OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND

UNCLAS STATE 060637

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SIPDIS - NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY
DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY
OSD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND

EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: GERMANY

REF: A. BERLIN 000845


1. (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below.


2. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal
(coordinated through NSC with strong
interagency support) to expand and extend the G8
Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction (GP) for another 10 years
(2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; other
GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging
global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats.
This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27
Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the April
23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG)
(reftel). All GP members recognize the evolving
global WMD threat, but most have been resistant to
our proposal ) largely due to worries about cost
and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts in
Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Canada
and the UK are the most supportive. Russia poses the
strongest opposition and has expressed that the
original Kananaskis priorities must be completed
before moving forward. Germany has expressed
similar concerns. Therefore the U.S. is increasing
senior diplomatic outreach to G8 partners on this
proposal, emphasizing that this commitment will help
address critical global proliferation challenges,
including the requirements of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Global Initiative),
and other G8 priorities. END SUMMARY.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


3. (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002
to address the spread of WMD, and now includes
the G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the
EU. 2007 marks the halfway point for the Global
Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion
commitment. GP donor pledges to date come
in at over $17 billion (including $10 billion
from the U.S.),plus an additional $6 billion
from Russia, which was not included in the initial
$20 billion commitment. The current GP scope
addresses WMD threats only within Russia and
other former Soviet states (the U.S. recognizes
all former Soviet nations as GP recipients, but
so far only Russia and Ukraine are officially
recognized as recipient states by the entire
Partnership). The Kananaskis document anticipated
an expansion by mandating that GP programs begin
&initially in Russia8 but not be limited to
Russia. In the context of the G8, the GP is
handled by the GPWG, which reports to the
Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG).
The GP is a unique model of multilateral
cooperation to combat WMD and missile threats
and has made great progress in its first five
years to reduce the proliferation threat,
including chemical weapons destruction; redirection
of former WMD scientists, technicians and
engineers; improving security for fissile
nuclear materials, chemical weapons stocks
and biological agents; and dismantlement
of decommissioned nuclear submarines.


4. (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend
the GP to combat new and emerging global WMD
threats includes four components: 1) Immediate
expansion of geographic scope outside of Russia
and the former Soviet Union (to include the
broadest possible participation of new recipient
states worldwide); 2) Immediate inclusion of
broadest possible functional scope to include
all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
and missile threats; 3) Extension of time
commitment for an additional 10 years (2012-2022);
and 4) Increased financial commitment of an
additional $20 billion for 2012-2022 with the
same parameters as original commitment (U.S.
$10 billion; $10 billion from other donors).
The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement at
the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8
committed to coordinate activities to reduce
the global WMD threat through the GP. Note
that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably
Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis
Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was
formed, already include a broad interpretation
of threats (chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly
argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important
priorities of chemical weapons destruction and
nuclear submarine dismantlement.


5. (SBU) After working this proposal at the
level of the GPWG and Political Directors, the
U.S. has gained some support from most G8 members
for the first two objectives (geographic and
programmatic expansion),with limited to no
support for the 10-year extension and additional
financial contribution at this time. Russia
objects to the entire proposal.

-------------- --
GERMANY POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
-------------- --


6. (SBU) Germany has virtually ignored the
proposal in every nonproliferation or
GP-related statement they have drafted
for the G8 Leaders to date, despite several
months of discussion on this topic in the
GPWG. During the April 23 GPWG, German
MFA expressed appreciation for our
proposal, but did not agree to include our
language in their draft GP five-year midpoint
review document, which is a Summit deliverable.
Germany specifically stated that the proposal
can/should only be considered at the highest
levels and did not support the U.S. assertion
that the GP has the responsibility to recommend
its views on the future of the GP to G8 Leaders
(emphasizing their view that the GP cannot
&decide8 such things). In particular, the
Germans seem most concerned with the additional
financial support requested and the inclusion
of the broadest possible number of potential GP
recipients upon geographic expansion, rather
than the current formal approach to GP accession,
which (largely by Russian design) has hampered
the GP,s ability to expand even within the FSU.


7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to
reach out, at the highest appropriate level,
to Germany to garner support for this proposal.
The Draft G8 Leaders' language proposed by the
U.S. for inclusion in the Nonproliferation
statement (as mentioned in the points below)
will follow as an attachment by email to Post.

Recommended talking points are included in Para 8.


8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND
APPROPRIATE:

--We remain committed to meeting or exceeding the
Global Partnership goals laid out at Kananaskis,
completing the priority tasks in Russia and the
former Soviet states.

--In addition to our current commitments, the
global WMD threat we face is urgent and evolving,
and our collective peace and security depends on
our response and leadership. Therefore, we must
act immediately and provide that leadership to
address the threats that all our nations face.

--Despite a longstanding discussion on the GP,s
future within the Global Partnership Working Group
and general support for the ideas we are proposing,
our proposal to expand and extend the GP is not
reflected in the circulated drafts of the GPWG,s
midpoint five-year review document (or the NPDG,s
broader nonproliferation statement).

--We understand that the financial commitment we
are asking for - another $10 billion from other
GP donors - is substantial. We recognize that it
will not be easy and will take time for many GP
members to develop mechanisms to fund projects
to combat the global threat.

--This is precisely why we must act now to begin
the expansion and extension process. The
global threat we face is too important to
delay, and we have a chance to
show important leadership.

--All G8 nations face the threat of WMD proliferation,
including WMD terrorism, and should not stop working on
halting the spread of WMD, related materials and
delivery systems after the Kananaskis documents'
terms expire in 2012.

--The original Kananaskis document stated a vision
for the future, and we are asking Leaders
to reaffirm a commitment for a vision of the future
beyond 2012.

--Global security demands that we help to
eliminate chemical weapons worldwide, reduce
dangerous nuclear, radiological, chemical,
and biological materials, and secure those
which remain. In doing so, we will greatly
reduce the dangerous of WMD proliferation
and terrorism. Even as we do so, we will
also facilitate access worldwide to the economic
and social benefits of the peaceful use of
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological
materials.

-------------- We have also committed to help the nations of the
world implement United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, thereby filling critical gaps in proliferation
prevention around the world. Expansion and
extension of the GP would provide us with a
way to help fill these gaps.

--The GP has been successful and effective despite
numerous obstacles to implementation, most of which
have been overcome. The Partnership works without
any bureaucracy or institutional infrastructure and
is a positive model of cooperation for combating
global proliferation threats. This makes the GP
an effective mechanism for providing assistance to
reduce global proliferation threats, including by
meeting our 1540 obligations in addition to other
critical G8 commitments, such as the Global Initiative.

--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate
activities to reduce the global WMD threat through
the GP. It is time now to take the next step to
continue and expand the GP.

--We have drafted Leaders, language for your
consideration as part of the G8 Nonproliferation
statement and we hope you will support us.

--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional
$10 billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that other GP
donors will also be able agree to contribute in total
an additional $10 billion.

IF THE INTERLOCUTOR INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR THE
CURRENT FORMAL MECHANISM OF ADMITTING NEW RECIPIENT
STATES:

--We feel that the current mechanism for admitting
new GP recipient states is cumbersome and does not
serve the G8,s need to broadly combat the WMD threat.
Five years into the Partnership, Russia has only
allowed itself and one other nation (Ukraine) to
formally benefit from the GP.

--When countries ask us for assistance in combating
terrorist threats they face, or when we identify an
important threat, we do not have the luxury of waiting
for a formal process before we act.

--Therefore, we urge you to consider the broadest
possible participation of states when the geographic
scope of the GP is expanded.

END POINTS


9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this
action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel),
NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen
Newhouse),ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff,
Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans),E (John Duncan and
Benedict Wolf),P (Maren Brooks),T (Susan Koch and
Jim Timbie),S/P (Ed Lacey),EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt,
Lisa Benthien),DoE/NNSA (Joyce Connery and Gerald Stacey),
and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melanson, Andy Weber).
RICE