(U) EUR A/S FRIED,S SEPTEMBER 25, 2007, MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 138413 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017 TAGS: OVIP FRIED DAN UNGA PREL PGOV MOPS NATO MARR KPKO NL AF, ZL SUBJECT: (U) EUR A/S FRIED,S SEPTEMBER 25, 2007, MEETING WITH DUTCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR PIETER DE GOOIJER Classified By: 1. (U) Classified by: EUR Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, Department of State. Reason 1.4 (b and d) ¶2. (U) September 25 2007, 11:45 a.m., New York ¶3. (U) Participants: United States A/S Dan Fried, EUR Elaine Samson, EUR(Notetaker) Netherlands Political Director Pieter de Gooijer Dutch UN Mission Political Officer Jules Gerzon ¶4. (C) SUMMARY. Afghanistan and Kosovo dominated the meeting. The Dutch are committed to remaining in Afghanistan, but to obtain their coalition government,s approval, there must be political, military, and financial solidarity and burdensharing among allies. On Kosovo, the Dutch expressed uncertainty that there is sufficient legal basis to continue KFOR if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). A/S Fried strongly disagreed and noted that lawyers from the Quint were developing a position that UNSCR 1244 remains in effect even if Kosovo makes a UDI. Fried explicitly warned that the United States would not replace forces if European nations pulled out of KFOR, and the Europeans will bear the blame for the baleful consequences of loss of international support for Kosovo if Kosovo falls apart. END SUMMARY. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶5. (C) The Netherlands is very concerned that no substantial, concrete contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are forthcoming from other NATO member countries. De Gooijer reaffirmed that the Netherlands made a military commitment when it decided to send troops to Afghanistan, and to stay when NATO assumed command of ISAF, but it never intended to be responsible for finding replacements and additional resources to help in Afghanistan. Dutch internal decisionmaking by all the factions in the coalition government is prepared to continue Dutch participation and support in Afghanistan, but only if there is political, military and financial solidarity and burdensharing with other allies. For the Christian Democrats to be able to justify their continued support, the Dutch participation has to be different from what they are doing now. Minister of Development Cooperation Bert Koenders is working to increase the development element of the Dutch mission. ¶6. (C) Nevertheless, the perception in the Netherlands is that it is doing more than other allies. The Dutch have identified several elements of their mission that other countries could take on, such as: battlegroup; protection of camps; Apaches and F-16s; PRTs; 2 OMLTs, and a hospital. Other countries need to make significant contributions to enable the Dutch government to generate enough support within the coalition to approve a continued presence. De Gooijer said that since February 2007 the Dutch have met with NATO SACEUR, the French, the Germans and others, and only the Slovaks have said they are considering sending 150-200 engineers. De Gooijer noted that he had talked to French FM Kouchner last week about providing two or three OMLTs, and Kouchner promised to promote it with the Defense Minister. De Gooijer asked A/S Fried to speak to NATO SACEUR and urge him to come up with more proposals for additional contingents. (Fried did so later that day.) The Dutch are even reaching out to non-NATO partners, and have approached Singapore to provide a hospital. The Netherlands was considering asking the Indonesians to provide a hospital, but the Australians didn,t support that idea. Italy has not made any specific proposals, nor has Spain or Turkey. ¶7. (C) A/S Fried suggested approaching Georgia to increase their presence in Aghanistan, since they are decreasing their contingent in Iraq (and are asking for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest.) De Gooijer was open to talking to the Georgians, but asked what they could do on the ground in Afghanistan? He noted that the actual capabilities of national contingents was very important, since they would be supporting each other and needed to be able to count on their abilities. Fried suggested that the Georgians might be capable of providing force protection. De Gooijer indicated the Dutch feel forced to consider what other alternatives there might be, including using the NATO Response Force (NRF),but that there was a lot of reluctance to use NRF. -------------- Kosovo -------------- ¶8. (C) De Gooijer commented that the GONL is concerned that if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), there would not be a legal basis for a continued peacekeeping operation (PKO),or that if a Kosovo UDI was not recognized by a number of countries, there would not be a strong enough basis for a ESDP or NATO PKO. A/S Fried disagreed strongly, noting that U.S., UK, French, German and Italian lawyers have been consulting, and believe that even if Kosovo declares independence, UNSCR 1244 remains in effect. Fried explicitly told the Dutch that Kosovo is a European as well as a U.S. problem, and that if European nations pulled out their troops after a UDI, the United States would not replace them and sustain KFOR. A European pull-out of KFOR or failure to support the ESDP Mission would have real consequences. People would die. After all the talk of European unity and ESDP, it would be unconscionable for Europe to let this problem in its own backyard fall apart. ¶9. (C) A/S Fried told the Dutch the U.S. has great confidence in Ischinger and Frank Wisner, and it may be possible to find some face-saving formula Serbia would accept. Fried advised De Gooijer that if nothing is resolved by December 10 when the current negotiating period ends, the Netherlands should be prepared to move forward. The ESDP mission should go ahead. KFOR will remain, and it is critical that KFOR,s legitimacy not be questioned. The EU cannot allow a few members to prevent the EU from acting positively. De Gooijer asked that the U.S. share its legal thinking with the skeptical EU members. If the legal reasoning for continuing KFOR and UNSCR 1244 was strong enough for other countries to accept, even if they did not completely agree with it, it would decrease the number of EU members who would not want to recognize an independent Kosovo to a manageable number. The building of an EU consensus might be able to keep them in line. RICE