MACEDONIA: PLANNING FOR KOSOVO STATUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000985 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KV MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PLANNING FOR KOSOVO STATUS REF: SKOPJE 953 Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). SUMMARY ¶1. (C) Macedonian government officials, party representatives, and think-tankers believe independence within the Ahtisaari framework is the only option for Kosovo status. They believe recognition of an independent Kosovo should also lead to the technical demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border based on the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement (reftel). ¶2. (C) Local Macedonian contacts tell us that security concerns regarding Kosovo status, though widespread, should be "containable" with the help of strengthened border policing and with the support of Macedonia's ethnic Albanian parties. International and government sources estimate that any population movements between Kosovo and Macedonia in the event of instability in the wake of Kosovo status will be much smaller than during the 1999 conflict, and could easily be accommodated in existing Macedonian government (GOM) shelters. Macedonian contacts are wary of the potential impact of a Serbian economic blockade to "punish" Skopje for recognizing Kosovo, but several have been proactive in trying to soften the blow, while some are even planning to profit from an expected increase in exports to Kosovo. ¶3. (C) Despite some opposition party criticism of the GOM's planning efforts for dealing with the fallout of Kosovo status, we believe the government has done serious behind-the-scenes contingency planning. Due to growing ties between Skopje and Pristina, we expect Macedonia to be a force for regional stability as an example, albeit imperfect, of a functioning multiethnic democracy. End summary. YES ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE... BORDER DEMARCATION, POLITICAL DIVIDENDS AND THE MEDIA PICTURE ¶4. (C) In recent conversations with Emboffs, a wide range of Macedonian government officials and political representatives have reaffirmed the consensus here that a prompt Kosovo status solution, based on the Ahtisaari plan is highly desirable. Local contacts indicate Macedonia will recognize and support Kosovo independence, but will expect Pristina in return to honor and swiftly begin to implement its commitment under the Ahtisaari plan to ensure the demarcation of the Macedonia-Kosovo border is carried out in accordance with the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement (reftel). They also stress that Macedonia will insist on no division of Kosovo in any status solution. ¶5. (C) Hoping that the U.S. and the EU will manage to build a critical mass of states to recognize Kosovo before Macedonia has to do the same, GOM's leaders are weighing the political credit they believe the country would receive from recognition, versus the cost in terms of relations with Belgrade. To that effect, the Chair of the Macedonian Parliament's Defense and Security Committee recently told us that, following recognition, "NATO should treat Macedonia as a de facto NATO member, because of the high cost the country would pay" for that decision. ¶6. (C) All political parties we have met with recently accept that there is no sustainable solution to the Kosovo question other than a CDI. Serbian minority MP Ivan Stoiljkovic, president of the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, is the obvious exception to that unified position. He warns that all Serbian minority representatives will leave Macedonian state institutions as soon as the country recognizes Kosovo's independent status. (Note: As an ethnic minority representing less than 5 percent of Macedonia's total population, ethnic Serbs are only minimally represented in state institutions. End note.) Predicting that the "post-recognition euphoria" of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia would be "uncontrollable," a visibly emotional Stoiljkovic told us that he felt the Macedonian state could not protect him and his family in such circumstances. Comment: Even though such statements do not present a real political challenge for the GOM, they could nevertheless be SKOPJE 00000985 002 OF 003 exploited by the irresponsible local media, which could steer public opinion in an unhelpful direction. End comment. SPILLOVER VIOLENCE... ETHNIC ALLIANCES, SKIRMISHES AND GOM PLANNING ¶7. (C) Macedonia's public and politicians expect that a continuation of the Kosovo status quo into the spring of 2008 could further increase tensions in the region that could spill over into Macedonia. Even though the overall environment does not seem conducive to sustained street protests, the mainstream ethnic Albanian parties would have to keep the lid on the actions of the sometimes unpredictable War Veterans Association of the former NLA fighters. EU and U.S. sources believe that, ultimately, all ethnic Albanian representatives in Macedonia would take their cue from their Pristina counterparts, and would respond to messages from the international community urging them to keep a lid on protests. ¶8. (C) The foreign policy advisors to the Prime Minister and to the President, respectively, believe that prolonged violence in Kosovo could split Macedonian society along ethnic lines, but they dismiss this scenario as "highly unlikely." A more plausible scenario, in their view, is for small-scale, low intensity skirmishes between ethnic Albanian agitators and Macedonian security forces along the border in the Tanusevci and Debelde region (northwest Macedonia). To this end, the GOM has formed a working group, headed by the Minister of Interior, which has already taken steps to strengthen security measures in the border area. BORDER MOVEMENTS... WELCOMING REFUGEES, INTERNATIONALS AND GOODS ¶9. (SBU) The Macedonian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP) and the local UNHCR office both expect that any post-CDI population movements from Kosovo into Macedonia would not exceed 2,000 Serbs, Roma and other minorities. The MLSP has surveyed all its regional reception centers and is ready to receive any refugee outflows. UNHCR has completed its contingency planning and is stockpiling essential foodstuffs for a potential refugee caseload. ¶10. (C) UNDP has reached an agreement with the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to grant diplomatic status to all international staff currently serving in Kosovo, in case they must be evacuated to or through Macedonia in the event of large-scale violence in Kosovo. Assessing the GOM's attitude as "highly cooperative," UNDP and UNHCR representatives add that the Macedonians are trying to open up the military bypass at the Blace border crossing to facilitate the movement of people and goods in the event of a Serbian economic blockade of Kosovo. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A SERBIAN TRADE EMBARGO... GLASS HALF-FULL, OR HALF-EMPTY? ¶11. (C) Macedonian interlocutors expect Serb actions to retaliate against Skopje for recognizing an independent Kosovo could range from downgrading of diplomatic relations to a full-blown trade embargo. According to 2006 figures from Macedonia's State Statistical Office, Macedonia was Kosovo's largest import partner, and Serbia was a close second. If Serbia implements a trade blockade against Kosovo following a CDI, some Macedonian business representatives believe that will present an opportunity for them to secure an even larger share of the Kosovo market. The business-savvy GOM planned for this eventuality during a recent closed session, during which it determined that Macedonian producers were ready and able to provide timely supplies of essential goods to an independent Kosovo. According to the PM's Chief of Staff, the GOM's main objective is to prevent smugglers from capitalizing on a trade embargo, and to keep consumer prices down for the general Kosovar population. ¶12. (C) A more pessimistic group, including the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor, point to statistics showing that Serbia's total trade in 2006 was three times that of Macedonia's; Macedonia's was 3.5 times that of Kosovo; and Serbia's was 11 SKOPJE 00000985 003 OF 003 times that of Kosovo. The conclusion they draw from the data is that Serbia is a more important trade partner for Macedonia and Kosovo than either of them is for Serbia. As a result, they believe a Serbian trade embargo would be more damaging for Macedonia than any potential benefits to be gained from increased sales to the Kosovo market. ¶13. (C) Local EU contacts emphasize that, were Serbia to take measures such as imposing trade restrictions, cutting off energy supplies, withdrawing landing rights or excluding foreign carriers from its airspace, it would be breaching not only bilateral agreements, but multilateral agreements such as CEFTA 2006, and the Energy Community and Common Aviation Area treaties. This might not deter Serbia from taking such measures against Macedonia over the short-term, but EU contacts argue that, as long as Serbia was the only country breaching the treaties, Macedonia could follow the appropriate complaints procedures and thus limit the negative regional economic impact. According to EU analyses, the most significant damage to Macedonia's economy would come from the loss of investors' confidence and the potential downward pressure on the Macedonian currency. COMMENT ¶14. (C) There is a clear consensus within Macedonia that the only solution for Kosovo is a CDI within the Ahtisaari framework. Border demarcation and security concerns are recurrent topics raised by all GOM officials, who have made it clear that only strong international action and support will ensure a favorable resolution of both issues. Politicians of all stripes are convinced that the transition process for Macedonia could be managed with minimal disruption, provided a large enough international coalition recognizes an independent Kosovo before Macedonia does the same. ¶15. (C) Even though opposition politicians and think-tankers criticize the GOM for "not planning, but just hoping for a solution" on Kosovo, the international community's assessment of the GOM's efforts is rather positive. Contingency plans for refugees, provisions of continued supplies of essential goods, and other security measures already are in place, and an inter-ministerial working group is drafting contingency economic plans to respond to a Serbian reaction to Skopje's recognition of an independent Kosovo. We will continue working with ethnic Macedonian, ethnic Albanian, and ethnic Serb party leaders to encourage them to take steps to avoid any potentially provocative actions in the months before and after the CDI. PM Gruevski has indicated through his Chief of Staff that he is willing to discuss some of the government's Kosovo contingency planning with the other three main political leaders in the country, and thus shed some light on what is seen by some as a non-transparent planning process. ¶16. (C) Growing ties between Skopje and Pristina, including recent bilateral contacts at the highest political level, suggest Macedonia could play a constructive and stabilizing role in a post-CDI Kosovo. Moreover, Macedonia's imperfect but functioning multiethnic democracy sets a positive example for an independent and multiethnic Kosovo and offers the benefits of good neighborly relations. MILOVANOVIC