GUIDANCE: ENGAGING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 063310 SIPDIS SIPDIS C//REL TO FRANCE AND UK E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: UNSC LE PREL PTER SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: ENGAGING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON REF: BEIRUT 611 Classified By: IO A/S Kristen Silverberg, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C//REL UK and France) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: The U.S. agrees with the French that a Chapter VII resolution should establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the basis of the Agreement and Statute already negotiated and signed by the UN and GOL. It is important that the Council establish the Tribunal in a way that as much as possible leaves its Lebanese character intact and maintains the substance of the Tribunal Agreement/Statute. Before we move forward in the Council, however, we need to ensure that OLA concurs that the way the P3 draft establishes the Tribunal has an adequate legal basis. There are also a few remaining questions that must be addressed, specifically, funding, Headquarters Agreement, Chapter VII reference, and selection of judges. Department recommends that USUN approach the P-3 about addressing these issues per objectives in para 2 below. USUN may share suggested OP resolution text in para 9 below with P-3 at its discretion. End summary and action request. ¶2. (C//REL UK and France) OBJECTIVES: Department requests USUN pursue the following objectives with the French and British missions and report back to Department: -- Raise our concerns about pursuing a resolution under which the Council would decide that the UN-GOL agreement would enter into force (French preference),and instead press for a resolution under which the Council would establish the Tribunal directly. If French continue to resist, USUN should further explore OLA and UK views (including whether OLA would be prepared to agree that such an approach is permissible) and report to Department (see para 3 for background). -- Note that we support assessed funding for the Tribunal but that we believe Lebanon should nevertheless be encouraged to cover the 49 percent share that would have been required under the original Agreement and believe the resolution should include language calling upon Lebanon to provide such funding (see para 4 for background). -- Ensure that the resolution provides that the Headquarters Agreement would be subject to agreement by the UN and the host country, but not the GOL (see para 5 for background). -- Solicit P-3 views on the desirability of having the relevant resolution language state that the Council is taking action under "Article 41" rather than "Chapter VII" (see para 6 for background). -- Note that the Department is seeking additional information (including about the Lebanese Supreme Council on the Judiciary) in order to better assess whether the issue of the selection of Lebanese judges needs to be addressed in the resolution, and report back any information that others may have discovered (see para 7 for background). -- Raise the desirability of a fuller preambular section that lays out the political background of this issue in more detail, including the extent to which the GOL has been involved in the negotiation of the agreement, the central involvement of the SYG in developing the text, and the approval and support that the Council has already expressed for its content. -- If asked, note that there are a number of potential issues that we feel are better left unaddressed in the resolution (see para 8 for background). -------------- Background -------------- ¶3. (C//REL UK and France) "Legal basis". As discussed with OLA on April 26, there are two basic ways that the Tribunal might be established - either by having the UNSC establish it directly, or by having the Council take action that results in the Lebanese establishing it (as would have been the case under the Tribunal Agreement as originally contemplated, under which the GOL would have acted to create it via an agreement with the UN). Department prefers the former approach - i.e., having the UNSC establish it directly - and believe it will help avoid legal objections from others (which OLA and the UK appear to share) about the French approach. Under the French approach, the UNSC would simply decide that the Agreement negotiated by the UN and GOL would enter into force. We anticipate members raising objections of principle about such an approach, raising concerns that it is impermissible or improper for the UNSC to require states to become parties to agreements to which they have not in fact agreed, and that such an approach is inconsistent with basic principles related to the requirement for consent under treaty law (including under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). For its part, Department believes that - as a legal matter - it is possible to work around such concerns by having the Council impose the substantive obligations on a state without actually making them parties to the agreement. However, we are concerned that this nuance will be lost - either purposefully or not -- on those who might raise objections, and we want to avoid creating any additional issues that could be taken advantage of by those seeking to block adoption of a resolution or work against its implementation. ¶4. (C//REL UK and France) Funding. The funding issue is closely related to the legal basis issue. If the UNSC acts directly to establish the Tribunal, the argument will be strong that the Tribunal will be a UNSC subsidiary organ (as has been the case, for example, with the ICTY and the ICTR, which were established in precisely this way). It would then follow that the Tribunal's expenses would be "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter, and would therefore be funded via assessments. Department favors assessed funding as a means to remove uncertainties about funding that could complicate the effort to start-up and operate the Tribunal. As a legal matter, this approach will also remove any legal requirement to return to the Lebanese parliament to secure the 49 percent share of the funding that Lebanon would have been required to provide under the Agreement (and thus avoid the risk of the Tribunal getting held hostage to Lebanese parliamentary blockage once again in the future). While we support assessed funding for the Tribunal, we believe that Lebanon should nevertheless be strongly encouraged to cover the 49 percent share that it would have been required to bear under the original Agreement, and believe the resolution should include language calling upon Lebanon to provide such funding. Amounts contributed by Lebanon would then reduce the "expenses of the Organization" that would need to be funded via assessments. ¶5. (C//REL UK and France) Headquarters Agreement. The Tribunal Agreement as signed by the UN and GOL provides that the location of the seat of the tribunal shall be "subject to the conclusion of a headquarters agreement between the United Nations, the Government, and the State that hosts the Tribunal." The requirement for the GOL to be a party to the headquarters agreement could result in the headquarters agreement being held hostage to parliamentary blockage in much the same way as the Tribunal agreement itself has been held hostage. To avoid this risk, USUN should work with the French to ensure that the resolution provides that the headquarters agreement would be subject to agreement by the UN and the host country, but not the GOL. ¶6. (C//REL UK and France) "Acting under Article 41" versus "Acting under chapter VII". Ref A suggests a misperception in Lebanon that UNSC action under chapter VII is tantamount to an authorization for foreign intervention in Lebanon. That view is clearly incorrect. Nevertheless, to better dispel any conceivable concerns, the resolution could refer specifically to Article 41 of the UN Charter, rather than to Chapter VII as a whole. Article 41 of the Charter is the specific provision of the Charter under which the Security Council may decide on "measures not involving the use of armed force". The provisions for Security Council authorization to use force are contained in Article 42 of the Charter. Both Articles 41 and 42 are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, but by specifically invoking Article 41 - and excluding Article 42 - it would be clear that the use of force would not be involved. USUN is requested to solicit P-3 views on the desirability of having the relevant resolution language refer to "Article 41" rather than "Chapter VII". ¶7. (C//REL UK and France) With respect to the provisions of the Statute/Agreement related to the selection of Lebanese judges to serve on the Tribunal, we are seeking additional information (including about the Lebanese Supreme Council on the Judiciary) in order to better assess whether the issue needs to be addressed in the resolution. Our preference would be not to address this issue in the resolution unless absolutely necessary. ¶8. (C//REL UK and France) There are a series of other issues that have been raised as potential issues but which the Department believes are better not addressed in the resolution. These include: -- Appointment of Deputy Prosecutor. Under the Agreement, the GOL would appoint the Deputy Prosecutor. We recognize the risk that a change in the government could make this difficult, but Lebanese refusal to name a deputy prosecutor should not prevent the Tribunal from functioning. -- Tribunal offices in Lebanon. The Tribunal is supposed to establish offices in Lebanon to conduct investigations "subject to the conclusion of appropriate arrangements with the Government." The use of the word "arrangements" reflects that an international agreement (which might need Parliamentary approval) is not required. -- Privileges and Immunities. In earlier discussions, OLA appeared to favor re-writing the extensive provisions contained in the Agreement/Statute if the Tribunal were established as a UNSC subsidiary organ, arguing that - in that case - the Tribunal would have immunities under existing UN agreements. However, the Tribunal provisions are in fact more tailored to the Tribunal,s particular circumstances (e.g., by addressing issues - such as the status of defense counsel - that do not arise in connection with typical UN operations),and OLA did not in fact identify any reasons why the provisions in the Statute/Agreement would require modification. -- Article 18-20 Technical provisions (e.g. amendment of the agreement, settlement of disputes). Leaving these provisions in place would help us demonstrate that the arrangements being put in place are as much as possible the very same as those in the signed UN-GOL agreement, even to the point that they would allow for the possibility of the UN and GOL subsequently modifying the arrangements. -- Jurisdiction over crimes committed after December 2005. Under the agreement signed by the UN and GOL, extension of the December 2005 date would require agreement by the GOL and SYG, plus UNSC consent. We would not use this resolution as an opportunity to change those arrangements. ¶9. (C//REL UK and France) Begin suggested OP text. Acting under (Article 41 of) Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, ¶1. Decides hereby to establish a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which except as otherwise provided in this resolution shall be governed by the terms applicable under the Agreement, including the Statute, that was signed by the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations on 23 January and 6 February 2007 respectively and that is annexed to this resolution on the same basis as if notification had been provided under Article 19(1) of the Agreement on the date of adoption of this resolution, and decides that Lebanon shall act in accordance with those terms; ¶2. Decides further that, in lieu of the provisions contained in Article 8(1) of the Agreement, the determination of the location of the seat of the Tribunal shall be subject to the conclusion of a headquarters agreement between the United Nations and the State that hosts the Tribunal; ¶3. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to bear forty-nine percent of the expenses of the Special Tribunal and decides that any expenses not so borne shall be considered expenses of the Organization in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations; ¶4. Requests the Secretary-General, in coordination when appropriate with the Government of Lebanon, to undertake the necessary measures to establish and facilitate the effective operation of the Tribunal in a timely manner and to report to the Council within (90) days of the adoption of this resolution and thereafter periodically with respect to its efforts; End suggested OP text. RICE