DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 029082 SIPDIS SIPDIS USDOJ FOR DIRECTOR INTERPOL-USNCB NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE, JOSE CARDENAS, AND GREG GATJANIS FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT PARIS PASS TO APP LYON E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016 TAGS: IR AR LE PGOV PREL FBI PTER KJUS ASEC PRT KTFN, KISL, KIRF, OAS, IT, UK, FR, GM SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH MARCH 13-15 INTERPOL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN LYON, FRANCE Ref: A. BUENOS AIRES 46 B. 2006 BUENOS AIRES 2749 and previous Classified By: Under Secretary Nicholas Burns for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 12. (U) SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (C) Argentina has asked for USG assistance in persuading Interpol to issue six Red Notices for five current and former Iranian officials and one Lebanese national thought by Argentina to be criminally responsible for the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires. Ambassadors for all action addresses, except Tel Aviv, are requested to approach host governments at the highest level to convey U.S. strong support in this matter. Ambassadors also are requested to meet with their Argentine counterparts to discuss AMIA and U.S. interests and actions. The AMIA attack killed 85 and wounded more than 150 individuals. Argentina originally requested that Interpol issue Red Notices for eight Iranian present and former officials and one notice against a Hizballah terrorist leader. Iran has formally objected to the eight Iranian notices and said that Argentina's request is political. The Interpol Executive Council (EC) will meet next week beginning on March 13 to consider a compromise whereby Red Notices will issue for five Iranian officials and the Hizballah terrorist leader but will not issue for a former Iranian President, a former Iranian Foreign Minister, and a former Iranian Ambassador. Argentina supports this compromise as does the USG. The GOA is concerned that the EC will decide against Argentina without a strong U.S. lobbying effort and we are prepared to pursue such an effort, as discussed below. For guidance on the public posture to be taken by Embassy if necessary, including if asked guidance, please see paragraph 17. ¶3. (C) If after reviewing this cable, Embassy determines that making the approach recommended here would be counterproductive to U.S. and Argentine efforts to obtain support for the Interpol compromise, Embassy should report this to Washington and await further guidance. Further, if Embassies Berlin, Rome, and Madrid believe this approach would be counterproductive to U.S. efforts on behalf of U.S. personnel who are the subject of criminal proceedings, then Embassy should report this to Washington. ¶4. (C) For Embassy Tel Aviv: Post is requested to convey the USG's interest in AMIA. Post also should inquire and report on any actions that the GOI is taking at home or with other capitals with respect to the AMIA matter before Interpol. OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶5. (C) Post should determine the most appropriate person at a senior level to deliver the demarche in order to achieve the desired results of support for Argentina's case at next week's Interpol Executive Committee meeting in Lyon, France, March 13-16. Embassy should pursue the STATE 00029082 002 OF 005 -- Thank host government for all past efforts to fight international terrorism. -- Remind or inform host government officials of the AMIA arrest warrants, noting that the GOA's request for Red Notices was made on the basis of a recently concluded GOA investigation of the AMIA bombing, -- Note that the AMIA bombing in 1994 was a heinous act of premeditated murder against innocent civilians and that Argentina is trying to bring to justice those its prosecutors have concluded are responsible for the worst act of terrorism to occur in South America. -- Note that we understand the Interpol Secretariat will recommend to the Interpol Executive Committee that Interpol 1) not publish Red Notices for three former Iranian officials (former President Rafsanjani, former Foreign Minister Velayati, and former Ambassador to Argentina Soleimanpour) and 2) support issuance of Red Notices for the remaining six suspects, including the Hizballah -IJO leader. (See details in Background.) -- Note that in addition this recent Red Notice under consideration, Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah is the subject of two other Red Notices. He is wanted in Argentina for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aries and by the United States for his role in the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 and related murders. -- The USG supports this compromise position developed by Interpol as appropriate under the circumstances. It will help Argentina in its efforts to achieve justice in the wake of a major terrorist attack on its territory against innocent civilians. It is also consistent with Interpol practice. -- Note that USG understands the GOA has already reached out to host government Foreign Ministry and government's ambassadors in Buenos Aires in all action addressee countries with representatives on the Interpol Executive Committee. (Note: Argentina and Singapore do not have diplomatic missions in each other's countries but the Argentine Charge in Indonesia has met in Singapore with GOS officials.) GOA may also contact host government's Interpol Executive Committee member to provide further information on the case as the Red Notice process continues. -- Explain to host government that the U.S. supports Argentina's request for international support for the Interpol approach. Express our strong hope that host government will support the approach that has been developed at Interpol at the upcoming Executive Committee meeting in Lyon. Only if asked about immunity issues or other potential Iranian defenses: -- Note that our support is focused on the context of this specific case, drawing upon the following points as needed: (1) the individuals with the strongest bases for immunity are excluded, (2) Iran has not justified or explained the basis of any immunity for any of the officials, including the remaining lower level officials, (3) the attack on AMIA was a vicious terrorist act that specifically targeted innocent civilians for which the six individuals have been charged and (4) the approach is consistent with Interpol practice. REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- STATE 00029082 003 OF 005 ¶6. (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to WHA/BSC - Drew Blakeney and NEA/IR - Sean Misko no later than March 9, 2007. Please caption cables "SIPDIS" and include the IR and PTER tags. We appreciate posts' assistance with this important demarche. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶7. (U) On July 18, 1994, Argentina suffered its worst terrorist attack, when the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) was bombed, killing 85 and wounding more than 150. The attack came two years after a terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, which left 29 dead and destroyed the building. The U.S. has supported an investigation against the individuals involved for over 12 years. ¶8. (U) On October 25, 2006, an Argentine special prosecutor issued a formal investigative report on the terrorist bombing of AMIA. On November 9, 2006 Argentine federal judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral issued arrest warrants against Iran's former President and current chairman of the Expediency Council Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, former Foreign Minister and current Khamenei advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, former Minister of Intelligence and current Assembly of Experts member Ali Fallahijan, former IRGC Commander and current Expediency Council member Mohsen Rezai, former Qods Force leader and current Deputy Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, former Ambassador of Iran (Buenos Aires) Hadi Soleimanpour, former Iranian Embassy (Buenos Aires) Cultural Attache Mohsen Rabbani, and former third secretary of the Iranian Embassy Ahmed Reza Asghari (a.k.a. Mohsen Randjbaran). The report named Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah as well. (FYI - In addition to being wanted in connection with the AMIA bombing, Mughniyah also is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice (requested by GOA) for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Further, on December 27, 2006, Interpol issued a Red Notice, at USNCB's request, for Mughniyah for his role in the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847. The Red Notice is based on Mughniyah's federal indictment in U.S. District Court District of Columbia for conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy and take hostages, murder, hostage taking, and aircraft piracy.) ¶9. (U) On November 16, 2006 the GOA sent applications for the issuance of Red Notices to the International Criminal Police Organization ("Interpol") seeking the assistance of the other 185 Interpol member countries in bringing the charged individuals to justice. The GOI challenged the Argentine application for Red Notices as politically motivated and also threatened to level tit- for-tat indictments of Argentine officials involved in the AMIA case. Interpol agreed to hold issuance of Red Notices in abeyance until each side could explain its position. GOA and Iranian government officials met in Lyon, France, on January 22, to present their perspectives on the case. After hearing GOA and GOI presentations, the Interpol Secretariat deferred action on the AMIA Red Notice applications to the Interpol Executive Committee which will meet March 13-16, in Lyon. ¶10. (SBU) The Interpol General Counsel has since recommended not issuing Red Notices for three defendants. The notices against Rafsanjani and Velayati are not being issued in light of the head of state immunity. The notice against Soleimanpour is not being issued because an earlier denial by the UK of a GOA extradition request for him demonstrated that there was insufficient evidence. Proceeding with a Red Notice under such circumstances would unnecessarily put Interpol into a political conflict with its members. The GOA has informed us that it is prepared to concur in these STATE 00029082 004 OF 005 ¶11. (C) The Argentine government has conducted a investigation and has concluded the AMIA bombing was a premeditated attack funded by the Iranian regime and executed by Hizballah. The AMIA bombing killed 85 and wounded more than 150 innocent civilians; it was the deadliest terror attack in the hemisphere until September 11, 2001. An Argentine trial and conviction of the individuals sought would establish the Iranian regime's and Hizballah's role in this attack and underscore Tehran's flagrant violation of international law and callous disregard for the lives of innocent civilians. The issuance of Interpol Red Notices for the 6 individuals (five Iranians and Mugniyah) noted above would advance U.S. counter terrorism policy objectives by supporting Argentina in its effort to prosecute those who it believes were responsible for this act of terror; spotlighting Iran's role as the leading state sponsor of international terrorism; increasing the costs to Tehran for its continued support of terrorism; and further exposing Hizballah's illegitimate, extremist agenda and role in carrying out terrorist attacks around the world. ¶12. (C) In supporting Argentine efforts, an important USG interest is in ensuring that we do so in a way that does not undermine our efforts to defend U.S. officials from foreign prosecutions relating to official conduct. These risks are minimized in this case because of its specific context, including the fact that the individuals with the strongest bases for immunity are excluded, Iran has not justified or explained the basis of any immunity for any of its officials, including the remaining lower level ones, the approach is consistent with Interpol practice, and it does not prevent Iran from raising immunity or other defenses bilaterally in the context of a specific extradition request. It is therefore important that our support for Interpol's compromise approach be tied to this specific case. If, and only if, host governments raise questions or concerns about immunity issues or other potential Iranian defenses, post should note that our support is focused on the context of this specific case, note some of the specific factors enumerated above, and request further guidance as necessary. ¶13. (U) Either country taking issue with a decision of the Executive Committee may petition the Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Morocco in November 2007, for a final and decisive vote on the issue. ¶14. (U) A Red Notice is an international "wanted" notice that provides information on the identification of fugitives charged with or convicted of serious crimes. Red Notices are issued by Interpol in Lyon at the request of one of the 186 Interpol member countries. The country initiating the notice commits to seeking the provisional arrest and extradition of the fugitive in question should he or she be located. Prior to issuance, the Interpol General Secretariat (IPSG) reviews each proposed Red Notice to ensure compliance with the Interpol Constitution. In particular, the General Secretariat reviews the Red Notice application to ensure compliance with Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution, which prohibits Interpol from engaging in activities of "a political, military, religious, or racial character." ¶15. (U) Additional historical background: Interpol issued Red Notices in November 2003 for 12 individuals implicated in the AMIA case, but the GOI complained of investigative irregularities by the Argentine judge involved in the earlier investigation of the bombing and the issuance of the warrants upon which the Red Notices were based. Based on the GOI's complaint, the Interpol Executive Committee cancelled the Red Notices in STATE 00029082 005 OF 005 SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST - ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH MARCH 13-15 INTERP September 2005. On September 21, 2005, the GOA petitioned the Interpol General Assembly then meeting in Berlin to reinstate the Red Notices, but the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to support the Executive Committee's decision to cancel the notices. A new prosecutor and judge have been leading a new investigation over the past two years. Based on their more complete and professional investigation, they have issued new indictments and arrest warrants now under consideration by Interpol. POINTS OF CONTACT -------------- ¶16. (U) Please contact the following individuals by email for any further background information or talking points on any aspect of the demarche to meet our objectives: WHA - Drew Blakeney/Caroline Croft, NEA/IR - Sean Misko/Tim Standaert, S/CT - Arnold Sierra/Patrick Worman, L/LEI - Emily Daughtry. PUBLIC POSTURE -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Approaches to host governments should be non- public through appropriate diplomatic channels. It is important that Argentina remain in the lead of this effort and that our role be perceived as a supportive rather than leading one. If asked by press or others about USG position, posts can, on the record: -- Acknowledge that USG strongly supports Argentina's efforts to permit Red Notices to be delivered for certain present and former Iranian officials in this AMIA case. -- We support the Jewish Community of Buenos Aires. -- In February, both AG Gonzales and U/S Burns assured AMIA leaders that we would support justice in this case. -- The attack on AMIA was a vicious act of terrorism. Argentina has conducted a comprehensive investigation and believes that present and former Iranian officials were behind this act of murder. We support their efforts to see that those responsible for this terrorist act are brought to Justice. -- Posts should not/not get into a public discussion of any immunity or related issues that might be raised. (If necessary, other questions can be referred back to Washington for consideration.) RICE