BULGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT

UNCLAS SOFIA 000169

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM EUN BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT
JUDICIAL REFORM

REF: 06 SOFIA 250


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Bulgaria's latest batch of constitutional
amendments, approved February 2, attempt to reform Bulgaria's
dysfunctional judicial system by creating an OIG-like entity
within the Supreme Judicial Council. Building on earlier core
amendments, which were seen as a precondition for EU membership, the

new changes seek to strike a balance between judicial
independence and accountability. While some amendments,
particularly those providing for fiscal decentralization and
abolishing conscription, are non-controversial, critics have
zeroed in on changes affecting the judiciary. Opponents predict
limited effectiveness and warn that establishment of a judicial
inspectorate chosen by parliament could lead to political
interference. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On February 2, the National Assembly adopted a package of
amendments with a particular emphasis on reforming the judiciary.
This is the fourth change in the country's basic law, and the
third in less than four years aimed specifically at increasing
the transparency and accountability of the judicial system. The
European Commission criticized the last revisions, adopted in
March 2006, as injecting ambiguity into magistrates' independence
(reftel). The Commission's October 2006 report recommended that
Bulgaria address the shortcoming, identifying it as one area that
could potentially trigger EU safeguard clauses.


3. (SBU) The new amendments, adopted with broad political
support, strive to find a middle ground between judicial
independence and accountability. The Parliament confirmed the
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) as the sole governing body over
the judiciary, solidifying its independence. At the same time,
MPs limited the magistrates' immunity to functional immunity,
making it easier for judges, prosecutors, and investigators to be
prosecuted for actions outside their official capacity. The
parliamentarians' most controversial decision was to establish an
11-member inspectorate within SJC to check and monitor the
judiciary's work. The inspectorate's members will be selected and
confirmed by two-thirds majority of Parliament to four-year terms
and will have
authority to investigate all judicial operations except those
pertaining to case merit. Many leading judicial figures openly
expressed skepticism about the new body's efficacy, highlighting
its unclear mandate, its vulnerability to political pressure, and
the existence of a similar inspectorate within the Ministry of
Justice. Judges confided to us serious doubts the new body will
make much of a difference, especially in what they characterized
as the hierarchical -- and often corrupt -- system where the
leadership "does not want to hear the word transparency." Various
EU embassies have warily eyed the judicial amendment, uncertain
of its usefulness or practicality.


4. (U) Along with judicial reform, the new constitutional
amendments also allow fiscal decentralization, enabling
municipalities to set local taxes and duties within the
boundaries of the law; abolish conscription and provide for a
fully professional army as of January 1, 2008; give parliament
budgetary independence; and eliminate the requirement for a
quorum to be present in parliament, except during actual votes.


5. (SBU) COMMENT: While some of the constitutional amendments
seem of dubious merit, others unequivocally represent positive
developments. Fiscal decentralization has been a goal of USG
assistance for many years, with USAID-supported projects actively
advocating for more local budgetary autonomy. The limits on
magistrates' immunity should, over time, increase judicial
accountability and allow the system to rid itself of some of its
negligent and corrupt members. The inspectorate, if staffed by
dedicated, reform-minded officials, should help speed the
administration of justice, lessen internal resistance to change,
and limit the corruption that hobbles the system's effectiveness.
Implementation of the judicial reform will serve as a de facto
litmus test of how well the system self-regulates, but on balance
the amendments overall are a step in the right direction. END
COMMENT

KARAGIANNIS