NORTH KOREAN USE OF ARAB BANK NETWORK

S E C R E T STATE 121863

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: KNNP XB XF PREL PARM KN IR
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN USE OF ARAB BANK NETWORK

REF: A. STATE 72416

B. STATE 61222

Classified By: ACTING ISN PDAS GEORGE LOOK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

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SUMMARY/BACKGROUND
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2. (S) Washington is increasingly concerned about efforts
by North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank to assist Tanchon
Commercial Bank to move funds from both Syria and Iran (REF A
& B). Tanchon Commercial Bank is the primary financial agent
behind the DPRK's weapons programs and was designated by the
USG under E.O. 13382 as an entity that provides financial
support to the DPRK's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
These transactions have occurred through Arab Bank PLC, one
of the oldest and most respected banks in the Middle East.
Arab Bank is headquartered in Amman, Jordan and is the
largest Arab banking network in the world with 400 branch
locations. Arab Bank also owns a 64.2 percent majority stake
in Arab Tunisian Bank. We urge Jordan to maintain vigilance
with regard to Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean financial
transactions in its jurisdiction to prevent these countries
from using deceptive financial practices to further their
proliferation-related activities.

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OBJECTIVES
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3. (S) Washington requests Post deliver the talking points
and non-paper in paragraph 4 to appropriate host government
officials in the foreign affairs and financial ministries.

-- (S) To alert host government officials to information we
have about Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean financial
activities that could be occurring in the Arab Bank network,
which is headquartered in Amman, and urge appropriate
authorities to investigate such transactions, especially
correspondent relationships, and to take steps to freeze any
accounts or transactions held or conducted in support of
proliferation-related activities.

-- (S) To urge the Kingdom of Jordan to maintain increased
vigilance over financial or commercial transactions with
Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean entities and banks in its
jurisdiction.

-- (S) To urge the Kingdom of Jordan to investigate these
financial transactions, and to take appropriate action.

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BACKGROUND/NONPAPER
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4. (S/REL JORDAN) Begin points:

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) In light of our commitment to share as
much information with your government as possible on Iranian
and DPRK proliferation-related activities, we would like to
raise serious concerns about Syrian, Iranian, and North
Korean financial activities in the Arab Bank network.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) It has long been the policy of the
United States to prevent the exploitation of the
international financial system for the purpose of conducting
illicit or proliferation-related financial transactions, and
to urge our international partners to do the same.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) We are concerned that Iranian, Syrian,
and DPRK-related entities may be assisting each other in
engaging in deceptive practices that exploit and weaken the
international financial system and undermine global financial
standards and best practices.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) We are concerned that Iran, Syria, and
DPRK proliferation entities are using the Arab Bank network
to process what may be proliferation-related transactions.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) The United States has information that
in 2007, North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank mission in Tripoli,
Libya (FTB Libya) has expanded its role as a key node in
North Korea's banking network and is helping Tanchon
Commercial Bank, the banking arm of North Korea's primary
weapons trading firm, KOMID, to move funds from both Syria
and Iran.

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SYRIA-DPRK
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-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) In 2007, FTB Libya provided assistance
to Tanchon in making remittances from funds from the sale of
unspecified, probably proliferation-related goods in Syria.
Our information indicates that Tanchon is establishing this
new arrangement because Tanchon could no longer remit funds
through a route it had previously used. FTB Libya arranged
remittance routes for Tanchon from Syria and other locations
via intermediary banks. We have information that Tanchon's
financial transfers are conducted surreptitiously by using
either aliases or front companies.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) By mid-February, FTB Libya arranged
remittances of funds for Tanchon through several Arab Bank
branches in the Middle East. Remittances going directly from
Syria could be sent from Arab Bank-Syria in Damascus, a
sister bank to Arab Tunisian Bank.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) The United States has information that
FTB Libya arranged remittance routes for Tanchon from Syria
and other locations via intermediary banks in Europe.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) These transfers, which were probably
proliferation-related, occurred inside the Arab Bank network
and involved both Arab Bank branches and Arab Tunisian Bank,
of which Arab Bank is a 64.2 percent stakeholder.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) By processing these transactions, Arab
Bank could be unwittingly assisting proliferation-related
activities.


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IRAN-DPRK
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-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) We have information that FTB Libya was
also planning to establish a route for Tanchon to use from
Iran.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) These transactions could be subject to
the restrictions in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and

1747.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) The U.S. urges countries to maintain
increased vigilance over financial or commercial transactions
with Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean entities and banks,
which may be using deceptive financial practices such as
those described above to circumvent targeted sanctions
imposed pursuant to UNSC resolutions and continue their
illicit or proliferation-related dealings.

-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) In the spirit of our continued
non-proliferation cooperation and joint efforts to prevent
Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean abuse of the international
financial system, we urge your government to investigate
these financial transactions, and to take appropriate action.


-- (S/REL TO JORDAN) We look forward to working with you on
this and other related security and counter-proliferation
matters, and are prepared to provide additional assistance as
appropriate.

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REPORTING DEADLINE
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5. (U) Post should report results within seven (7) business
days of receipt of this cable. Please slug replies for ISN,
T, TREASURY, EAP and NEA. Please include SIPDIS in all
replies.

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POINT OF CONTACT
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6. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up
information is Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5408,
McGeehanKJ@state.sgov.gov.


7. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.
RICE