Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07SKOPJE449
2007-06-06 13:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:
MACEDONIA: THE NAME ISSUE AND NATO MEMBERSHIP
VZCZCXRO7212 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSQ #0449/01 1571335 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 061335Z JUN 07 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6145 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000449
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: THE NAME ISSUE AND NATO MEMBERSHIP
REF: A. ATHENS 1131
B. SKOPJE 416
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).
SUMMARY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000449
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: THE NAME ISSUE AND NATO MEMBERSHIP
REF: A. ATHENS 1131
B. SKOPJE 416
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).
SUMMARY
1. (C) Strict adherence to the 1995 Interim Agreement (IA)
between Greece and Macedonia should remain central to
preventing the name dispute from blocking Macedonia's
membership in NATO, once it has met membership standards. A
Greek threat to veto Macedonia's membership in NATO, or to
withhold parliamentary ratification of membership pending a
compromise on the name, would stiffen Skopje's resistance to
accepting anything other than its dual-name proposal as a
solution. Macedonia is ready, if not happily so, to enter
NATO as FYROM; we believe USG insistence on strict adherence
by both sides to the IA would reassure Athens that the GOM
would not join under its constitutional name. Any suggestion
that the USG was reconsidering its 2004 decision to recognize
Macedonia under its constitutional name would harden the
GOM's position on a compromise solution and create widespread
ill-will among the currently pro-U.S. Macedonian public. End
summary.
1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN CENTRAL TO OUR EFFORTS
TO MANAGE NAME ISSUE
2. (C) We agree with Embassy Athens's main points regarding
Macedonia's path to NATO, and the need to prevent Greece from
using the name issue to place an obstacle in that path, once
an invitation for Macedonia is merited (ref A). Central to
our efforts in this regard should be a rigorous insistence
that both sides adhere to the letter and spirit of the 1995
Interim Agreement (IA) as the foundation for managing and
resolving the dispute.
3. (C) We also should continue to insist that this is a
bilateral issue, to be resolved by both parties under UN
auspices through the process facilitated by Ambassador
Nimetz. As such, we believe the GoG should be advised
against using Macedonia's NATO membership candidacy as
leverage for forcing a compromise solution on the name.
GREEK VETO OF NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD NOT SOFTEN THE MACEDONIAN
POSITION
4. (C) A Greek threat to veto Macedonia's membership in NATO
absent a solution to the name issue, or the Greek
parliament's refusal to ratify Macedonia's membership, would
stiffen Skopje's insistence on the dual-name solution as the
government's final offer for resolving the matter. Nearly
all political parties would rally around the flag with the
message: "Yes to NATO, but not at any cost." Macedonian
political leaders would view a Greek refusal to ratify
membership as a clear breach of the terms of the IA and as a
direct assault on Macedonia's national dignity and identity.
Resistance to an alternate compromise on the name dispute
would harden. Some might call for a return to the original
Macedonian flag, the design of which was altered in
compliance with the IA.
MACEDONIA READY TO ENTER NATO AS FYROM
5. (C) Macedonian leaders have made it clear that Macedonia
is prepared to enter NATO as FYROM. Most recently, President
Crvenkovski reiterated this policy in an early June interview
in the Greek press. As noted above, our insistence on strict
adherence to the IA should reassure Athens that Macedonia
will enter NATO as FYROM, unless a mutually-agreed solution
to the name issue is reached before then.
6. (C) We agree with Embassy Athens that the points in ref B,
which we have suggested the President deliver to PM Gruevski
in Tirana June 10, should underscore the need for Skopje to
avoid actions that could be considered by Athens as
provocative. In the meantime, we also support suggestions
for confidence-building measures between the two parties that
could ease tensions. We note, however, that we have seen
nothing in public or private statements of Macedonian leaders
to support Greek claims of Macedonian irredentism.
Furthermore, FM Milososki repeatedly has assured us that
Macedonia does not aim for exclusivity in the use of cultural
SKOPJE 00000449 002 OF 002
or historical symbols related to ancient Macedonian history.
We are aware, however, of the volatility of this issue and
regularly reinforce the message that rhetoric should remain
low and (as President Crvenkovski just said on local
television three days ago) Macedonia should neither provoke
Greece nor respond to provocation.
US DECISION ON THE NAME SHOULD REMAIN FIRM
7. (C) The U.S. decision in 2004 to recognize Macedonia by
its constitutional name reversed several years of negative
perceptions of the U.S. among ethnic Macedonians and created
a wave of popular support for the United States that remains
strong today. Any suggestion that the USG was reconsidering
that decision would, we believe, press the GOM to the wall
and result in widespread negative feeling among the
population toward the United States. A bunker mentality
would set in, and Skopje would become less amenable to a
compromise solution on the name.
MILOVANOVIC
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: THE NAME ISSUE AND NATO MEMBERSHIP
REF: A. ATHENS 1131
B. SKOPJE 416
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).
SUMMARY
1. (C) Strict adherence to the 1995 Interim Agreement (IA)
between Greece and Macedonia should remain central to
preventing the name dispute from blocking Macedonia's
membership in NATO, once it has met membership standards. A
Greek threat to veto Macedonia's membership in NATO, or to
withhold parliamentary ratification of membership pending a
compromise on the name, would stiffen Skopje's resistance to
accepting anything other than its dual-name proposal as a
solution. Macedonia is ready, if not happily so, to enter
NATO as FYROM; we believe USG insistence on strict adherence
by both sides to the IA would reassure Athens that the GOM
would not join under its constitutional name. Any suggestion
that the USG was reconsidering its 2004 decision to recognize
Macedonia under its constitutional name would harden the
GOM's position on a compromise solution and create widespread
ill-will among the currently pro-U.S. Macedonian public. End
summary.
1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN CENTRAL TO OUR EFFORTS
TO MANAGE NAME ISSUE
2. (C) We agree with Embassy Athens's main points regarding
Macedonia's path to NATO, and the need to prevent Greece from
using the name issue to place an obstacle in that path, once
an invitation for Macedonia is merited (ref A). Central to
our efforts in this regard should be a rigorous insistence
that both sides adhere to the letter and spirit of the 1995
Interim Agreement (IA) as the foundation for managing and
resolving the dispute.
3. (C) We also should continue to insist that this is a
bilateral issue, to be resolved by both parties under UN
auspices through the process facilitated by Ambassador
Nimetz. As such, we believe the GoG should be advised
against using Macedonia's NATO membership candidacy as
leverage for forcing a compromise solution on the name.
GREEK VETO OF NATO MEMBERSHIP WOULD NOT SOFTEN THE MACEDONIAN
POSITION
4. (C) A Greek threat to veto Macedonia's membership in NATO
absent a solution to the name issue, or the Greek
parliament's refusal to ratify Macedonia's membership, would
stiffen Skopje's insistence on the dual-name solution as the
government's final offer for resolving the matter. Nearly
all political parties would rally around the flag with the
message: "Yes to NATO, but not at any cost." Macedonian
political leaders would view a Greek refusal to ratify
membership as a clear breach of the terms of the IA and as a
direct assault on Macedonia's national dignity and identity.
Resistance to an alternate compromise on the name dispute
would harden. Some might call for a return to the original
Macedonian flag, the design of which was altered in
compliance with the IA.
MACEDONIA READY TO ENTER NATO AS FYROM
5. (C) Macedonian leaders have made it clear that Macedonia
is prepared to enter NATO as FYROM. Most recently, President
Crvenkovski reiterated this policy in an early June interview
in the Greek press. As noted above, our insistence on strict
adherence to the IA should reassure Athens that Macedonia
will enter NATO as FYROM, unless a mutually-agreed solution
to the name issue is reached before then.
6. (C) We agree with Embassy Athens that the points in ref B,
which we have suggested the President deliver to PM Gruevski
in Tirana June 10, should underscore the need for Skopje to
avoid actions that could be considered by Athens as
provocative. In the meantime, we also support suggestions
for confidence-building measures between the two parties that
could ease tensions. We note, however, that we have seen
nothing in public or private statements of Macedonian leaders
to support Greek claims of Macedonian irredentism.
Furthermore, FM Milososki repeatedly has assured us that
Macedonia does not aim for exclusivity in the use of cultural
SKOPJE 00000449 002 OF 002
or historical symbols related to ancient Macedonian history.
We are aware, however, of the volatility of this issue and
regularly reinforce the message that rhetoric should remain
low and (as President Crvenkovski just said on local
television three days ago) Macedonia should neither provoke
Greece nor respond to provocation.
US DECISION ON THE NAME SHOULD REMAIN FIRM
7. (C) The U.S. decision in 2004 to recognize Macedonia by
its constitutional name reversed several years of negative
perceptions of the U.S. among ethnic Macedonians and created
a wave of popular support for the United States that remains
strong today. Any suggestion that the USG was reconsidering
that decision would, we believe, press the GOM to the wall
and result in widespread negative feeling among the
population toward the United States. A bunker mentality
would set in, and Skopje would become less amenable to a
compromise solution on the name.
MILOVANOVIC