Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07STATE48895
2007-04-12 21:32:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:
(C) SINGAPORE: IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION
P 122132Z APR 07 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 048895
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2032
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC SN IR
SUBJECT: (C) SINGAPORE: IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION
ACT - NOTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ONE SINGAPOREAN
ENTITY
REF: A. SINGAPORE 175
B. STATE 7886
C. 06 SINGAPORE 3180
D. 06 STATE 153425
E. 05 SINGAPORE 1055
F. 05 STATE 61519
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),
(D),AND (H).
S E C R E T STATE 048895
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2032
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC SN IR
SUBJECT: (C) SINGAPORE: IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION
ACT - NOTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ONE SINGAPOREAN
ENTITY
REF: A. SINGAPORE 175
B. STATE 7886
C. 06 SINGAPORE 3180
D. 06 STATE 153425
E. 05 SINGAPORE 1055
F. 05 STATE 61519
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),
(D),AND (H).
1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy
Singapore. Please see paragraph 6.
2. (S) Background: The Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (ISNA) requires periodic reports
to Congress identifying foreign entities with respect
to whom there is credible information indicating that
they have transferred to or acquired from Iran or Syria
items on multilateral lists (Australia Group (AG),
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR),Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)) or other items with
the potential to make a material contribution to
missile, WMD, or other certain weapons programs.
3. (S) The USG has determined that Sokkia Singapore
Pte Ltd. has engaged in activities, as noted above,
that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to
Section 3 of the ISNA. Specifically, Sokkia Singapore
in 2004 shipped theodolites to a suspected front
company for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG),
the entity responsible for Iran's liquid-fueled
ballistic missile program. We first raised this issue
with GOS authorities in April 2005, asking them to
investigate and take measures to ensure that entities
in Singapore did not assist missile programs in Iran,
and advising them that sanctions pursuant to U.S. law
could result from Sokkia Singapore's actions (Ref F).
In September 2006, we reminded our Singaporean
interlocutors that we were still waiting to hear what
actions they had taken in this case (Ref D). In
response, Singapore officials said that they were
engaged in ongoing surveillance of Sokkia Singapore,
but also said that an investigation could move forward
only if they were given evidence that the items were
going to Iran's missile program, and doubted that the
case could be successfully prosecuted (Ref C). In
January 2007, we clarified with the GOS that we were
not requesting that Singapore prosecute Sokkia
Singapore, but repeated our warning about the
possibility of the imposition of sanctions (Ref B).
GOS officials said that they planned to contact Sokkia
Singapore as part of their industry outreach effort
prior to expanding Singapore's export control list, and
said that the MFA would provide us with the details of
their investigation once completed (Ref A). Since that
time we have not received any additional information
from the GOS on this case.
4. (S) Pursuant to the provisions of the ISNA, the
following penalties are imposed on Sokkia Singapore
Pte. Ltd., its subunits, subsidiaries, and successors:
a. No department or agency of the United States
Government may procure, or enter into any contract for
the procurement of any goods, technology, or services
from them;
b. No department or agency of the United States
Government may provide any assistance to them, and they
shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance
program of the United States Government;
c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United
States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to
them of any defense articles, defense services, or
design and construction services under the Arms Export
Control Act are terminated; and
d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items, the export of which is
controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979
or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing
such licenses are suspended.
These measures, which will take effect shortly, will
remain in place for two years. We want to provide
advance notice to the Singaporean Government of this
decision, note that this determination will be
published soon in the Federal Register, and make clear
that the penalties are only on the specific entity
involved in this case and not on any other entity or on
any part of the government of Singapore. End
Background.
5. (S) Purpose/Objective: To inform the host
government of the sanctions determination prior to its
publication in the Federal Register.
6. (S) Action request: Post is requested to provide
the following suggested talking points to appropriate
Singaporean government officials and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
7. (S//REL SINGAPORE) Suggested Talking Points:
-- The United States has determined that there is
credible information indicating that Sokkia Singapore
Pte. Ltd. transferred to Iran items that have the
potential to contribute materially to missile programs
in Iran.
-- Specifically, as we first advised you in April 2005,
Sokkia Singapore in 2004 shipped dual-use items to a
suspected front company for the Shahid Hemmat
Industrial Group (SHIG),the entity responsible for
Iran's liquid-fueled ballistic missile program.
-- Among the items transferred to SHIG were
theodolites, which can be used in a missile program to
calibrate and align guidance and navigation
instruments.
-- Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Iran
and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA),the following
measures are imposed on Sokkia Singapore Pte. Ltd and
its successors, subunits, and subsidiaries:
a. No department or agency of the United States
Government may procure, or enter into any contract for
the procurement of any goods, technology, or services
from them;
b. No department or agency of the United States
Government may provide any assistance to them, and they
shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance
program of the United States Government;
c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United
States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to
them of any defense articles, defense services, or
design and construction services under the Arms Export
Control Act are terminated: and
d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items, the export of which is
controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979
or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing
such licenses are suspended.
-- These measures will take effect shortly and will
remain in place for two years.
-- This determination will be published soon in the
Federal Register.
-- We want to make clear that these penalties are being
levied only on the involved entity, Sokkia Singapore
Pte. Ltd., and not on any other entity or on any part
of the Singapore government.
(if asked)
-- We take into account available information -
including enforcement actions by your government - in
making sanctions determinations.
8. (U) Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR and EAP/MTS. A response is requested as soon
as possible. Department point of contact is Matt
Hardiman, ISN/MTR, 202-647-3176 (hardimanmx@state.sgov.gov).
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2032
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC SN IR
SUBJECT: (C) SINGAPORE: IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION
ACT - NOTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ONE SINGAPOREAN
ENTITY
REF: A. SINGAPORE 175
B. STATE 7886
C. 06 SINGAPORE 3180
D. 06 STATE 153425
E. 05 SINGAPORE 1055
F. 05 STATE 61519
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),
(D),AND (H).
1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy
Singapore. Please see paragraph 6.
2. (S) Background: The Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (ISNA) requires periodic reports
to Congress identifying foreign entities with respect
to whom there is credible information indicating that
they have transferred to or acquired from Iran or Syria
items on multilateral lists (Australia Group (AG),
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR),Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)) or other items with
the potential to make a material contribution to
missile, WMD, or other certain weapons programs.
3. (S) The USG has determined that Sokkia Singapore
Pte Ltd. has engaged in activities, as noted above,
that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to
Section 3 of the ISNA. Specifically, Sokkia Singapore
in 2004 shipped theodolites to a suspected front
company for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG),
the entity responsible for Iran's liquid-fueled
ballistic missile program. We first raised this issue
with GOS authorities in April 2005, asking them to
investigate and take measures to ensure that entities
in Singapore did not assist missile programs in Iran,
and advising them that sanctions pursuant to U.S. law
could result from Sokkia Singapore's actions (Ref F).
In September 2006, we reminded our Singaporean
interlocutors that we were still waiting to hear what
actions they had taken in this case (Ref D). In
response, Singapore officials said that they were
engaged in ongoing surveillance of Sokkia Singapore,
but also said that an investigation could move forward
only if they were given evidence that the items were
going to Iran's missile program, and doubted that the
case could be successfully prosecuted (Ref C). In
January 2007, we clarified with the GOS that we were
not requesting that Singapore prosecute Sokkia
Singapore, but repeated our warning about the
possibility of the imposition of sanctions (Ref B).
GOS officials said that they planned to contact Sokkia
Singapore as part of their industry outreach effort
prior to expanding Singapore's export control list, and
said that the MFA would provide us with the details of
their investigation once completed (Ref A). Since that
time we have not received any additional information
from the GOS on this case.
4. (S) Pursuant to the provisions of the ISNA, the
following penalties are imposed on Sokkia Singapore
Pte. Ltd., its subunits, subsidiaries, and successors:
a. No department or agency of the United States
Government may procure, or enter into any contract for
the procurement of any goods, technology, or services
from them;
b. No department or agency of the United States
Government may provide any assistance to them, and they
shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance
program of the United States Government;
c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United
States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to
them of any defense articles, defense services, or
design and construction services under the Arms Export
Control Act are terminated; and
d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items, the export of which is
controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979
or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing
such licenses are suspended.
These measures, which will take effect shortly, will
remain in place for two years. We want to provide
advance notice to the Singaporean Government of this
decision, note that this determination will be
published soon in the Federal Register, and make clear
that the penalties are only on the specific entity
involved in this case and not on any other entity or on
any part of the government of Singapore. End
Background.
5. (S) Purpose/Objective: To inform the host
government of the sanctions determination prior to its
publication in the Federal Register.
6. (S) Action request: Post is requested to provide
the following suggested talking points to appropriate
Singaporean government officials and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
7. (S//REL SINGAPORE) Suggested Talking Points:
-- The United States has determined that there is
credible information indicating that Sokkia Singapore
Pte. Ltd. transferred to Iran items that have the
potential to contribute materially to missile programs
in Iran.
-- Specifically, as we first advised you in April 2005,
Sokkia Singapore in 2004 shipped dual-use items to a
suspected front company for the Shahid Hemmat
Industrial Group (SHIG),the entity responsible for
Iran's liquid-fueled ballistic missile program.
-- Among the items transferred to SHIG were
theodolites, which can be used in a missile program to
calibrate and align guidance and navigation
instruments.
-- Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Iran
and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA),the following
measures are imposed on Sokkia Singapore Pte. Ltd and
its successors, subunits, and subsidiaries:
a. No department or agency of the United States
Government may procure, or enter into any contract for
the procurement of any goods, technology, or services
from them;
b. No department or agency of the United States
Government may provide any assistance to them, and they
shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance
program of the United States Government;
c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United
States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to
them of any defense articles, defense services, or
design and construction services under the Arms Export
Control Act are terminated: and
d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items, the export of which is
controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979
or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing
such licenses are suspended.
-- These measures will take effect shortly and will
remain in place for two years.
-- This determination will be published soon in the
Federal Register.
-- We want to make clear that these penalties are being
levied only on the involved entity, Sokkia Singapore
Pte. Ltd., and not on any other entity or on any part
of the Singapore government.
(if asked)
-- We take into account available information -
including enforcement actions by your government - in
making sanctions determinations.
8. (U) Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR and EAP/MTS. A response is requested as soon
as possible. Department point of contact is Matt
Hardiman, ISN/MTR, 202-647-3176 (hardimanmx@state.sgov.gov).
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text