DEMARCHE: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH IN EASTERN CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 103146 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR GD'ELIA RKANEDA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017 TAGS: MOPS MASS PBTS KPKO PREL PREF EUN CT CD FR SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: WORKING WITH THE FRENCH IN EASTERN CHAD REF: A. (A)USEU BRUSS 2302 ¶B. (B)PARIS 2913 ¶C. (C)PARIS 2837 ¶D. (D)NDJAMENA 530 ¶E. (E)NDJAMENA 504 ¶F. (F)USEU TODAY REPORTS Classified By: AF A/S Jendayi E. Frazer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) Department requests Embassy Paris to convey to French government officials the USG support for Foreign Minister Kouchner's plan to deploy a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) bridging mission in Eastern Chad and to explore what types of assistance the French might need and desire from the U.S. OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Department requests that Embassy pursue the following objectives: --Inform the French government that the USG is supportive of the French proposal for an international humanitarian peace support operation in eastern Chad. --Solicit more information about the mission itself and about how the mission will interplay with other initiatives in Chad, including ongoing humanitarian operations. --Query contacts about the type of support the U.S. could provide to advance the French proposal. We look forward to working with France and the EU on civilian aspects; encourage France to direct any requests for non-EU military, logistics or training support through NATO, where the U.S. and other Allies could consider potential contributions; --Express Department's willingness to participate in further discussions about the mission in either Washington or Paris. REPORTING DEADLINE -------------- ¶3. (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable by August 1. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Over 400,000 individuals are now displaced in eastern Chad (235,000 Darfur refugees and over 170,000 internally displaced persons). Insecurity continues to hamper the ability of the UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners to deliver humanitarian assistance, prevents IDPs from returning home, and negatively impacts the lives of Chadians who are trying to remain in their homes. Armed groups operate throughout the area and can misuse refugee and IDP camps with impunity. The inability of the Government of Chad (GOC) to provide basic law and order in the region and effectively suppress (through negotiation or force of arms) cross-border threats to the regime suggests a need for external actors to step in to effect peace and security. The GOC continues to oppose a robust UN peacekeeping force in eastern STATE 00103146 002 OF 004 Chad as suggested in 2006, but seems open to the French initiative, without committing to an eventual UN force to which the ESDP mission would bridge. ¶5. (SBU) To address the situation, in June, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner proposed an initiative to address security concerns in eastern Chad. The initiative has two goals: first, to improve security in and around refugee/internally displaced person (IDP) sites and in areas from which many of the IDPs originated by deploying an interim force in eastern Chad; and second, to launch a civil reconstruction effort in the areas whence the IDPs fled in order to promote return, recovery, and reconciliation. The security force would not have a mandate to secure or manage the Sudan-Chad border. ¶6. (C) According to a non-paper circulated by the French in June, the "civilian" (police/gendarme/stability police) component of the security force would include 800 Chadian gendarmes and 230 international police/gendarmes, mostly from Francophone countries. The French had envisioned that the police force would be blue-hatted and would be commanded by an international police officer. The non-paper is silent about the composition of the military force, but reports from Brussels suggest that the military force would be comprised of 2,000-3,000 EU troops as part of an ESDP deployment, protecting a 900 km by 200-400 km zone in eastern Chad. The French do not want to provide more than half the total troops, and are apparently concerned about force generation. Sweden is reportedly considering offering troops, perhaps as part of the Nordic Battlegroup that would follow an initial deployment by the French. ¶7. (C) The mission was briefed to the USG as a temporary mission (from October 2007 to May 2008 approximately) that would be followed by a UN military force in eastern Chad, a force that the USG still considers a priority. Since the original briefing, there are reports that this mission may end in one year or with the deployment of the hybrid UN-African Union force. ¶8. (U) The Secretary expressed her support for such a mission when she met with President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner in Paris in June. The Department is exploring ways in which we can be helpful. Some ideas include: --Utilizing our positive relationship with the AU and UNSC to obtain buy-in for the initiative and to support a UNSC authorization for the bridging force. --Encouraging Germany and other EU members to support the French initiative and contribute troops, without diminishing the priority of other ongoing missions' needs, particularly in Afghanistan. --Encouraging DPKO to broaden its thinking when formulating options for a possible follow-on force. --Committing USG funding for the follow-on UN force. Congress STATE 00103146 003 OF 004 granted 83 million dollars for a UN force in Chad through the fiscal year 2007 supplemental appropriation. This funding may only be used for assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. --Should funding permit, providing training through the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) for international gendarme peacekeepers to deploy as part of the bridging force. --Training and equipping of African military forces for this mission, if funding is available. This or similar requests for security, training or logistics assistance from the United States for the proposed ESDP should be directed through NATO. ¶9. (U) The Department requests that Embassy Paris ascertain the following information about the plan: --The size of the military component of the force and the expected role and contribution of each EU member nation. Have any countries committed to sending troops? Will the ESDP include enabling forces? How will the force be supplied? How will the EU deploy such a force? What type of units will it include? What will be their Rules of Engagement (ROE)? --The role of the United Nations. Will France still pursue a robust UN peacekeeping force to follow the France-EU force? If so, has there been any progress in obtaining Chadian buy-in for the follow-on force? The UN peacekeeping mission will also include a presence in the Central African Republic (CAR). Will the EU consider a bridging presence in the CAR? Would current initiatives, such as the Central African Multinational Force (FOMUC) or the French presence in CAR, be expanded? We believe a UN peacekeeping deployment in CAR could help address spillover from Darfur and provide a useful base for launching UN peacekeeping in Darfur and Chad. --The participation and role of the African Union and the militaries and police forces of its members states in the mission. --Will the force include a political component or address domestic Chadian issues such as political reconciliation? What do French experts see as the root causes of the instability in Eastern Chad, and how will the proposed security and reconstruction mission address those drivers of instability? --What level of Chadian participation is expected? ¶10. (SBU) The USG is also interested in partnering with France and with the EU on the civilian aspects of this initiative. We intend to increase our emergency humanitarian non-food assistance to IDPs with supplemental budgets provided to USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA),as well as to State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). We would be interested in hearing more about France and EU reconstruction efforts and how we can best coordinate our extensive humanitarian efforts in the region with their efforts. STATE 00103146 004 OF 004 POINT OF CONTACT -------------- ¶11. (U) Please contact Madeeha Ashraf at (202) 647-1637 or via e-mail for any necessary further background information or argumentation to meet our objectives. RICE