U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION NONPAPER

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159779 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017 TAGS: CR MARR PARM PL PREL RS SUBJECT: U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION NONPAPER TRANSMITTAL REF: STATE 159179 Classified By: Acting U/S John C. Rood ¶1. (U) Action requested paragraph 3. ¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The Non-Paper on the U.S. proposal to Russia of missile defense cooperation and transparency and confidence-building measures in paragraph 4 was delivered by Embassy Moscow to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 21 (Ref A). In a telephone conversation between Acting U/S John Rood and Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Pojar on November 23, DFM Pojar requested a copy of the U.S. Non-paper, and U/S Rood agreed. U/S Rood had previously discussed the U.S. proposals with Polish U/S Witold Waszczykowski on November 21. ¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassies Prague and Warsaw are requested to expeditiously deliver the U.S. Non-Paper contained in paragraph 4 to Czech MFA First Deputy Minister Tomas Pojar and Polish MFA Under Secretary of State Witold Waszczykowski. Embassies Warsaw and Prague are also requested to provide the list in paragraph 5 of possible transparency and confidence-building measures that Acting Under Secretary Rood will offer DFM Kislyak at their meeting on November 26 in Washington, D.C. ¶4. (C/REL Poland and the Czech Republic) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. NON-PAPER: U.S. Non-Paper November 20, 2007 U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation The United States remains interested in pursuing missile defense cooperation with Russia. Such cooperation could be an important element in a broader strategic partnership between the United States and Russia aimed at addressing the key security challenges facing both our nations in the 21st century. This non-paper outlines and reaffirms our previous proposals, including the proposals discussed during the "2-plus-2" meeting in Moscow. On April 17, 2007, the United States provided a non-paper outlining a comprehensive proposal for bilateral cooperation across the full spectrum of missile defense activities at Strategic Security Dialogue talks in Moscow led by Acting Under Secretary of State John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak. The next week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also provided the U.S. proposal to Defense Minister Serdyukov in Moscow. Our proposal is still on the table. Such cooperation could include: -- Joint research, development, and testing of missile defense systems and components; -- Joint modeling and simulation of missile defense architectures; -- Sharing of early-warning data, including completion of the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow; -- Co-location of U.S. and Russian radars and the sharing of data from such sensors; and -- Development of the ability of U.S. and Russian forces to jointly operate missile defense systems in joint military operations, such as peacekeeping. During the U.S.-Russia experts meetings in September and October, the United States elaborated and expanded upon our April 17 offer for bilateral cooperation. Specifically, we provided the following proposals: -- A joint sensor cooperation effort, which would include the Qabala radar in Azerbaijan, the Armavir radar in southern Russia, a U.S. X-band radar in the region, and perhaps other sensors to monitor the Iranian missile program. Such cooperation would include the establishment of shared data centers in Moscow and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This proposal would expand upon President Putin,s offer and could establish a foundation for deeper cooperation in the future. -- A joint cooperative regional missile defense architecture, which would include U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense systems. The United States is interested in further exploring President Putin's June 7 proposal, as elaborated on July 2 at Kennebunkport, to jointly monitor the emerging ballistic missile threats from the Middle East using the Russian-leased early warning radar at Qabala, Azerbaijan, as well as the early warning radar currently under construction at Armavir in southern Russia. The U.S. found the Russian-hosted visit to Qabala extremely useful in evaluating Qabala,s capabilities to monitor the threat from Iran and the Middle East generally. We re-affirm our interest in further talks to explore the details of the Russian proposal and in conducting a similar visit to the Armavir radar to evaluate its potential contribution to a joint architecture. The April 17 U.S. proposal, as well as the joint regional architecture proposal, raise the possibility of co-locating a forward-based X-band radar with a Russian early warning radar to provide supplementary data not capable of being collected by these two Russian radars. The U.S. delegation's presentation in Moscow on October 10 -- entitled "Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture" -- outlines steps for integrating U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense interceptors, sensors, and for the first time, command and control functions. It constitutes an integral part of our proposal for cooperation. The joint missile defense architectures that we are proposing are based on a "building block" approach for different levels of participation by Russia in a regional system that the U.S. and Russia would design together with Europe. Our goal in making this proposal is to maximize the defense of NATO, the United States, and Russia against ballistic missiles from Iran or other dangerous regimes which may acquire such weapons in the future, and to do so in a real strategic partnership. Through bilateral missile defense cooperation, Russian officials and experts would gain an in-depth understanding of the U.S. missile defense system, including its capabilities as well as its direction and pace. Furthermore, as the United States and Russia move forward in our efforts to develop a joint architecture, it would become clear that such capabilities could not possibly threaten Russian security. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures We have stressed that the greatest confidence-building measure we could offer Russia is a partnership with the United States and NATO Allies to develop and operate a joint regional missile defense architecture. Such a strategic partnership would provide Russia with insight into U.S. missile defense efforts and influence over the future direction of our joint missile defense efforts. In addition, at the 12-13 October "2-plus-2" meeting, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense indicated the willingness of the United States to pursue measures associated with such cooperation to build confidence and promote transparency. Thus, within the context of agreement to pursue a joint regional missile defense architecture, the United States would be willing to put in place new transparency and confidence-building measures to provide greater confidence to Russia that the limited U.S. missile defense capabilities deployed in Europe are not directed at Russia and will not undermine its security. At the "2-plus-2" meeting, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense discussed measures such as: -- Offering assurances that U.S. European-based assets are not directed against Russia; -- Exchanging radar data and providing situational awareness about the status of U.S. -- and Russian -- missile defense capabilities and operations; and -- Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia, and potential visits to missile defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland, subject to the consent of, and consistent with the conditions established by, each of those nations. In the event that host countries refuse such visits, we could work on some form of technical monitoring. Additionally, at the "2-plus-2" Ministerial in Moscow, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense discussed another possible confidence-building measure which would take into account developments in the Iranian longer-range ballistic missile threat in decision-making about bringing the interceptor site in Poland and the radar site in the Czech Republic to full operational/on-alert status. We believe that this addresses key Russian concerns regarding our missile defense site and we would be happy to further discuss specifics during our next experts-level meeting. At that time, the U.S. delegation would also welcome receiving Russia,s ideas or proposals including for transparency and confidence-building measures. END TEXT OF U.S. NON-PAPER. ¶5. (C/REL Poland and the Czech Republic) BEGIN TEXT OF LIST: The United States is prepared to offer the following transparency and confidence-building measures, if the Russian Federation participates with us in a joint regional missile defense architecture: -- Regular exchanges of information on MD policy, program, technical, funding, threat assessments in a U.S.-Russia Transparency Working Group. -- U.S. Assurance not to construct in Europe more than 10 silo-launchers for 10 long-range GBIs without prior notification and discussions. -- U.S. Assurance of no major modifications of interceptor silo-launchers without prior discussions. -- U.S. Assurance to take into account developments in Iranian missile programs in decisionmaking to bring the interceptor site in Poland and the radar in Czech Republic to full operational status. -- U.S. Assurance not to conduct interceptor flight-tests from silo-launchers in Poland. -- Sharing of "real-time" radar tracking data via centers in Moscow and Brussels. -- Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia. -- Potential visits to MD facilities in Poland and/or the Czech Republic (subject to each Host Nation's agreement and conditions). Reciprocal visits to Russia by NATO personnel could also be conducted. -- U.S. to provide Russia with rapid alerts via the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link ("Hotline") of any long-range ground-based missile defense interceptor launches. END TEXT OF LIST. RICE