GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA: BERLIN FRIENDS MTG - JAN 22

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 018053

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PREL UN GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA: BERLIN FRIENDS MTG - JAN 22


Classified By: DAS Matthew Bryza for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. DAS Matthew Bryza attended a January 22
meeting in Berlin of the UN Friends of the Secretary
General for Georgia (FSG or Friends) hosted by the German
MFA. The Friends finalized a list of substantive
confidence-building measures to be discussed with the
sides at Geneva on February 12-13. They agreed to try to
depoliticize and streamline the UNOMIG mandate renewal
process, perhaps by convening additional meetings for
substantive discussions to take place well in advance of
mandate renewal negotiations. Bryza said the U.S. would
consider a visa for Abkhaz separatist "foreign minister"
Shamba to appear in New York, provided Shamba came to
report on substantive progress in negotiations and
assuming prior agreement on a streamlined UNOMIG mandate
renewal. Notably, the Friends agreed on Georgia's right
in principle to administer to its citizens in the Upper
Kodori Gorge and its obligation to provide appropriate
security not only for its citizens, but for CIS
peacekeepers and UNOMIG observers, as well. END SUMMARY


2. (C) In addition to Bryza, the FSG were represented
by: Sir Brian Fall (UK),Veronique Bujon-Barre (France),
Hans-Dieter Lucas (Germany),and Vladislav Chernov
(Russian Federation). Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) for Abkhazia Jean Arnault also

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attended. Assisting were EUR/CARC Conflicts Advisor John
Crosby (U.S.),Louise Savill (UK),Aurelia Bouchez
(France),Christoph Retzlaff and Mirko Schilbach
(Germany),and a notetaker from the Russian Embassy in
Berlin.


3. (C) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. SRSG Jean Arnault started
the meeting by recapping recent developments in Georgia's
Abkhazia region. He highlighted the resumption of joint
UNOMIG/JPKF patrols of the Upper Kodori Valley (UKV);
noted progress on ensuring Georgian access to the UKV
without presenting a threat to the Abkhaz; said he would
ask the UN to increase the international police contingent
within UNOMIG to full complement; and pointed to
arrangements by which a UNOMIG Human Rights Officer would
be present whenever human rights issues are raised in the
Gali district, despite refusal of the Abkhaz to allow a UN
Human Rights sub-office there. Nonetheless, Arnault said
tensions remain high. As Abkhaz elections approach, he
said, "president" Sergei Bagapsh has staked his
re-election campaign in part on evicting the Georgian
"Government in Exile" from the UKV; Kosovo final status
talks are weighing on the sides; and fears that ongoing
disagreements may lead to violence are widespread.
Arnault said his main priority is to "restore the fabric
of relations between the sides."


4. (C) BREAKING THE STALEMATE. Bryza thanked Arnault for
a clear and carefully-drafted UNOMIG report and asked for
Arnault's thoughts on breaking the stalemate in the
Georgian-Abkhaz political dialogue. Arnault said the
upcoming Geneva Friends meeting on February 12-13 might
help move the sides on the issue of the format for their
meetings. He said two mechanisms exist for the sides to
discuss security issues: the quadripartite meeting (QPM)
and ad hoc meetings, as begun in January 2006 when Abkhaz
"foreign minister" Sergei Shamba met Georgian State
Minister for Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze. Arnault
said Georgia had failed to appoint a QPM coordinator, so
the QPMs had ceased. Shamba, on the other hand, refused
to meet again in the ad hoc format.


5. (C) RUSSIA: ABKHAZ FEARS ARE JUSTIFIED. Chernov also
thanked Arnault for his report, noting it provided a tool
for working with the sides to revitalize the Coordination
Council and Sochi Working Groups. Chernov said form was
more important than substance in moving forward the
conflict resolution process. Nevertheless, he supported a
bilateral meeting at the highest level to discuss an
agreement on non-use of force between the sides. Chernov
said the Georgian "Government in Exile" antagonized the
Abkhaz and contributed to continuing deadlock. He said
Russia's concern about the situation in the UKV centered
on military security: pointing to "500 (Georgian)
military personnel dressed in MOIA uniforms" and the
likelihood that Georgian President Saakashvili's plan to
build summer camps in the UKV was actually a plan to build
gathering places for reserve forces, Chernov said the
Abkhaz were justified in fearing Georgian intentions to
use the UKV as a launching site for an attack on Abkhazia.


6. (C) NON-USE OF FORCE PLEDGE. Calling for greater
tranparency and confidence-building in the UKV, Fall
supported the need for a Georgian non-use of force pledge
but said there were ways to build confidence even without
such a pledge by Georgia. Fall said it was important for
all five Friends to tell the Government of Georgia (GoG)
that they supported Georgia's right to ensure law and
order and provide local services in the UKV. The French
delegation agreed it was important to focus on
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and stress to the
sides that Kosovo would not be a precedent for Abkhazia.
Chernov volunteered that regular phone calls between
Georgian and Abkhaz leaders in the Coordination Council
format were an effective mechanism for building
confidence; Arnault contradicted him, saying phone
diplomacy was not working. Bryza praised Chernov's
suggestion, noting that it was easier to use existing
formats; in any case, he said something must be done.
Bryza said a non-use of force pledge by Georgia would be a
good step forward but asked what Saakashvili could expect
in return.


7. (C) THE "KOSOVO EFFECT." Arnualt reiterated the need
for the FSG to work with the sides to overcome objections
to existing mechanisms. On Kosovo, he said the GoG felt
compelled to create dual power situations in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia specifically because of the threat of a
Kosovo precedent. Arnault said the GoG needed
reassurances that they had nothing to fear, regardless of
how Kosovo was resolved. In that case, he predicted the
GoG would "give up on the Government-in-Exile" which
would, in turn, help Bagapsh agree to direct talks with
Saakashvili.


8. (C) RUSSIA: NO RECOGNITION IF NO MORE HOSTILITIES.
Chernov said a Georgian non-use of force pledge was not
enough to satisfy Russia and the Abkhaz that Georgia did
not intend to move deeper into Abkhazia from its UKV
base. He said the Russian Federation had been "restrained
with the Abkhaz" regarding independence and that Russia
preferred agreed multilateral approaches to resolve the
conflict. Chernov said, "this will be our position,
provided there is no resumption of hostilities." He
underscored that military action by Georgia would affect
Russian security, and he said Saakashvili's statement that
2007 would be a "crucial" year for the resolution of the
conflicts left Russia with the need to "prepare for
eventualities."


9. (C) CBMs AND THE GEORGIAN PRESENCE IN UKV. Discussion
turned to a non-paper on CBMs tabled by the Germans. (A
copy of the final version of the paper was sent by email
to Department and Embassy Tbilisi on January 22.) While
the paper speaks for itself, the discussion of certain
specific measures yielded some insights. On the issue of
joint CIS PKF/UNOMIG patrols, Arnault said UNOMIG planned
to reestablish a permanent presence in the UKV village of
Azhara. He called for a proportionate Georgian law
enforcement presence to ensure the GoG's ability to
provide security and services to the approximately two
thousand UKV residents.


10. (C) RUSSIA ON CONDITIONS FOR GEORGIAN PRESENCE IN
UKV. Chernov said the letter of the 1994 Moscow Agreement
was vague but that its spirit provided that the Kodori
Valley should not become a "hotbed for renewed
confrontation." He said looking simply at the uniforms of
the Georgians deployed in the UKV was "not enough" and
noted that UNSCR 1716 - the most recent UNOMIG mandate
renewal - mentioned the need to follow the Moscow
Agreement and "other relevant documents." The UK and
German representatives pressed to know what those
documents might be. Chernov, unable to dodge the
question, admitted that in his "modest experience," he did
not know of any. Nonetheless, he said withdrawal of heavy
weaponry by Georgia was also not sufficient and that
Georgia should not be permitted to stockpile spare parts,
gas, or oil in the UKV. Nor should Georgia be permitted
to build infrastructure projects like a bridge built for
heavy vehicles, he said.


11. (C) AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON GEORGIAN UKV PRESENCE.
Bryza said the U.S. would raise Chernov's points about
uniforms and stockpiling with the GoG. He said Georgia
needed to change its approach to the "Government in Exile"
but noted that it appeared that all of the Friends agreed
in principle that Georgia has the right to administer to
residents of the UKV. Arnault insisted that Georgia had
an obligation to provide armed forces of some sort in the
UKV in order to protect both the CIS PKF and UNOMIG
observers. He asked Chernov for a Russian position on
acceptable Georgian troop levels in the UKV. Fall
supported Arnault's request. Notably, Chernov did not
push back.


12. (C) CALIBRATING THE UNOMIG PRESENCE. Arnault noted
that UNOMIG would request six more international civilian
police to reach the UNSC-mandated level of twenty
officers. Chernov said Russia has told Abkhaz leaders to
continue cooperating with the UN civilian police, noting
that the crime rate had decreased recently. Arnault said
UNOMIG would try to expand along the ceasefire line, given
renewed potential for skirmishes. He planned to establish
a forward base in lower Gali to which human rights
officers and others might eventually be attached. He also
planned to request the UN to increase the number of
military observers to its maximum authorized strength of
134, and possibly to ask for authorization for another
15-20 military observers.


13. (C) INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE. On the possibility
for introduction of an international police force beyond
the UNOMIG police advisors into the security zone, Chernov
said it would not be helpful. He said the Abkhaz would
prefer continued assistance by UN advisors. Bryza said
the goal was for Abkhaz and Georgian police to work
together but that Georgians needed to see an improvement
in the security situation in Gali and Zugdidi to restore
their confidence. Arnault noted that Gali residents do
not feel safe now and that UN training and equipment would
not be enough to restore their sense of security. Arnault
said the judiciary was a real problem, as most of those
arrested in Gali are "recirculated" back into the
population.


14. (C) INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS. During a discussion of
potential assistance for developing the Sukhumi port,
Chernov said the Abkhaz were "split at the top" on the
issue but that they saw a potential infringement on their
authority over the port. He said the Abkhaz might
consider an international presence at the port in return
for certain unspecified benefits. Bryza said Tbilisi was
also concerned about relinquishing customs authority over
a port on Georgian territory but that the Georgians
recognized the advantages of opening up Abkhazia to the
outside world.


15. (C) MOVING FORWARD. Over lunch, Arnault launched a
discussion about strategies to send the parties back to
the negotiating table instead of relying on the
international community to move the conflict resolution
process forward via a Kosovo-driven "recognition debate."
Bryza agreed that the sides need to move toward "real
confidence-building" and said he would send that message
strongly to the Georgians. Arnault emphasized the role of
the FSG should be to urge the sides to negotiate and help
them implement what they agree upon. Bryza proposed
institutionalizing a series of intermediate meetings to
take place between Geneva meetings, mandate renewals, or
both. Arnault suggested a mid-March meeting at which the
SRSG would evaluate progress on the ground since Geneva.
Fall suggested that a statement by UNSYG Ban Ki-moon, read
by Arnault, could encourage the FSG to produce a roadmap
and keep pressure on both sides.


16. (C) SHAMBA VISA. Chernov suggested an intermediate
meeting might be useful if Shamba were to appear before
the UN in New York. Arnault agreed it would be a good
idea for Shamba to visit New York to report on real
progress achieved after Geneva, but he argued for another
venue besides the UNSC. Fall said an Arria-format meeting
could be agreeable as long as it was not held in
conjunction with negotiations for a UNOMIG mandate
renewal. He said the FSG needed to indicate full support
for a UNOMIG mandate renewal before considering such a
meeting. Arnault argued against an Arria-format meeting
and suggested an "open meeting" sponsored by an NGO as the
venue for Abkhaz and Georgians to report on their
progress. The French delegation underscored the
importance of timing and the need to avoid having a
meeting too close to the UNOMIG mandate renewal
negotiations. Fall disliked the idea of an NGO-hosted
meeting.


17. (C) UNOMIG RENEWAL. Lucas said "we can do much
better (on a UNOMIG renewal) this time" and suggested
enshrining the CBMs from the German non-paper in a
streamlined, forward-looking UNSC resolution. Arnault
suggested the FSG agree on a streamlined UNSCR by
mid-March that would avoid political issues and laundry
lists of tasks for the sides. He said the sides look to
the UNSCRs as landmarks and that the mandate renewal
should be used as a tool by the FSG to focus the sides on
important issues. The French asked about lengthening
mandates to more than six months and said the renewal
process must not be interrupted by arguments over
"negative substance." Chernov said there is "no doubt
that the role of UNOMIG is important" and advocated a
regular renewal process in order to "keep the issue high
on the UN agenda." Bryza said it was clear that all of
the Friends wanted UNOMIG to be renewed but that a process
was needed for "real discussion" of substantive issues,
perhaps a series of meetings led by U/SYG Guehenno. Fall
suggested New York meetings at the Deputy PermRep level at
which the Georgians and the Abkhaz could brief the FSG.
The Friends agreed to consider two or three meetings per
year - either in Geneva or New York - to take place in
advance of UNOMIG mandate renewal discussions. These
additional meetings would be designed to delink the
mandate renewal from substantive negotiations between the
sides.


18. (C) COMMENT: Chernov was a pleasant surprise thanks
to his readiness to push the discussion further rather
than simply playing defense like his predecessor, Amb.
Bocharnikov. Chernov seemed focused on reducing tensions
on the ground in order to foster momentum in the conflict
resolution process. The overall dynamics of the FSG
Berlin meeting were positive and collaborative, leaving
much to be discussed on February 12-13 in Geneva. END
COMMENT.
RICE