. Although it agreed to ease delivery of humanitarian aid on March 28, the GOS has not fully ceased its harassment of humanitarian organizations. ¶10. (SBU) Pressure is the only language Sudan understands. We are confident that sanctions will bolster, not hinder, the international community's efforts to achieve progress in Darfur. ¶11. (U) These sanctions are a direct response to Sudanese intransigence. The United States remains committed to the UN/AU-led mediation process, and we continue to support UN SYG Ban's efforts to convince Khartoum to accept the hybrid force. We will also continue to pursue appropriate action in the UN Security Council. However, it has been four years since this conflict began, almost a year since the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for UN forces in Sudan, and six months since the GOS first agreed to that force. The people of Darfur cannot wait any longer. If the GOS remains intransigent, we are prepared to take more robust action, including increasingly stronger sanctions. ¶12. (U) While there may be little support in Brussels, sanctions through the EU would be particularly effective because the EU, as a whole, is the leading exporter to Sudan, with a total export value 30 percent higher than even China. Bilaterally, we will focus our push for sanctions on the UK, France, and Germany. Individually, Germany is the second largest exporter to Sudan (behind China),followed by France. A German contractor is building in Sudan the largest dam in Africa with major Italian and French sub-contractors, while an Italian firm was recently awarded the construction of a large, new refinery complex in Port Sudan. RICE