INSTRUCTIONS FOR UNSC SESSION ON KOSOVO, DECEMBER

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 168395

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL YI UNSC UNMIK
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR UNSC SESSION ON KOSOVO, DECEMBER
19


Classified By: IO PDAS James B. Warlick for reasons 1.4(B)
and (D).


1. (C) USUN may draw on the points in paragraph 2 for use
during the UN Security Council session on Kosovo on
December 19, 2007. Our Quint partners (UK, Germany,
Italy, France) have agreed to a low-key approach. We seek
to avoid a contentious meeting, which could make it more
difficult for UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to
cooperate with us in the future. U.S. interventions
should state our general talking points: negotiations have
exhausted their potential, the status quo is
unsustainable, we need to move forward to implement the
Ahtisaari Plan. Serbian PM Kostunica may propose a UNSC
referral of the Kosovo issue to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ); we provide contingency points for a
response below (paras 3 and 4).


2. (SBU) Begin Points.

-- Over two years ago, the Council supported the launch of
the process to solve the last major issue related to
Yugoslavia's collapse: the status of Kosovo. The Council
blessed the appointment of UN Special Envoy Martti
Ahtisaari who undertook over fifteen months of intensive
negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina.

-- The submission of the report of the U.S./EU/Russia
Troika brings us to a critical moment in the resolution of
Kosovo's future status.

-- President Ahtisaari accomplished exactly what the
Security Council requested of him. He prepared a
comprehensive proposal for the way forward and that
proposal enjoyed broad international support, including
from the EU, NATO, the UN Secretary-General, and an
overwhelming majority of UN Security Council members.

-- President Ahtisaari, an experienced international
statesman who has mediated many conflicts in the service
of the United Nations, told us then that "the
negotiations' potential to produce any mutually agreeable
outcome on Kosovo's status is exhausted." Nevertheless,
the Security Council was unable to act on his
recommendations. We were disappointed, as prompt Security
Council action would have provided the best basis for
moving forward.

-- As a result of the deadlocked discussions in the
Council, we agreed to one more period of negotiations
between the parties. The United States supported this
effort and assigned Ambassador Frank Wisner, one of our
most experienced diplomats, to the endeavor.

-- We are grateful to the Troika for its hard work and
intense schedule of meetings. This trio of outstanding
negotiators explored every conceivable avenue for
potential compromise. Yet by the time their mandate
concluded, the parties were still deadlocked.

-- After two years of negotiations, the parties are now no
closer on the question of Kosovo's final status. The
Troika process did not fail due to a lack of time. Given
the differing views, there is no indication that after
another 120 days -- or any other period of time -- the
parties would find a middle ground between their
respective positions.

-- We respect the position of Russia and wish we could
have come to an agreement, but we have not. We need
statesmanship to move forward on our common goal of a
stable and secure future for Europe.

-- So now the international community is faced with
difficult decisions about the way forward. New talks
would only freeze the conflict, condemning the people of
Kosovo to continued uncertainty. Some conflicts that the
Security Council reviews have festered for decades,
destabilizing entire regions for generations. This is not
the future we seek for Kosovo. UNMIK was supposed to end
last year. It has lasted eight years and done all it can
do.

-- Fortunately, the Ahtisaari Proposals give us a roadmap
for moving ahead. Implementation will enhance regional
stability, lock in democratic reforms, and accelerate the
integration of all the countries of southeast Europe into
Euro-Atlantic institutions.

-- The Ahtisaari proposals will also enhance and protect
the rights, security, and culture of Kosovo's non-Albanian
communities. The proposal includes international
presences to monitor and, if necessary, take action to
ensure that Kosovo's government is living up to its
obligations.

-- European leaders have said they are ready to accept
their responsibilities and bring this process to
completion. The United States is also prepared to move
forward.

-- As we do so, however, we must work together to ensure
stability on the ground in Kosovo. In particular, we must
remind both Belgrade and Pristina of the commitment they
made to the Troika not to use violence, make threats, or
engage in provocations. We must remind Kosovo's leaders
that they must do everything within their power to ensure
that non-Albanian communities feel safe and secure in
Kosovo.

-- Serbia's leaders also have responsibilities to keep the
peace in Kosovo. We have seen disturbing developments
recently that seem contrary to the pledges made to the
Troika. Belgrade has opened a branch office of its
government Ministry for Kosovo in north Mitrovica. This
provocation is contrary to the pledges Belgrade made to the
Troika to avoid inflammatory acts. As UNMIK has pointed out,
such a unilateral act, uncoordinated with UNMIK, is in
violation of Security Council resolution 1244 and is
illegal. This office should be closed and no others
should be opened.

-- A lack of resolution to Kosovo's status is preventing
the full integration of the Balkans into Europe. We would
like to see Serbia take its rightful place among European
countries and in Euro-Atlantic institutions.

-- To achieve this integration, it is essential to solve
the problem of Kosovo's status, which is hampering both
Serbia and Kosovo's advancement.

-- It is time to move forward to a brighter future where
Serbia and Kosovo can be partners and neighbors, fully
integrated into Europe.

-- The Council has played an important role in Kosovo,
especially in setting up the framework for its post-war
interim administration. The status process is at an end.
We have to move on to the next step.

End points.


3. (C) Serbian President Tadic has said he may request a
Security Council referral of this matter to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). We do not want to
be in the lead responding to this request, as the
discussion could quickly devolve into a discussion of U.S.
views of the ICJ and international law. Only if pressed,
USUN may deploy the general points in para 4 below.


4. (SBU) Begin If raised/if necessary points.

-- Although the Ahtisaari recommendations have been on
the table eight months, Belgrade has only now raised this
issue. Their eleventh hour timing suggests this is a
diversionary tactic designed to distract the Council and
stall the process. Nor does the proposal make sense on the
merits.

-- The issues we face here are not different in character
from the kinds of issues the Council routinely encounters
in the course of its work. It is not the Council's
practice to refer matters to the ICJ merely because some
party claims that an issue on the Council's agenda has
legal aspects. To do so would be to abdicate the Council'
s responsibilities under the Charter to address matters of
international peace and security.

-- Any opinion from the ICJ would necessarily be limited
to legal questions and cannot resolve the broader
political dispute that is the source of the debate within
the Council.

-- The status quo in Kosovo is unsustainable and
threatens to spark new regional instability. We must
swiftly act on the one proposal on the table: the Plan of
the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.

End Points.
RICE