(S) DEMARCH REQUEST: POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 134596 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PGOV MASS TH IR SUBJECT: (S) DEMARCH REQUEST: POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF AN/PRC-77 RADIOS TO IRAN Classified By: Acting DAS Kevin O'Keefe for reasons 1.4(b) and (c) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see Paragraph 2. -------------- Objective -------------- ¶2. (S) Prevent the Government of Thailand (GOT) from transferring -- temporarily or otherwise -- to Iran AN/PRC-77 radios for upgrading. Avert a potential violation of UNSCR 1747, which prohibits the export to Iran of military equipment. Alert Thailand a Thai entity may be in danger of violating the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) and becoming subject to USG sanctions. If a transfer has already occurred, attempt to obtain the details of the transfer, i.e. how many radios were transferred and when the transfer occurred. Department requests that Post do so by discussing background information included below at highest appropriate levels within the GOT. -------------- Background -------------- ¶3. (S) The Department has received credible information indicating a Thai firm, General Comtech Ltd. (No 186 Chareon Krung 36, Chareon Krung Road, Bangrak, Bangkok),may be attempting to arrange for an Iranian firm to carry out a major upgrade of the US-origin AN/PRC-77 radios of Thailand's armed forces. This upgrade, if carried out, may violate Thailand's end-use and re-transfer assurances regarding US-origin military equipment. ¶4. (S//REL THAILAND) Under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),the President is required to provide a semi-annual report to Congress identifying foreign entities about which we have "credible information" that indicates the entity transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria: a) equipment and technology listed on multilateral export control lists (Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement); b) items of the same kind as those on multilateral lists, but falling below the control list parameters (when it is determined that such items have the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems); c) other items with the potential of making such material contributions; or d) items on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists. Because the AN/PRC-77 radio is controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement, the t ransfer of this technology could subject the recipient to INKSNA sanctions. We want to alert the Thai authorities to the implications under U.S. law of this possible transfer to Iran, and work with them to prevent any further violations that could negatively impact U.S.-Thailand security cooperation. ¶5. (U) Although the Department has not been able to identify precisely the mechanism pursuant to which the GOT originally acquired these radios, the relevant authority is likely found in the Arms Export Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or their predecessor acts. Pursuant to these acts, prior to the sale or grant of defense articles from the USG to a foreign government, that government must agree to obtain the authorization of the Department before any retransfer. Similar requirements apply with respect to defense articles procured via direct commercial sales. ¶6. (S//REL THAILAND) As required by law, the Department reported to Congress on previous violations by the GOT of its end-use, security and retransfer obligations. Violations include unauthorized upgrades of F-5 aircraft by an Israeli private entity, and the transfer of F-100 engines and components to companies in Israel, Singapore and the Republic of Korea. The Department may be required to report to Congress if the GOT transfers these radios to Iran, making it important to know whether a transfer - even temporary - of these radios has occurred and which entities were involved. Support for the GOT in Congress is already strained by Thailand's 2006 military coup. Any violations of retransfer assurances could further degrade this support for the GOT. ¶7. (S//REL THAILAND) The following text has been cleared for release to Thailand at the SECRET level and should be used STATE 00134596 002 OF 002 verbatim: -- (S//REL THAILAND) We have information that the firm General Comtech Ltd. (No 186 Chareon Krung 36, Chareon Krung Road, Bangrak, Bangkok) was attempting to arrange for an Iranian firm to carry out a major upgrade of the US-origin AN/PRC-77 radios of Thailand's armed forces. ¶8. (U) Post should contact Tim Liston in PM/RSAT at 202-647-9121, if there are further questions. Following consultations with the GOT on this matter, please provide the Department with a summary of this discussion by September 28. Please slug response for ISN/CATR- Michael Rolleri. RICE