OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND

UNCLAS STATE 060919 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY DOD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN REF: A. BERLIN 000845 ¶1. (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal (coordinated by the NSC with strong interagency support) to expand and extend the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) for another 10 years (2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; other GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging global WMD threats. This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27 Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the April 23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG) (reftel). All GP members recognize the evolving global WMD threat, but most have been resistant to our proposal ) largely due to worries about cost and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts in Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Canada and the UK are the most supportive. Russia poses the strongest opposition and has expressed that the original Kananaskis priorities must be completed before moving forward. Germany has expressed similar concerns. Therefore the U.S. is increasing senior diplomatic outreach to G8 partners on this proposal, emphasizing that this commitment will help address critical global proliferation challenges, including the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and other G8 priorities. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8 initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002 to address the spread of WMD, and now includes the G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the EU. 2007 marks the halfway point for the Global Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion commitment. GP donor pledges to date come in at over $17 billion (including $10 billion from the U.S.),plus an additional $6 billion from Russia. The current GP scope addresses WMD threats only within Russia and other former Soviet states (the U.S. recognizes all former Soviet nations as GP recipients, but so far only Russia and Ukraine are officially recognized as recipient states by the entire Partnership). The Kananaskis document anticipated an expansion by mandating that GP programs begin &initially in Russia8 but not be limited to Russia. In the context of the G8, the GP is handled by the Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG),which reports to the Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG). The GP is a unique model of multilateral cooperation to combat WMD and missile threats and has made great progress in its first five years to reduce the proliferation threat, including chemical weapons destruction; redirection of former WMD scientists, technicians and engineers; improving security for fissile nuclear materials, chemical weapons stocks and biological agents; and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. ¶4. (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend the GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats includes four components: 1) Immediate expansion of geographic scope outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union (to include the broadest possible participation of new recipient states worldwide); 2) Immediate inclusion of broadest possible functional scope to include all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and missile threats; 3) Extension of time commitment for an additional 10 years (2012-2022); and 4) Increased financial commitment of an additional $20 billion for 2012-2022 with the same parameters as original commitment (U.S. $10 billion; $10 billion from other donors). The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement at the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8 committed to coordinate activities to reduce the global WMD threat through the GP. Note that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was formed, already include a broad interpretation of threats (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important priorities of chemical weapons destruction and nuclear submarine dismantlement. ¶5. (SBU) After working this proposal at the level of the GPWG and Political Directors, the U.S. has gained some support from most G8 members for the first two objectives (geographic and programmatic expansion),with limited to no support for the 10-year extension and additional financial commitments at this time. Russia objects to the entire proposal. -------------- JAPAN POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Japan has participated in the GP, but has not committed much funding. Japan initially expressed its concern about justifying an expansion of the GP when the program is so associated with a now oil rich Russia. However, we are working to make it clear to Japan that a geographic expansion of the GP would include Asia and could help address some of Japan,s regional security concerns. Japan was recently supportive of the geographic expansion at the April 23 GPWG, but did not endorse the financial commitment or specific time extension. ¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to reach out, at the highest level, to Japan to garner support for this proposal. The Draft G8 Leaders' language proposed by the U.S. for inclusion in the Nonproliferation statement (as mentioned in the points below) will follow as an attachment by email to Post. Recommended talking points are included in Para 8. ¶8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE: --In addition to meeting or exceeding our current Global Partnership commitments laid out at Kananaskis, the global WMD threat we face is urgent and evolving, and our collective peace and security depends on our response and leadership. Therefore, we must act immediately and provide that leadership to address the threats that all our nations face. --Expanding the geographic scope of the Global Partnership to focus on worldwide threats beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union - with all G8 nations (including Russia) as partners - would allow for greater attention to combat emerging terrorist threats in Southeast Asia and other terrorist hotspot regions. --In fact, the U.S. is already beginning to address global WMD threats, including important work to combat nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological threats in Southeast Asia. --Despite a longstanding discussion on the GP,s future within the Global Partnership Working Group and general support for the ideas we are proposing, our proposal to expand and extend the GP is not reflected in the circulated drafts of the GPWG,s midpoint 5-year review document or the NPDG,s broader nonproliferation statement. --We understand that the financial commitment we are asking for - another $10 billion from other GP donors - is substantial. We recognize that it will not be easy and will take time for many GP members to develop mechanisms to fund projects to combat the global threat. --This is precisely why we must act now to begin the expansion and extension process. The global threat we face is too important to delay, and we have a chance to show important leadership. --All G8 nations face the threat of WMD proliferation, including WMD terrorism, and should not stop working on halting the spread of WMD, related materials and delivery systems after the Kananaskis documents, terms expire in ¶2012. --The original Kananaskis document stated a vision for the future, and we are asking Leaders to reaffirm a commitment for a vision of the future beyond 2012. -- Global security demands that we help to eliminate chemical weapons worldwide, reduce dangerous nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological materials, and secure those which remain. In doing so, we will greatly reduce the dangerous of WMD proliferation and terrorism. Even as we do so, we will also facilitate access worldwide to the economic and social benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials. --We have also committed to help the nations of the world implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, thereby filling critical gaps in proliferation prevention around the world. Expansion and extension of the GP would provide us with a way to help fill these gaps. --The GP has been successful and effective despite numerous obstacles to implementation, most of which have been overcome. The Partnership works without any bureaucracy or institutional infrastructure and is a positive model of cooperation for combating global proliferation threats. This makes the GP an effective mechanism for providing assistance to reduce global proliferation threats, including by meeting our 1540 obligations in addition to other critical G8 commitments, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. --At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate activities to reduce the global WMD threat through the GP. It is time now to take the next step to continue and expand the GP. --We have drafted Leaders, language for your consideration as part of the G8 Nonproliferation statement and we hope you will support us. --The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional $10 billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that other GP donors can also be able to match this. IF THE INTERLOCUTOR INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR THE CURRENT FORMAL MECHANISM OF ADMITTING NEW RECIPIENT STATES: --We feel that the current mechanism for admitting new GP recipient states is cumbersome and does not serve the G8,s need to broadly combat the WMD threat. Five years into the Partnership, Russia has only allowed itself and one other nation (Ukraine) to formally benefit from the GP. --When countries ask us for assistance in combating terrorist threats they face, or when we identify an important threat, we do not have the luxury of waiting for a formal process before we act. --Therefore, we urge you to consider the broadest possible participation of states when the geographic scope of the GP is expanded. END POINTS ¶9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel),NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen Newhouse), ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans),E (John Duncan and Benedict Wolf),P (Maren Brooks),T (Susan Koch and Jim Timbie),S/P (Ed Lacey),EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, Lisa Benthien), DOE (Joyce Connery, Gerald Stacey),and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melason, Andy Weber). RICE