MACEDONIA: MOVING TOWARD EARLY ELECTIONS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000709 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: MOVING TOWARD EARLY ELECTIONS? Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) and (D). SUMMARY ¶1. (C) According to a high-ranking MFA contact, PM Gruevski increasingly favors calling early general elections to capitalize on his high poll ratings and to end intra-coalition squabbling he believes is hobbling his economic development agenda. Gruevski believes he could work more efficiently with opposition ethnic Albanian DUI than he currently can with his junior partner, eAlbanian DPA, and is convinced that doing so could lead to more rapid progress on Macedonia's NATO membership requirements. Although polls indicate Gruevski would easily win early elections by a landslide, such a move would freeze forward movement on political dialogue and judicial reform, and could result in a flawed electoral process and politically troubled aftermath that could in fact jeopardize Macedonia's NATO membership prospects. End summary. HIGH POLL RATINGS, INTRA-COALITION SQUABBLES PUSH GRUEVSKI TOWARD SNAP ELECTIONS ¶2. (C) MFA State Secretary Igor Ilievski told P/E Chief during a meeting August 30 that PM Gruevski increasingly favors calling early general elections. Ilievski said the Executive Committee of Gruevski's VMRO-DPMNE (center-right, ruling coalition party) had met two weeks ago for extended discussions on the question of whether to call early elections, and that the consensus had been in favor of such a move. Ilievski subsequently had been instructed by the government to consult with the international community (the US Embassy and, possibly, the EUSR mission) regarding whether such a move would be prudent. ¶3. (C) Ilievski said the government was leaning toward early elections for several reasons, including Gruevski's and VMRO-DPMNE's strong poll standings and increasingly difficult intra-coalition relations with junior partners NSDP and ethnic Albanian DPA. He added that Gruevski now believed he could work more efficiently with ethnic Albanian opposition party DUI, which has a strong lead over DPA in recent polls, and that such a move could lead to speedy resolution of several outstanding issues related to Macedonia's NATO accession. Gruevski also was convinced that the resulting coalition would be more stable, Ilievski added. ¶4. (C) Ilievski confided that FM Milososki was in favor of using the threat of early elections to pressure DPA and NSDP into more constructive coalition behavior, but was not convinced of the necessity of actually following through with a call for snap elections. He acknowledged that GOM officials were aware of potential risks to Macedonia's NATO candidacy if the conduct of the elections was seriously flawed and led to a negative assessment by OSCE/ODIHR monitors, but said PM Gruevski was convinced the early election option was the only way out of an increasingly difficult coalition partnership. NO TIMELINE DETERMINED, LIKELY TO BE A SNAP DECISION ¶5. (SBU) Asked whether a timeline for early elections had been discussed, Ilievski said the only consensus had been that the elections should take place well before the NATO summit in April 2008, but that there was no discussion of a specific timeline. He suspected Gruevski would make the decision quickly, if at all, and would call for the early elections as soon as possible after the decision was made public. (NOTE: The next regularly scheduled general elections are to be held in 2010, the last elections having taken place in July 2006. Under the current electoral code, early elections can be held within 60 days after the parliament votes by simple majority to dissolve itself.) COMMENT ¶6. (C) Although the polls indicate Gruevski would win by a landslide snap elections called within the next 2-3 months, such a move would risk a seriously flawed electoral process and a potentially destabilizing aftermath for Macedonia. It also would likely freeze progress on the political dialogue and judicial reforms required for NATO membership. Relations between DUI and DPA have worsened since Gruevski chose the SKOPJE 00000709 002 OF 002 smaller DPA as his coalition partner in 2006, and we would expect fierce electoral battles between the two parties and numerous instances of voter fraud, intimidation or violence (as occurred during the 2006 electoral campaign) in predominantly eAlbanian areas. ¶7. (C) Were DPA to be left out of the resulting governing coalition, as is likely, party president Menduh Thaci could turn to his old disruptive, politically destabilizing tactics. The resulting picture of weak and flawed democratic institutions in Macedonia could hamper the country's chances for a NATO membership invitation at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Far better, in our view, for Gruevski to work on smoothing intra-coalition relations and to redouble efforts to build consensus with DUI on NATO-related reforms, and to aim for early elections after a NATO invitation, than to risk his long-term Euro-Atlantic integration goals for short-term political gain. Our EUSR POLAD colleague also believes early elections could harm Macedonia's EU membership bid, for the reasons cited above, but she has yet to brief EUSR Fouere on this development. NAVRATIL