INSTRUCTIONS: P-3 NEGOTIATIONS ON SPECIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 067046 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 TAGS: UNSC LE PREL PTER SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS: P-3 NEGOTIATIONS ON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON REF: A. EMAIL KUMAR/REINEMEYER 05/15/2007 ¶B. BEIRUT 655 Classified By: IO A/S Kristen Silverberg; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C//REL UK and France) This is an action request. Dept cannot accept the ad ref text because of its failure to address in full the potential consequences of Parliamentary paralysis. In particular, the text would create the danger that a failure by the Parliament to appropriate funding would prevent the establishment of the Tribunal or its operations. USUN should address this issue by seeking one of the options below (see para 3). In addition, OP1 bis is missing a word to make clear that the HQ Agreement is to be concluded by the UN and the host State. (See para 4.) USUN is instructed to seek closure on the draft text by COB May 16. End action request. ¶2. (C//REL UK and France) Department is ready to accept the ad ref draft resolution (Ref A) with the exception of the funding provision (and subject to the correction of OP1 bis). The UN-GOL Tribunal Agreement provides that the Secretary General will commence establishing the Tribunal when he has sufficient contributions in hand to finance establishment of the Tribunal and 12 months of its operations. (The agreement also provides that the GOL will provide 49 percent of the expenses.) Therefore, the inability of the Lebanese Government to provide its 49 percent share of Tribunal costs could be raised as an argument against establishment of the Tribunal. (A desire to prevent Parliamentary approval of the Tribunal,s funding could also give the Lebanese opposition an additional motive to block the reopening of the Parliament. See Ref B for more background on potential consequences of the failure of Parliament to reopen.) ¶3. (C//REL UK and France) The U.S., as well as the Government of Lebanon, strongly believes it is necessary to remove any question about the need for parliamentary action prior to the establishment of the Tribunal. Therefore, Department requests USUN discuss with the P-3 ways to ensure the funding provisions in the agreement do not pose an obstacle to establishment or implementation. Department offers the following options and would be open to other suggestions as long as they address this underlying concern. Option 1: 51 percent voluntary contributions from States; 49 percent paid by the Government of Lebanon or, if the GOL is unable to pay, the 49 percent is funded through assessed contributions subject to repayment by Lebanon. (With this option, we would need to include in the resolution text both a timeframe for determining whether GOL funding would be forthcoming, as well as a mechanism for how this determination would be made.) Option 2: Add language to make clear that the Secretary General should commence the process of establishing the Tribunal as soon as he receives sufficient funds from any source (i.e., no initial contribution from Lebanon required in order for the Secretary-General to proceed). Note this would override any implication in the last part of paragraph 5 that the absence of a Lebanese contribution could block the establishment or operations of the Tribunal. Option 3: Preference for 51 percent voluntary contributions from States and 49 percent from the Government of Lebanon, but any amount not covered by the Government of Lebanon could be covered by other donors. ¶4. (C) OP 1 bis should read: "Decides further that if the Secretary General reports that the Headquarters Agreement has SIPDIS not been concluded as envisioned under Article 8 of the Agreement, the location of the seat of the Tribunal shall BE determined in consultation with the Government of Lebanon AND SHALL be subject to the conclusion of a Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the State that hosts the Tribunal;" ¶5. (U) For reference and citing of precedent, USUN may wish to propose language similar to the following from para 2 of A/RES/58/284 of April 26, 2004 dealing with the Sierra Leone Special Court: &Authorizes the Secretary General, as an exceptional measure, to enter in commitments in an amount not to exceed 16.7 million U.S. dollars to supplement the financial resources of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for the period from x to x, on the understanding that any regular budget funds appropriated for the Court would be refunded to the UN at the time of the liquidation of the Court should sufficient voluntary contributions be received.8 RICE