C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 138413

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017
TAGS: OVIP FRIED DAN UNGA PREL PGOV MOPS NATO MARR KPKO NL
AF, ZL
SUBJECT: (U) EUR A/S FRIED,S SEPTEMBER 25, 2007, MEETING
WITH DUTCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR PIETER DE GOOIJER


Classified By: 1. (U) Classified by: EUR Assistant Secretary of State
Daniel Fried, Department of State. Reason 1.4 (b and d)


2. (U) September 25 2007, 11:45 a.m., New York


3. (U) Participants:

United States
A/S Dan Fried, EUR
Elaine Samson, EUR(Notetaker)

Netherlands
Political Director Pieter de Gooijer
Dutch UN Mission Political Officer Jules Gerzon


4. (C) SUMMARY. Afghanistan and Kosovo dominated the
meeting. The Dutch are committed to remaining in
Afghanistan,
but to obtain their coalition government,s approval, there
must be political, military, and financial solidarity and
burdensharing among allies. On Kosovo, the Dutch expressed
uncertainty that there is sufficient legal basis to continue
KFOR if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI). A/S Fried strongly disagreed and noted that lawyers
from the Quint were developing a position that UNSCR 1244
remains in effect even if Kosovo makes a UDI. Fried
explicitly
warned that the United States would not replace forces if
European nations pulled out of KFOR, and the Europeans will
bear the blame for the baleful consequences of loss of
international support for Kosovo if Kosovo falls apart.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
Afghanistan
--------------


5. (C) The Netherlands is very concerned that no substantial,
concrete contributions to the International Security
Assistance
Force (ISAF) are forthcoming from other NATO member
countries.
De Gooijer reaffirmed that the Netherlands made a military
commitment when it decided to send troops to Afghanistan, and
to stay when NATO assumed command of ISAF, but it never
i

ntended
to be responsible for finding replacements and additional
resources to help in Afghanistan. Dutch internal
decisionmaking
by all the factions in the coalition government is prepared
to
continue Dutch participation and support in Afghanistan, but
only if there is political, military and financial solidarity
and burdensharing with other allies. For the Christian
Democrats
to be able to justify their continued support, the Dutch
participation has to be different from what they are doing
now.
Minister of Development Cooperation Bert Koenders is working
to
increase the development element of the Dutch mission.


6. (C) Nevertheless, the perception in the Netherlands is
that
it is doing more than other allies. The Dutch have
identified
several elements of their mission that other countries could
take on, such as: battlegroup; protection of camps;
Apaches and F-16s; PRTs; 2 OMLTs, and a hospital.
Other countries need to make significant contributions to
enable
the Dutch government to generate enough support within the
coalition to approve a continued presence. De Gooijer said
that
since February 2007 the Dutch have met with NATO SACEUR,
the French, the Germans and others, and only the Slovaks have
said they are considering sending 150-200 engineers.
De Gooijer noted that he had talked to French FM Kouchner
last week about providing two or three OMLTs, and Kouchner
promised to promote it with the Defense Minister. De Gooijer
asked A/S Fried to speak to NATO SACEUR and urge him to come
up
with more proposals for additional contingents.
(Fried did so later that day.) The Dutch are even reaching
out
to non-NATO partners, and have approached Singapore to
provide
a hospital. The Netherlands was considering asking the
Indonesians to provide a hospital, but the Australians
didn,t
support that idea. Italy has not made any specific
proposals,
nor has Spain or Turkey.


7. (C) A/S Fried suggested approaching Georgia to increase
their presence in Aghanistan, since they are decreasing their
contingent in Iraq (and are asking for a Membership Action
Plan
(MAP) at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest.) De Gooijer
was open to talking to the Georgians, but asked what they
could
do on the ground in Afghanistan? He noted that the actual
capabilities of national contingents was very important,
since
they would be supporting each other and needed to be able to
count on their abilities. Fried suggested that the Georgians
might be capable of providing force protection. De Gooijer
indicated the Dutch feel forced to consider what other
alternatives there might be, including using the NATO
Response
Force (NRF), but that there was a lot of reluctance to use
NRF.

--------------
Kosovo
--------------


8. (C) De Gooijer commented that the GONL is concerned that
if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI),
there would not be a legal basis for a continued peacekeeping
operation (PKO), or that if a Kosovo UDI was not recognized
by a number of countries, there would not be a strong enough
basis for a ESDP or NATO PKO. A/S Fried disagreed strongly,
noting that U.S., UK, French, German and Italian lawyers have
been consulting, and believe that even if Kosovo declares
independence, UNSCR 1244 remains in effect. Fried explicitly
told the Dutch that Kosovo is a European as well as a U.S.
problem, and that if European nations pulled out their troops
after a UDI, the United States would not replace them and
sustain KFOR. A European pull-out of KFOR or failure to
support the ESDP Mission would have real consequences.
People would die. After all the talk of European unity and
ESDP,
it would be unconscionable for Europe to let this problem
in its own backyard fall apart.


9. (C) A/S Fried told the Dutch the U.S. has great
confidence in Ischinger and Frank Wisner, and it may be
possible to find some face-saving formula Serbia would
accept.
Fried advised De Gooijer that if nothing is resolved by
December 10 when the current negotiating period ends, the
Netherlands should be prepared to move forward. The ESDP
mission should go ahead. KFOR will remain, and it is
critical
that KFOR,s legitimacy not be questioned. The EU cannot
allow a few members to prevent the EU from acting positively.

De Gooijer asked that the U.S. share its legal thinking with
the skeptical EU members. If the legal reasoning for
continuing KFOR and UNSCR 1244 was strong enough for other
countries to accept, even if they did not completely agree
with it, it would decrease the number of EU members who would
not want to recognize an independent Kosovo to a manageable
number. The building of an EU consensus might be able to
keep them in line.
RICE