DEMARCHE TO SYG STAFF ON CCW

UNCLAS STATE 163406 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MCAP MOPS PARM PREL AORC OTRA SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SYG STAFF ON CCW REF: USMISSION GENEVA 2472 ¶1. The Department instructs USUN to demarche the Secretary General's staff at the appropriate level regarding the Secretary General's statement at the opening of the 2007 SIPDIS Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva. The statement, delivered by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, included several factual errors, and could be damaging to the effort to negotiate an instrument on cluster munitions. OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. The Department instructs USUN to pursue the following objectives: -- The SYG should modify the extreme positions his representative expressed regarding cluster munitions, which are opposed by the permanent members of the Security Council and most other military powers. -- The SYG's representatives at the CCW talks should communicate his clarified position to the parties in order to facilitate negotiations on a new protocol for the CCW addressing the issue of cluster munitions. -- The SYG should be aware that a future cluster munitions instrument that is not carefully tailored could undermine the ability of certain countries to cooperate militarily under UN mandates. REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶3. USUN should report the results of this demarche to John Mariz in IO/UNP by December 7. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶4. Mr. Sergio Duarte, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, on November 7 delivered a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the States Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) at the opening plenary session of their annual meeting in Geneva. ¶5. The primary issue being discussed at the Meeting of States parties was whether to adopt a negotiating mandate that would lead to negotiations on a new protocol for the CCW addressing the issue of cluster munitions. The United States has actively supported such a mandate, believing that the CCW is the best framework for addressing concerns associated with the use of cluster munitions, while balancing both humanitarian and military considerations. ¶6. The U.S. believes that cluster munitions continue to be legitimate weapons when employed properly and in accordance with existing international humanitarian law. In many instances, cluster munitions result in much less collateral damage than unitary weapons would if used for the same military mission. If the use of cluster munitions were banned or unreasonably restricted, in some instances soldiers might have to fire many more non-cluster projectiles, potentially causing greater civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. ¶7. The Secretary General's message was inaccurate and unhelpful on several specific points, including the following: -- He referred to the "inherent inaccuracy" of cluster munitions. This is simply incorrect. Cluster munitions are not inherently more inaccurate than other munitions. They are weapons intended to attack area targets, as opposed to precision-guided weapons, but this does not make them "inherently inaccurate." -- He also referred to the "frequent malfunctioning" of cluster munitions. This statement implies that most cluster munitions as a whole fail to work as designed, when the opposite is true. There are also many other factors that impact upon malfunctioning rates, including weather, terrain, storage conditions that affect all weapons. For the U.S., our policy is that future acquisitions of cluster munitions will have a 99% functioning rate in testing. -- The message described cluster munitions as "indiscriminate." Cluster munitions are not indiscriminate if used properly, in accordance with existing principles of international humanitarian law. The discrimination is a result of targeting of military objectives and not the accuracy of the weapon. -- He also mentioned the "horrendous humanitarian... effects" of cluster munitions. Cluster munitions do harm civilians in post-conflict situations. However, they are only a small part of the broader problem of explosive remnants of war ("ERW"). -- The SG's message called for a new instrument prohibiting "the use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians." This borrows the terminology used by those states and NGOs favoring a sweeping ban on cluster munitions. We do not consider any category of cluster munitions by their nature to cause unacceptable harm to civilians - it is the manner in which they are used that can result in this effect. -- He also called for the new instrument to require "destruction of current stockpiles" of cluster munitions. Incorporating a destruction requirement in the instrument would not be a good idea because the huge resources involved in meeting such a requirement would likely be unacceptable to a number of countries. In addition, a destruction requirement would not directly address the humanitarian issue. -- He also called for an "immediate freeze [on] the use and transfer of all cluster munitions." This goes beyond even what he called for to be part of the instrument and is totally unacceptable. -- His message also called for provisions on "victim assistance" and "clearance." These are not needed in an instrument on cluster munitions as there are existing mechanisms for addressing these issues. They are explicitly addressed in the 5th Protocol to the CCW on ERW. ¶8. It was particularly unfortunate that the Secretary General chose to make these points at the outset of the Meeting of States Parties. A number of countries at this meeting have serious concerns about embarking on a negotiation on cluster munitions. Despite his unhelpful remarks, States Parties did agree to negotiate. However, by taking an extreme view of the contents of an eventual CM instrument, the Secretary General may have complicated these negotiations by convincing countries like Russia that a cluster munitions instrument would likely amount to far-reaching ban on cluster munitions. Moreover, by adopting the language of NGOs pushing an absolute ban on cluster munitions, the Secretary General has publicly aligned himself with extreme elements against the Perm 5 and most other major military powers. ¶9. A CM instrument with extreme positions on cluster munitions such as the "criminalization" of cooperation with states who do not adopt the same instrument could also impede cooperation between states that might otherwise cooperate militarily under UN mandates. A more moderate and balanced approach taking into account the military requirements of states as well as humanitarian considerations will be required to protect the ability of states to fully contribute military assets to UN operations. RICE