REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY SPECIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 155045

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2027
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM
SUBJECT: REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY SPECIAL ADVISOR
GAMBARI


Classified By: IO Acting A/S James Warlick, Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: On November 13 Special
Advisor Ibrahim Gambari will report to the UN Security
Council on his November 3-8 trip to Burma. USUN is
instructed to draw from points in para 4 for its intervention
on the Gambari briefing/report and public comments
afterwards, highlighting U.S. support for Aung San Suu Kyi's
statement, noting that her position has not changed, and
stressing the need for the Burmese regime to begin a
meaningful and time-bound dialogue on a peaceful transition
to civilian democratic rule. As soon as P3 negotiations in
New York are completed, USUN is instructed to forward to the
Department the text of a Security Council Presidential
Statement (PRST) for consideration later next week.
Instructions on the PRST will be sent septel once text has
been received and circulated in the Department. End Summary
and Action request.


2. (C) BACKGROUND: The Burmese regime's handling of UN
Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari's November 3-8 visit to Burma
was disappointing. Gambari was kept in the remote capital of
Nay Pyi Taw for almost the whole visit and the regime
strictly controlled his itinerary. Senior General Than Shwe,
who had met with Gambari in the past, refused to meet with
him. Instead, Gambari met with the Prime Minister (Burma's
third-ranking general) and other officials, and hand-picked
representatives of the private sector, non-governmental
organizations, and ethnic minority groups. Gambari was
allowed to meet once with members of the National League for
Democracy and once with Aung San Suu Kyi shortly before his
departure. He was not, however, allowed to meet with other
detainees or with Buddhist monks involved in the recent
protests. During his visit, the Burmese state media
announced that the proposal of a tripartite dialogue with
Aung San Suu Kyi and Gambari is "premature." Gambari told
foreign diplomats that he would be allowed to return, hoped
to do so in 2-3 weeks, and was pressing the regime for a
date. Several foreign diplomats usually sympathetic to the
regime told the U.S. Charge in Rangoon that they felt the way
the regime managed the visit had been a personal snub to
Gambari and a humiliation for the UN.


3. (C) BACKGROUND (cont'd): Following his visit to Burma,
the UN and Mr. Gambari released a statement by Aung San Suu
Kyi expressing support for the UN "good offices" mission, her
willingness to engage with the leadership of the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) and her desire that
preliminary discussions give way soon to a "meaningful and
time-bound dialogue." On November 9, Aung San Suu Kyi met
with her colleagues in the National League for Democracy
(NLD) for the first time in three years. End of background.


4. (U) Begin points.

-- The United States deeply appreciates the efforts of
Special Advisor Gambari and his team. Media reporting around
the world testified to Mr. Gambari's efforts to fulfill the
objectives laid down by this Council in its October 11 PRST,
namely "to create the necessary conditions for a genuine
dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all concerned parties
and ethnic groups in order to achieve an inclusive national
reconciliation with the direct support of the United Nations."

-- The United States welcomes the statement by Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi released by Mr. Gambari on November 8. We echo her
thanks to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon for his efforts to
promote national reconciliation, democracy and human rights
in Burma. We fully support her continued willingness and
commitment to engage in a "meaningful and time-bound dialogue
with the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council)," and
reiterate her call that this dialogue begin as early as
possible.

-- Unfortunately, Senior General Than Shwe and the SPDC
continue to resist such a dialogue. In fact, the SPDC
announced through the state media on November 6 that
tripartite talks involving the SPDC, Aung San Suu Kyi and Mr.
Gambari would be "premature." In reality, these talks are
long overdue and have been called for repeatedly by Burma's
neighbors, by the broader international community, and, most
recently, by this Council in its October 11 Presidential
Statement. To fulfill its obligations to this body, the
regime should immediately begin this dialogue. Failure to do
so would require further action by this Council.

STATE 00155045 002 OF 002


-- We call on those countries with influence over Burma,
particularly its neighbors, to persuade Burma's ruling
generals to begin the inclusive dialogue on the peaceful
transition to democracy that Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese
people seek and the UN is prepared to facilitate.

-- It is incumbent upon the Security Council as well to
continue its efforts to ensure that the SPDC does not simply
continue to impose its so-called road map to democracy, which
excludes Burma's democratic and ethnic minority groups from
meaningful participation and which clearly lacks legitimacy,
as evidenced by the recent massive protests. A peaceful
transition to democracy will require a process that is shaped
by, includes and is supported by all of the people of Burma.

-- The United States is pleased that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi met
with her fellow members of the National League for Democracy
on November 9. This is a positive development, however
small, that must be built upon. In her statement, Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi noted that she must take into consideration "the
interests and opinions of as broad a range of political
organizations" in Burma as possible, particularly Burma's
ethnic minorities. It is critical that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
be free to consult broadly in order to engage in meaningful
dialogue with the SPDC.

-- It is unreasonable to expect that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
will be able to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the
Burmese generals while she is under house arrest and her
movement and consultations are tightly controlled. If Than
Shwe and his senior generals are committed to a genuine
dialogue on transition to civilian democratic rule in Burma,
the first step should be immediate and unconditional release
of all political prisoners and detainees, including Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi. This is an essential step toward fulfilling the
UNSC's call for the regime "to create the necessary
conditions for a genuine dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and all concerned parties and ethnic groups in order to
achieve an inclusive national reconciliation with the direct
support of the United Nations."

-- Than Shwe's decision not to meet with Mr. Gambari as he
has in the past reflects a disturbing lack of commitment to
working with the UN to promote the process of national
reconciliation. If the UN "good offices" mission is to be
effective, the Burmese regime needs to allow Mr. Gambari to
control his own itinerary and to meet with any person he
deems relevant to his efforts. The generals themselves need
to directly engage with Mr. Gambari, rather than trying to
communicate through intermediaries or the media.

-- The United States fully supports the "good offices"
mission and believes that this mechanism can facilitate the
outcome that we all seek - a peaceful transition to a
representative and responsible government in Burma. The
Secretary General is clearly committed to the process, as is

SIPDIS
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. It is now time for Senior General Than
Shwe and his regime to demonstrate that they are equally
committed, by releasing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other
political prisoners and beginning the meaningful and
time-bound dialogue that she has called for, leading to
transition and national reconciliation.

End points.
RICE