BULGARIA: AMBASSADOR'S JULY 16 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER STANISHEV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000863



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



DEPT FOR EUR/NCE NORDBERG



E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, NATO, KCRM, KCOR, ECON, ENRG, LY, BU

SUBJECT: BULGARIA: AMBASSADOR'S JULY 16 MEETING WITH PRIME

MINISTER STANISHEV



Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. SUMMARY. The Ambassador met one-on-one with Prime Minister

Sergey Stanishev July 16 and reviewed a number of current

issues. Topics covered included the release of nurses

imprisoned in Libya, Iraq/Afghanistan, cabinet changes,

Kosovo, the extradition treaty, bases, and economic issues.

Stanishev said while the Interior Minister was still fighting

his plans to shake up the security service structure, his

coalition partners supported the proposal. Looking as

relaxed and confident as ever, Stanishev joked that the

strong support voiced by President Bush in their June 11

meeting was welcome, but also created new challenges: "once

you are labelled 'Mr. Clean,' some people expect you can

solve all their problems for them." End summary.



Libya and the Bulgarian Nurses

--------------

2. (SBU) Stanishev said the one-day delay in the Higher

Judicial Council's ruling communitng the death sentences

occurred because of the need to get sign-offs from the

children's families. The overall deal still seemed to be

holding, but Bulgaria had no sense of how fast the transfer

might take place. This all depended on the Libyans, and how

quickly they wanted (and were able) to dispose of matters. A

reduction in the sentence would make it easier legally to

effect their transfer to Bulgaria under the bilateral

judicial agreement. The European Commission has offered a

plane to fly to Libya, pick them up and deliver them to

another EU member state, where a Bulgarian plane will be

waiting to complete their return. "They were quite insistent

on this," Stanishev said, although he said the Bulgarians had

turned down the EU offer to fly them into Sofia on an EC

plane as bad optics. Throughout the discussion, the PM

repeatedly said how much Bulgaria appreciated the consistent

US support on the nurses and recognized how decisive that

support has been.



3. (SBU) Stanishev said the paperwork had already been

drafted to grant the nurses a full pardon immediately after

they arrived in Sofia -- it was inconceivable that they

should spend even a night in custody in Bulgaria, no matter

how it might be perceived in Libya. The Ambassador asked if

the government was planning any warning to the 1000-plus

Bulgarians living and working in Libya to keep a low profile

if the pardon led to a violent backlash. Stanishev said they

hadn't considered this; most Bulgarians in Libya were working

on private contracts, without any formal link to the Embassy

or GoB. He said the Presidency had convened a working group

to coordinate all aspects of the release, and he would ask

them to consider readiness for any backlash.



National Agency for Security

--------------

4. (C) Stanishev said he had several direct and even

"emotional" discussions with Minister of Interior Petkov, who

continued to resist the PM's planned security agency

reorganization. Some of his opposition was being fuelled by

the "professional" level within the MoI stemming from

personal interests of individuals. For instance, Gen.

Iliyev's position as General Secretary of the MoI would be

harder to justify after the reorganization, since a large

part of his function was coordinating activities of MoI u

nits (e.g., National Security Service - NSS) that would no

longer be part of the Ministry.



5. (C) Stanishev admitted that the Interior Minister had not

yet seen Sertov's draft law for the new agency. He recalled

that the MoI had produced a draft at the very beginning of

the process that would have created another

coordinative/analytical body without any operational

component. This was not what Stanishev had in mind and he

had asked his own national security advisor Petko Sertov to

produce his own draft. Much of the discussion with

tripartite coalition partners, Simeon and Dogan, had focused

on this issue of operational vs. coordinative functions.

Simeon and Dogan expressed support for the PM's plan,but

decided for tactical reasons to set up a working group

comprising representatives of the three coalition parties to

review the draft and listen to different views, both from

professionals and experts -- including MoI Petkov.



6.(C) The Ambassador raised concern about the sudden

appearance of a General Secretary position in the

reorganization. Stanishev was unaware of it ("I'm not

involved in every detail") but said it might be something

required by their law on public administration. He said U.S.

experts should pass their views to Sertov and the position



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could be removed if there were no legal obstacles. The

Ambassador also urged that the regulatory authorities of the

Financial Intelligence Agency be kept intact. Stanishev said

the Agency was given its own semi-autonomous status in the

reorganization; he had asked Sertov to look very closely at

what would work best because he felt the PM did not have a

clear enough oversight of the economic aspects of national

security, which were significant.



Cabinet Changes at Ministry of Economy and Energy and

Ministry of Justice

-------------- --------------

7. (SBU) Stanishev said he had faced a difficult choice on

Economy/Energy. In choosing Petar Dimitrov as new, he had

opted for a reliable professional who was also a decent

person (PM shorthand for "not corrupt"). Downsides were his

lack of experience in the Executive Branch and energy sector,

but he would get a lot of help, including directly from the

PM. Lack of English was also a drawback. Stanishev said

that while the other candidate, Petar Kanev, would have been

a popular choice with the media and business community, Kanev

had worked closely in the past with shady energy businessman

Krassimir Georgiev. Since Georgiev's ties to ex-minister

Ovcharov had hastened Ovcharov's departure, it would have

been inconvenient politically" and lacking credibility to

replace him with Kanev. Stanishev said he did not know the

new Minister of Justice Miglena Tacheva well, but knew she

was energetic and had the will to make changes, which her

predecessor Petkanov had lacked.



Kosovo

--------------

8. (SBU) The Ambassador briefed Stanishev on the state of

play on the "minimalist" UNSC in NY, which the Russians

had,in a word, trashed. Stanishev said the Bulgarians

continued to try to influence the more moderate side of the

Serbian political spectrum (read: Tadic) to recognize and

speak publicly about the European perspective for Serbia, but

this was practically impossible during an election year.

Instead of fighting the problem, the Serbs needed to focus on

improving standards and implementation of provisions in the

Ahtissari plan. But even moderate Serbs did not believe that

provisions in the Ahtissari plan would actually be

implemented. Stanishev again probed our firmness on

partition, as Serbian interlocutors continue to raise this

with him and partition was a nightmare scenario for Sofia.

The Ambassador responded that U.S. opposition to partition

remained firm.



Iraq, Afghanistan and HMMWVs

--------------

9. (SBU) The Ambassador informed Stanishev that the Embassy

was expecting a delegation from Washington July 19-20 to

discuss our cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The

Ambassador explained that we were beginning to look at other

potential missions for coalition partners, one of which was

the middle ring security for the UN mission inside the Green

Zone. Stressing that this was not a formal request or

proposal, the Ambassador wanted to share with him ideas that

were being discussed informally and that might be raised

during the delegation's meetings. Stanishev simply nodded

but did not offer any other reaction. On the HMMWV issue,

Ambassador said that while the U.S. respected Bulgaria's

desire to have the best equipment for its forces, we

encouraged them to accept our offer of a loan of ten HMMWV

1025s made in response to President Parvanov's request to

President Bush. He confirmed that the offer was cost-free,

and reiterated that their acceptance of it would have no

effect whatsoever on the timing of delivery of the HMMWVs

ordered through FMS. Stanishev appeared unaware of the

letter from CHOD Stoykov declining the HMMWV 1025 loan and

said he would look into it.



Extradition treaty

--------------



10. (U) Stanishev confirmed that he had asked the Foreign

Ministry for a survey of practices in other EU member states

and for their legal view on the proposed treaty before

presenting it to the Council of Ministers for a final

decision. The Ambassador stressed the urgency of quick

action; Stanishev said he understood.



Bases

--------------

11. (SBU) The Ambassador pointed to the uptick in negative

press attention to the joint bases following Russia's

announcement that it was suspending its participation in the



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CFE Treaty. The extreme nationalist ATAKA party, the

Russian Embassy, and other anti-Western forces would continue

to use our military cooperation as a rallying point;

countering this would require both Stanishev and President

Parvanov to speak out reiterating Bulgaria's strategic

interests. Stanishev said this would not be a problem; his

position on the bases was consistent and principled. But he

hoped we would be able to complete the implementing

agreements as soon as possible; without them, the legal

foundation for operation of the bases was not complete, and

any small incident could take on larger public overtones.

The Ambassador informed Stanishev that the Embassy expected a

team from EUCOM to come out soon to finalize the agreements,

acknowledging that this had taken longer than expected and

that the delay was on the US, not Bulgarian side.



Looking ahead: More Interaction with the Public on

Economic Issues

-------------- --------------

12. (U) Stanishev said the Coalition Council and Council of

Ministers would meet in special session at the end of July

for a strategic review of budget priorities for the coming

year, with an eye to better communication with the citizenry.

Pressure for increases in social spending were increasing,

with doctors, teachers and miners threatening to go on strike

and pensioners threatening to protest. Part of the problem

was a failure of government to clearly explain the priorities

and tradeoffs in a modern economy, especially since fiscal

and budgetary discipline was key. Stanishev said this

discussion might be followed by a series of "town meetings"

similar to the successful open forum held on Roma issues.

These meetings could serve as a mini-referendum on government

policies and priorities.



Comment

--------------

13. (C) Stanishev continues to play a steady hand: he is

pushing forward with the reorganization of the domestic

security agencies, methodically building support within the

coalition and showing only as many of his cards as absolutely

needed, as his adviser completes the draft legislation with

continuing U.S. input. Success in steering his draft law

through to a first reading in Parliament before the summer

recess will amount to a political victory as well. While

there are strong "command and structural" reasons for the

changes he is pushing, they also serve to undercut the

authority of Interior Minister Petkov, whose inability to

score any real success in the fight against organized crime

here is a growing liability for the PM and the Socialist

Party. End comment.

Beyrle

Beyrle