MACEDONIAN: ELECTORAL CODE CHANGES WOULD ALLOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000730 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIAN: ELECTORAL CODE CHANGES WOULD ALLOW GUARANTEED MINORITY AND DIASPORA SEATS REF: SKOPJE 629 Classified By: Poloff Katrina Mosser for reasons 1.4(b) & (d) SUMMARY ¶1. (SBU) Following more than six months of talks between Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and a group of MPs from the smaller ethnic minority communities (Turks, Serbs, Bosniacs, Roma, Vlachs),the government announced on August 27 that it would seek to amend the electoral code to guarantee ten new parliamentary seats for smaller ethnic communities in Macedonia, in exchange for their support for the government's parliamentary agenda. With those minority MP votes, the governing coalition would have enough votes to pass legislation that requires a qualified ("Badinter") majority. If the proposed amendments pass, ethnic Albanian opposition party DUI will lose its control of Badinter majority votes in the parliament, which it has used in the past to block legislation it did not support. Although Gruevski will be able to secure Badinter majorities for priority legislation if his proposal passes, he already has alienated ethnic Albanian parties, possibly including junior coalition partner DPA, who see the move as an anti-Albanian end run to weaken the voting power of their MPs in the legislature. End summary. GRUEVSKI STRIKES A DEAL WITH ETHNIC MINORITY MPS ¶2. (SBU) On August 27 Prime Minister Gruevski unveiled his proposal to amend the electoral code in order to add ten new guaranteed parliamentary seats for smaller ethnic minority communities (Turks, Serbs, Bosniacs, Roma, Vlachs). The proposal includes adding three new seats for diaspora communities, creating a government agency for minority rights, and enacting a law on the protection of minorities. Gruevski's proposal came after more than six months of negotiations between the Prime Minister and a group of five MPs from the smaller ethnic minority communities. ¶3. (C) The agreement, which PM Gruevski previewed with the Ambassador in a July 31 meeting (reftel),guarantees four seats to the ethnic Turkish community; two seats to the ethnic Roma community; two seats to the ethnic Serb community; one seat to the ethnic Bosniac community; and one seat to the ethnic Vlach community. The seats are allocated based roughly on each minority community's representation in Macedonia's population. In addition to the guaranteed ethnic minority seats, three seats will be elected from the Macedonian diaspora (one each for diaspora populations in North America, Europe, and Australia). ¶4. (SBU) As part of his legislative package, Gruevski also has agreed to create a government agency for minority rights, which will be directly linked to the existing Sector for Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. In addition, the government will propose a new law for the protection of minority rights, which will address key areas of concern to minority communities - cultural preservation, education, and language use. ¶5. (SBU) In exchange for the 13 new guaranteed seats and the rest of the package, the five ethnic minority MPs have agreed to support the governing coalition in parliamentary votes that require qualified ("Badinter") majorities. As a result, the governing coalition will now have 20 out of 35 ethnic minority votes in parliament. That will allow the government to pass legislation requiring a Badinter majority, without having to rely on support from opposition MPs. (NOTE: The Badinter majority requires that certain draft legislation - pertaining mainly to culture, use of language, local government, and education - receive a majority of ethnic minority MPs' votes in order to be enacted. END NOTE.) A GREEN LIGHT FOR CONTROVERSIAL LEGISLATION? ¶6. (C) The addition of five Badinter votes to the governing coalition bloc likely will allow Gruevski's government to pass a number of controversial pieces of legislation that have been deadlocked in parliament, and to appoint the remaining five members of the State Judicial Council (SJC), which requires a parliamentary vote with a Badinter majority. SKOPJE 00000730 002 OF 002 The SJC, an independent body charged with guaranteeing the independence and autonomy of the judiciary, has not been completely constituted since last year and therefore cannot fully discharge its mandate. Ten of the fifteen members that do not require parliamentary approval have been appointed; the remaining five members are subject to parliamentary approval and have become pawns in a political tug-of-war between the government and opposition. ¶7. (C) Gruevski's deal with the minority parties could end the parliamentary gridlock on the SJC appointments, although the electoral code amendments already face fierce resistance from DUI, which has submitted over 4,000 amendments to the proposal in a classic filibustering move. (NOTE: Some local analysts believe the government will be forced to withdraw the proposed amendments to the electoral code, since they believe it would take until October just to debate the DUI amendments. END NOTE.) Opposition SDSM also opposes the deal, and has threatened to boycott the parliamentary session when the proposal comes up for debate. SDSM leaders tell us they object to the government introducing the changes without consulting all political parties, and oppose using the electoral code as a bargaining chip for gaining Badinter votes. In addition to DUI and SDSM opposition, the proposal faces public criticism from other minority groups, including representatives of the Egyptian, Croatian, and Montenegrin communities, who say they should be included in any deal to give guaranteed seats to minorities. HOW WOULD THE DEAL BE IMPLEMENTED? ¶8. (SBU) The Macedonian Constitution allows for the parliament to have between 120 and 140 seats; therefore, there is no requirement to amend the Constitution in order to add the 13 new seats. If the proposed amendments to the electoral code pass, the changes would be implemented during the next parliamentary elections. PM Gruevski can immediately establish the new government agency for minority rights, as it does not require parliamentary approval. The proposal for a new law on the protection of minorities will have to be submitted and voted on in parliament. COMMENT ¶9. (C) DUI has held a strategic advantage in the parliament because it, along with two independent MPs, has been able to effectively block legislation requiring the Badinter majority for nearly a year. The shift in power brought about by Gruevski's latest proposal, along with the government's inaction regarding implementation of the May 29 Agreement with DUI (reftel),could further marginalize the party. DUI's frustration with the governing coalition will be further exacerbated if PM Gruevski uses the newly acquired minority votes to bypass DUI and to enact controversial legislation that requires a Badinter majority vote. ¶10. (C) Although not as vocal in opposing the proposed amendments as DUI, DPA has shown little overt enthusiasm for expanding the voting power of the other minority parties. The addition of ten guaranteed minority seats could dilute the power of the ethnic Albanian community as a whole, since there are no guaranteed seats for the ethnic Albanian community. DPA signaled its lack of enthusiasm, which could further strain intra-coalition relations, by failing to send a representative to the September 4 Parliamentary Committee on Political Systems discussions of the draft electoral code changes. End comment. NAVRATIL