OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND

UNCLAS STATE 060918

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BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: UK

REF: A. BERLIN 000845


1. (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below.


2. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal
(coordinated by the NSC with strong interagency support)
to expand and extend the G8 Global Partnership Against
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) for
another 10 years (2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion;
other GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging
global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats.
This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27
Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the April
23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG)
(reftel). All GP members recognize the evolving
global WMD threat, but most have been resistant to
our proposal ) largely due to worries about cost
and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts in
Russia and the former Soviet Union. The UK and
Canada are the most supportive. Russia poses the
strongest opposition to the proposal and has
expressed that the original Kananaskis priorities
must be completed before moving forward. Germany
has expressed similar concerns. Therefore, the
U.S. has decided to increase senior diplomatic
outreach to G8 partners on this proposal,
emphasizing that this commitment will help
address critical global proliferation challenges
under United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (Global Initiative),and other G8 priorities.
END SUMMARY.

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BACKGROUND
--------------


3. (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in
2002 to address the spread of WMD, and now
includes the G8 plus 13 additional donor nations
and the EU. 2007 marks the halfway point for the
Global Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion
commitment. GP donor pledges to date come in at
over $17 billion (including $10 billion from the
U.S.),plus an additional $6 billion from Russia,
which was not included in the initial $20 billion
commitment. The current GP scope addresses WMD
threats only within Russia and other former
Soviet states (the U.S. recognizes all former
Soviet nations as GP recipients, but so far
only Russia and Ukraine are officially recognized
as recipient states by the entire Partnership).
The Kananaskis document anticipated an expansion
by mandating that GP programs begin &initially in
Russia8 but not be limited to Russia. In the
context of the G8, the GP is handled by the GPWG,
which reports to the Nonproliferation Directors
Group (NPDG). The GP is a unique model of
multilateral cooperation to combat WMD and
missile threats and has made great progress
in its first five years to reduce the
proliferation threat, including chemical
weapons destruction; redirection of former
WMD scientists, technicians and engineers;
improving security for fissile nuclear materials,
chemical weapons stocks and biological agents;
and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear
submarines.


4. (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and
extend the GP to combat new and emerging
global WMD threats includes four components:
1) Immediate expansion of geographic scope
outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union
(to include the broadest possible participation
of new recipient states worldwide); 2) Immediate
inclusion of broadest possible functional scope
to include all chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear and missile threats; 3) Extension of
time commitment for an additional 10 years
(2012-2022); and 4) Increased financial commitment
of an additional $20 billion for 2012-2022 with
the same parameters as original commitment (U.S.
$10 billion; $10 billion from other donors).
The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement at
the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8
committed to coordinate activities to reduce
the global WMD threat through the GP. Note
that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably
Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis
Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was
formed, already include a broad interpretation
of threats (chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly
argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important
priorities of chemical weapons destruction and
nuclear submarine dismantlement.


5. (SBU) After working this proposal at the
level of the GPWG and Political Directors, the
U.S. has gained strong support from the UK and
Canada and more modest support from Japan and
France for the first two objectives (geographic
and programmatic expansion),with limited to no
support for the 10-year extension and additional
financial commitments at this time. Russia
objects to the entire proposal.

--------------
UK POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
--------------


6. (SBU) The UK has been a strong supporter of
the U.S. proposal with avid interest in the need
to geographically and programmatically expand the
GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats.
The UK has indicated that the proposal has been
sent to the Prime Minister level for consideration,
but so far the UK has stopped short of being able
to specifically endorse new financial commitments
and the 10-year expansion at this time. Continued
outreach on the proposal might help bring the UK
around in their support for the entire proposal,
and may strengthen their resolve to push hard with
other G8 nations for geographic and programmatic
expansion.


7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to
reach out, at the highest appropriate level, to
the UK to thank them for their outstanding support
for geographic and programmatic expansion of the
GP and press for support for the entire proposal
as part of the Nonproliferation Leaders, statement.
The Draft G8 Leaders' language proposed by the U.S.
for inclusion in the Nonproliferation statement will
follow as an attachment by email to Post.

Recommended talking points are included in Para 8.


8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND
APPROPRIATE:

--We have greatly appreciated the UK,s strong
support for our proposal to expand the Global
Partnership to combat new and emerging global
WMD threats. Your support in the GPWG and
through your Political Director and Sherpa
has been critical.

--We now have Japan and France expressing interest
in our proposal, but Germany is still cool to the
proposal. We seek your continued strong support
at the highest possible levels to garner stronger
support from Germany, to maintain the support we
have from Japan and France, and to press the
Italians to come around.

--We are also reaching out to Russia in hopes that
they can come to the table with us as a partner in
a geographic expansion and time extension of the
GP ) especially given Russia,s solid support for
joint initiatives to combat WMD worldwide, such
as the Global Initiative and United Nations
Security Resolution 1540.

--However, without new funding commitments to the GP
to go along with the geographic expansion, Russia,s
support will be more difficult, and global programming
will take more time.

--We recognize that the funding commitment is the
most difficult part of the proposal, but we hope
that you will be able to join us in supporting the
full proposal, including the financial commitment
and 10-year extension.

--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate
activities to reduce the global WMD threat through
the GP. It is time now to take the next step to
continue and expand the GP.

--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional $10
billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that the UK
and other GP donors can together agree to be
able to match this commitment.

--We greatly appreciate your continued strong
support for geographic and programmatic expansion,
and we hope that you will strongly consider the
financial commitment and time extension.

--Can we count on you to strongly endorse this as
an integral part of the Nonproliferation Leaders,
statement?

--If possible, UK outreach to Germany and other G8
nations to support inclusion of this language in
Nonproliferation Leaders statement and GP Midpoint
Review document would be especially helpful.

END POINTS


9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this
action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel),
NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen
Newhouse),ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff,
Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans),E (John Duncan and
Benedict Wolf),P (Maren Brooks),T (Susan Koch and
Jim Timbie),S/P (Ed Lacey),EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt,
Lisa Benthien),DOE/NNSA (Joyce Connery, Gerald Stacey),
and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melanson, Andy Weber).
RICE