PDAS VOLKER'S MEETINGS WITH BULGARIAN PM STANISHEV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000499 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR FOR PDAS VOLKER, EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO ENRG SR YI EU BU SUBJECT: PDAS VOLKER'S MEETINGS WITH BULGARIAN PM STANISHEV AND FM KALFIN Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with PDAS Volker on April 11, PM Stanishev and FM Kalfin strongly endorsed supervised independence for Kosovo and pressed the need for a Security Council resolution. Both ministers also engaged on Black Sea issues, with Kalfin arguing for a stronger NATO presence. Volker praised Bulgaria's decision to increase deployments in Afghanistan from 75 to 400. On Missile Defense, Kalfin confessed to feeling "squeezed" between Russia and the U.S. over a system that "wouldn't cover Bulgaria," but conceded PDAS Volker's point that the system was needed and that NATO was the proper forum for discussions on a more comprehensive MD system. END SUMMARY. KOSOVO/BALKANS: ¶2. (C) Stanishev and Kalfin needed no convincing on the merits of the Ahtisaari plan. Both fear the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence and stressed that a UN Security Council resolution is "essential" to maintaining stability in the region. Stanishev emphasized the need to consolidate the EU's position and move forward as quickly as possible. He recalled meeting Kostunica and Tadic during a recent trip to Belgrade; Stanishev's message to them was that Serbia should look toward Europe -- and that Serbian politicians could start to get over the past by refocusing on the rights of Kosovo Serbs. Stanishev suggested that "if something can be done additionally" to increase protections for Kosovo Serbs, it could help clear the way for a U.S.-EU common position on the issue and reduce the chance of a Russian veto at the UN. Though very supportive of the substance of the Ahtisaari Plan, Kalfin was less forward-leaning than Stanishev on process, doubting that Bulgaria could do much to sway allies' views either way on this issue. NATO/AFGHANISTAN ¶3. (C) Volker thanked both leaders for their role in Bulgaria's recent decision to increase the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan from 75 to 400. He spoke of the example Bulgaria provides to more traditional allies, who have yet to "take ownership of the challenge" in Afghanistan, and went on to preview headline themes for the upcoming Oslo Summit. Kalfin and Stanishev welcomed his comments, thanking the U.S. for our logistical support while admitting that the decision entailed significant financial (and political) sacrifice for the GoB. As Stanishev noted, Bulgaria is No. 4 in NATO in defense expenditures per capita, but the country's low GDP and its ambitious program of simultaneous reforms and deployments means that the Bulgarian defense budget remains very tight. Kalfin spoke briefly about public opinion, noting that most Bulgarians lack accurate information on the country's foreign deployments; he is instructing the MFA to work with the MoD, NATO and the U.S. to get the word out. BLACK SEA ¶4. (C) Both ministers raised Black Sea issues. Stanishev spoke broadly about a "new spirit" in the region in recent years and Bulgaria's view that countries should focus on "initiatives" rather than getting bogged down in creating new structures. Kalfin reiterated Bulgaria's long-held desire to see a greater NATO role in the Black Sea. Volker responded by explaining why the sensitivities of Turkish and Russian partners demanded that "security come last" -- but that this did not inhibit littoral states and partners from working to improve people's lives and help modernize the region. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶5. (C) Volker spoke briefly with both Kalfin and Stanishev on the U.S. case for missile defense. Both noted that Russia was putting increased pressure on Bulgaria over this issue. Kalfin agreed with us that the system could not threaten Russia and that Russia was aware of this. Bulgaria is unlikely to get out in front on this issue, according to Kalfin -- in his words, being "squeezed" between Russia and a system that will not cover Bulgaria "does not make us feel comfortable." He agreed with Volker that the U.S. system could contribute to a NATO system that would protect all member states -- and that NATO was the proper forum for discussion of such issues. BULGARIA IN THE EU ¶6. (C) Stanishev signaled his intention to move past the national period of self-congratulation following EU entry and tackle important business -- "we have to get fit, get on our feet," he said, bemoaning the fact that even some ministers seem more intent on relaxing than getting to work. As Volker congratulated him on the progress Bulgaria has made, Stanishev noted that change may be more visible from the outside; at home the government still faced a huge challenge in upgrading standards, managing people's expectations and simultaneously working within the EU for a stronger Europe. Still, he said, countries such as Bulgaria -- in which change has become a way of life -- may be better equipped to deal with the challenges of the future than those such as France where leaders have trouble selling change. Volker seconded these thoughts, praising the more entrepreneurial political culture in Central and Eastern Europe. He encouraged Bulgaria to take full advantage of its EU membership by targeting its foreign policy to maximize its influence and by effectively tackling rule of law and corruption to allow the Bulgarian economy to reach its full potential. NURSES IN LIBYA ¶7. (C) Securing the release of the Bulgarian nurses in Libya remains Bulgaria's top foreign policy goal. Volker assured the ministers that Deputy Secretary Negroponte would raise the issue again with the Libyans in his visit to Tripoli. Kalfin took some solace in the EU's success in finally securing a common position on the issue, and solicited an additional U.S. contribution, saying that Bulgaria wanted to step up technical assistance to the anti-HIV center in Benghazi in order to "sweeten the deal." Noting that U.S. institutions such as Baylor University were already assisting the center, PDAS Volker said that the United States would "do what we can." ¶8. (U) PDAS Volker did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. BEYRLE