CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ DIFFICULT WITHOUT

S E C R E T SOFIA 001287 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR PM AND EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017 TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR BU IZ SUBJECT: CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ DIFFICULT WITHOUT UNSCR REF: SECSTATE 150164 Classified By: AMB John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. Bulgaria's ruling coalition supports the deployment of 155 servicemembers to Iraq and is mulling the deployment of an additional 40 engineers, but it has consistently stated that it views a UNSCR as a politically necessary to continue its deployments. Given over 70 percent public opposition to the deployments and increasing pressure to focus attention and resources to domestic priorities, it would be difficult but not impossible for the government of Bulgaria to continue deployments to Iraq without the political cover of a UN resolution. We expect the Bulgarian response to depend upon whether they are asked to stay by the Government of Iraq, the actions of other NATO/EU states and calculations of the possible impact on 2009 parliamentary elections. End Summary. LEGAL SCENARIOS ¶2. (S) Our assessment is that Bulgaria would be able to legally operate in Iraq under any of the four scenarios described in reftel, though options A (the U.S. concludes a agreement with Iraq and Bulgaria joins as a party to the agreement) or D (Bulgaria commits its forces under U.S. command ) either through an international mechanism or through provisions in a U.S.-Iraq bilateral agreement covering all forces under U.S. command) would likely be preferable to the GOB, though it is difficult to be certain without consultation with the host government. All of the scenarios described in reftel would require approval by the Council of Ministers and the parliament, a process that usually takes months. POLITICAL CHALLENGES ¶3. (S) The biggest challenges to continued Bulgarian engagement in Iraq following the expiration of final UNSCR on 31 December 2008 are political. Despite pledging in the 2005 elections to withdraw all forces from Iraq, the ruling Socialist party has maintained its mission in Ashraf and is very seriously considering expanding its commitment through the deployment of 40 engineers. The Bulgarians remain strong partners on security issues, but they have consistently warned us that all future deployments to Iraq would be contingent on a new UNSCR. The government is currently beset by a long and contentious teachers strike and internal dissent in the ruling party following last week's local election. It will certainly be reticent to stick its neck out further on the Iraq deployments, which remain very unpopular with the Bulgarian public. ¶4. (S) While an easy yes is unlikely, a positive result is still possible. We expect Bulgaria's next moves in Iraq, following the expiration of a follow-on UNSCR in 2008 to be guided by four factors. First, the GOB will watch the U.S. Government's next steps closely with regards to force levels and will likely wish to be included in whatever legal accommodations we reach with the Government of Iraq. Second, the Bulgarian response will depend upon whether the Government of Iraq specifically calls on coalition governments to stay. Third, Bulgaria will gauge the reactions of other NATO and EU states. If other coalition members begin backing out, it will be much harder for Bulgaria to stay. Finally, Bulgarian decision makers will be forced to weigh the impact of staying in Iraq on the 2009 Parliamentary elections. Election politicking will become increasingly intense beginning in Summer 2008. Therefore, the later it gets, the less inclined the ruling coalition will be to stake out any controversial positions. ¶5. (S) A generic UNSCR that calls for support to Iraq, but does not authorize military action might be an acceptable alternative for the Bulgarians, though consultation would be required since at this stage the expectation is for a new UNSCR substantially the same as 1723. Broadly speaking, the legal considerations for continued deployments to Iraq will not weigh as heavily on Bulgarian decision makers as the political considerations described above. Beyrle