DEMARCHE ON THE CRISIS IN GUINEA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 019838 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PARIS FOR GREG D'ELIA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: GH GV ML MO MR PGOV PREL SL SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON THE CRISIS IN GUINEA REF: A. A) CONAKRY 179 ¶B. B) CONAKRY 18 ¶C. C) CONAKRY 181 AND PREVIOUS SITREPS ¶1. SUMMARY: The Department requests action embassies to encourage host country leadership at the highest appropriate level to press the Government of Guinea (GOG) to seek a resolution of the crisis, bring an end to the violence, promote dialogue, and seek a civilian-led constitutional transition plan. Objectives -------------- ¶2. In addition to the objectives and background, the Department encourages embassies to draw upon the tone and points delivered by Embassy Conakry in reftel A. Objectives are as follows: --If the government has not already done so, encourage host country government to issue a public statement expressing its concerns about the reports of human rights violations and denouncing the GOG's military curfew. --Encourage the host country government to advocate that the highest levels of the GOG end the current military curfew immediately, so that all parties may return to dialogue. --Persuade host country government that the only durable resolution to the Guinea crisis is a civilian-led constitutional transition. --Convey to host country government that the USG believes that civil society has legitimate concerns that they are raising about Guinea's long poor governance and mismanagement of the country's vast natural wealth. Background -------------- ¶3. The political crisis in Guinea continues to escalate. After nationwide protests turned violent, the GOG on February 12 declared a "State of Siege", and imposed a draconian curfew. As noted in reftels, there have been numerous deaths and significant economic damage. Popular discontent and frustration may be growing beyond the control of the government, military, unions, civil society and opposition parties. ¶4. The USG's position is to support a peaceful civilian- led transition. We have sent clear and unambiguous messages to all political and military leaders in Guinea to end the violence against civilians, that a military takeover is unacceptable, and could negatively affect U.S. foreign assistance and our longstanding, friendly cooperation with Guinea. ¶5. Contrary to the GOG's assertions that the unions and outside influences have instigated the current crisis, we strongly believe that the unions are expressing widespread and long-held popular frustrations with Guinea's poor governance and the mismanagement of its vast natural wealth. The leadership vacuum created by President Conte's advanced age, ill health, and self- interested political advisers has left the Guinea's institutions of government profoundly dysfunctional. Contrary to the interpretation of some, U.S. support for change within Guinea's constitution is not/not an endorsement of individuals or particular parties. Article 34 of Guinea's constitution allows for the vacation of power from the president and calls for the National Assembly President, as interim head of state, to oversee democratic presidential elections. ¶6. The regrettable military curfew imposed under the "state of siege" hinders dialogue and violates Guinea's international obligations to ensure the free movement of STATE 00019838 002 OF 002 diplomats. The growing restrictions on civil liberties and weakening of democratic institutions have already increased under the state of partial military rule. ¶7. While the military curfew may provide a temporary respite to the violence, the situation is not tenable. Only broad-based dialogue, entered in good faith and leading to a civilian-led political transition, can end the current crisis and improve democratic governance. Simply put, the people of Guinea are fed up. ¶8. The USG will continue to engage ECOWAS to take a more proactive role. We are looking to the AU and certain regional governments that have entr,e with the Government of Guinea for assistance in pressing Conte to step aside. In particular Ghanaian President Kufour, Malian President Toure, Colonel Vall of Mauritania, President Kabbah and King Mohammed VI of Morocco have particularly strong, personal relationships with President Conte, so we are encouraging them to step into the gap personally. Point of Contact -------------- ¶9. Please contact AF/W Deji Okediji at (202) 647-3469 or via email for any necessary further background information. Embassy is requested to report the results by cable to AF/W at earliest opportunity. RICE