MACEDONIA-KOSOVO BORDER DEMARCATION: GOOD FENCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000953

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA-KOSOVO BORDER DEMARCATION: GOOD FENCES
MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS

REF: 2006 PRISTINA 1121

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) Macedonia will recognize and support Kosovo
independence provided two critical conditions are met in any
final status arrangement: 1.) demarcation of the
Macedonia-Kosovo border proceeds as set forth in the 2001
Belgrade-Skopje agreement and reaffirmed by the UNSC, and 2.)
no division, addition, or other alteration of Kosovo's
territory. As the USG moves forward with decisions regarding
Kosovo independence, it will be critical to Macedonia's
stability for us to reaffirm the validity of the 2001 border
accord, and to ensure Pristina is committed to demarcating
the border -- as a technical matter -- on the basis of that
agreement as part of any final status arrangement. End
summary.

MACEDONIAN SUPPORT FOR TIMELY RESOLUTION OF KOSOVO STATUS,
AHTISAARI PLAN


2. (C) Macedonia's leaders support resolving Kosovo's status
sooner, rather than later. Strong supporters of the
Ahtisaari plan, they also consistently underscore their
commitment to the Contact Group guiding principle of "no
changes in borders." Implicit in that commitment is their
insistence that their border with Kosovo eventually will be
demarcated in accordance with the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje border
agreement, an internationally accepted and UN-endorsed
agreement which delineated the border.

KOSOVARS DO NOT ACCEPT VALIDITY OF 2001 AGREEMENT


3. (C) Kosovars rejected the 2001 agreement because it was
concluded with Belgrade, without Kosovar participation, and
because it netted Macedonia a small wedge of Kosovar
territory in the process. Skopje is eager to resolve the
technical demarcation issue in order to facilitate more
effective patrolling of the currently porous border. The GOM
also wants to move forward on demarcation in order to avoid
giving Pristina a chance to reopen negotiations on the border
delineation, which Skopje believes could lead to
destabilizing challenges to Macedonia's territorial integrity.

AHTISAARI PLAN AND DEMARCATION BASED ON 2001 AGREEMENT


4. (C) At the end of 2006, a joint cable from U.S. Office
Pristina and Embassy Skopje (reftel) outlined the arguments
and recommendations for ensuring Kosovo would accept, as part
of the Ahtisaari final status package, border demarcation
based on the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement. As we later
understood it, that goal was achieved in the Ahtisaari plan.
At that time, the GOM anticipated a UNSCR would set forth
Kosovo's final status and would refer explicitly to the 2001
Belgrade-Skopje agreement as the basis for demarcation. With
a UNSCR now unlikely, we believe it is again essential to
take concrete steps to ensure any final status settlement
explicitly refers to border demarcation on the basis of the
2001 agreement between Belgrade and Skopje, and commits
Pristina to that position.

RECOGNITION AND DEMARCATION -- AN IMPLICIT LINK


5. (C) Macedonia will follow the US and EU lead in timing its
decision to recognize an independent Kosovo, but the
government does not want to be in the vanguard of recognizing
states. It also does not want to be among the last to
recognize, acknowledging that its relationship with Pristina
should start off on the right foot. Implicit in the GOM
position, however, is the notion that, after Macedonian
recognition takes place, the Kosovar side will proceed with
technical demarcation of the border based on the 2001
agreement. Should Pristina attempt to reopen before then the
question of delineating the border, based on the 1974
agreement establishing the administrative boundary line
between then-Yugoslav Serbia and Macedonia, for example,
Skopje almost certainly would delay, if not withhold,
recognition. That outcome would open opportunities for those

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seeking to destabilize Kosovo-Macedonia relations.

WAY FORWARD

6 (C) Per earlier exchanges while the Ahtisaari process was
active, we -- and the Macedonians -- understood the Kosovar
side had accepted that Kosovo-Macedonia border demarcation
would take place based on the 2001 agreement. If the
Ahtisaari Plan remains the explicit basis for a CDI, then the
border issue will have been properly addressed. If not, then
we believe that any Kosovo final status arrangement must
include explicit acceptance by the Kosovar side, and
internationally, of demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia
border based on the 2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement.


7. (U) This message has been coordinated with U.S. Office
Pristina.
MILOVANOVIC