Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SOFIA87
2007-01-18 13:10:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIA AND OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER NATO MARR MOPS TU BU 
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VZCZCXRO1484
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSF #0087/01 0181310
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181310Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3089
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000087 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NATO MARR MOPS TU BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY

REF: A. 06 SOFIA 1573

B. 06 SOFIA 848

C. 06 SOFIA 743

D. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0020 07

E. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0038 07

F. 06 STATE 79658

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000087 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NATO MARR MOPS TU BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY REF: A. 06 SOFIA 1573 ¶B. 06 SOFIA 848 ¶C. 06 SOFIA 743 ¶D. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0020 07 ¶E. DAO SOFIA IIR 6 811 0038 07 ¶F. 06 STATE 79658 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Despite persistent U.S. lobbying and a high-level push from official visitors, GoB officials are not yet sold on membership in Turkish-led Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH). Credible doubts about Turkey's willingness to share information have fed into deep-seated mistrust of Turkish (and Russian) intentions in the Black Sea. We can start to bridge the confidence gap between Bulgaria and Turkey by encouraging the two sides to improve the quality of information sharing. Building trust between these two NATO allies will improve the efficiency of Black Sea maritime security operations and open the door to increased Bulgarian participation and eventual membership in OBSH. END SUMMARY. Interagency skepticism... -------------- ¶2. (S) Bulgarian skepticism of OBSH is nothing new (as reported in reftels A-C); the Bulgarian inter-agency has divergent views, though the trend line is to question rather than sign up to OBSH: The MoD: The civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense is by far the most forward-leaning, favoring pragmatic engagement with OBSH, including formally joining the operation "if necessary." This qualifier is, in itself, telling. The MFA: The politically controversial optic of Bulgarian forces participating in what is still seen largely as a Turkish operation has led the MFA to oppose formal membership in OBSH, while favoring pragmatic cooperation and information exchange. Privately, MFA security officials paint a picture of OBSH as a Russian-Turkish wolf in NATO clothing. They strongly advocate an "equal seat at the table" for Bulgaria -- hinting that if NATO's Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) cannot be extended into the Black Sea, Bulgaria may reorient its Black Sea Policy toward the EU -- a forum free of what it sees as excessive Russian and Turkish influence. The General Staff: Bulgaria's military leadership opposes direct participation in OBSH, and is particularly sensitive to the possibility of being incorporated into
a Turkish chain of command. Military commanders favor an "equal seat" for Bulgaria and want to boost the role of the Burgas maritime information center by channeling information directly from Burgas to CC-MAR Naples. Officials in the General Staff and MFA alike complain of Turkey's unwillingness to sign a bilateral agreement on classified information exchange -- first proposed by Bulgaria shortly after its accession to NATO in 2004. ...fueled by suspicions regarding Turkey -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Balkan historical baggage is only part of Bulgarian distrust of Turkish motives. By itself, this would not have been a show-stopper. Unfortunately, more operational and geopolitical concerns also weigh into the equation -- namely Bulgarian intelligence reports that Turkey is withholding information on threats to maritime security. Bulgarian military intelligence has confided to us (protect) that it monitors communications traffic in the Bosphorus (ref. D). Reftel E contains suspicious vessel reports documenting the Bulgarian services' assertion that Turkey regularly fails to inform Bulgaria of vessels suspected of links to terrorism, trafficking in persons, and smuggling of arms and narcotics -- even when these vessels are bound for Bulgarian ports. The Way Out -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Bulgaria and Turkey are stuck in a circular argument over OBSH. If these two allies are to cooperate SOFIA 00000087 002 OF 002 effectively in the future -- in OBSH or otherwise -- they need to begin their own dialogue about security and intelligence. We suggest the following course of action to break the impasse: - Encourage Bulgaria to reach out to Turkey to begin a bilateral dialogue on Black Sea security. - Encourage mil-to-mil and intel-to-intel talks between Turkey and Bulgaria, including direct talks by CNOs, military intelligence chiefs and counter-terrorism coordinators. (Turkish willingness to sign an agreement on classified information exchange or to consider a special role within OBSH for Bulgaria's Burgas center would be especially important clinchers for a skeptical GoB.) - U.S. and NATO political support for OBSH to help calm Bulgarian fears of NATO "abandoning" the Black Sea. We will have to gauge carefully when to deliver such messages to break through Bulgarian reservations. ¶5. (S/NF) Ultimately, the endgame of this Black Sea saga -- as seen by the Bulgarians -- will likely require Turkey to open the taps of information to Bulgaria as a quid pro quo for Bulgarian membership in OBSH. This solution would best come from the Allies themselves. We should continue to advocate participation in OBSH, both in bilateral meetings and especially during high-level military visits. Absent greater bilateral Turkish-Bulgarian trust and information flow, we should not anticipate an imminent breakthrough in Bulgarian resistance to joining OBSH, but that shouldn't deter us from pushing for greater Bulgarian participation (e.g. increased sharing of operational information with Turkish commanders, or participation in a suspect vessel exercise that could be organized with OBSH partners) while also encouraging more openness from the Turkish side as a sweetener for eventual Bulgarian membership. BEYRLE

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